Conservative Understanding and Nationalist Exclusion

Cold War II ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 182-202
Author(s):  
Christian Jimenez

The chapter focuses on the issue of “moral equivalence” (invented by neoconservatives during the Cold War), which attempts to discredit virtually any criticism of U.S. policy, foreign or domestic, in novels, films, and books, to show how it continues to be utilized today. The chapter compares Bridge of Spies and Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy and argues that, far from equating the West and Russia, these films try, repetitiously, to suggest that there is no equivalence whatsoever between these entities, for Russia is continuously framed as some bestial “Other” without freedom and normality against the essential healthiness, even the life–through the use of bright colors–of Western countries. The chapter showcases how the films attempt to contain criticism to only a few selected areas and disallow any other, perhaps genuinely difficult, criticisms of world politics, as represented in the Cold War cinema.

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Isabela de Andrade Gama

Since the end of the Cold War Russia has been treated as a defeated state. Western countries usually perceive Russia not only as a defeated state but also relating it to Soviet Union. Beyond that the West has Orientalized Russia, segregating it from the “western club” of developed states. But Russia’s recovery from the collapse of the 90’s made it more assertive towards the West. It’s proposed here that this assertiveness is due to it’s orientalization, it’s inferior status perceived by the West. The inferior perception by the West has triggered a process of identity’s reconstruction which will be analyzed through a perspective of ontological security. The more Russia has it’s great power status denied, the more aggressive it becomes regarding it’s foreign policy. As the international hierarchy continues to treat Russia as that of “behind” the modern states, and the more it feels marginalized, it will double down on efforts to regain its great power status it will have to dispose power. Russia’s ontological insecurity might lead it to a path of aggressiveness.


1964 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Power

Among the foreign policies of the new states which have emerged from the Western colonial empires, that of India occupies a leading place. The first non-Western nation to become a member of the British Commonwealth, India became a symbol and catalyst of self-determination for several nationalist movements. India proceeded on an “independent” path in world politics and had numerous emulators in the world. Where India's role in the state-making revolution has met with considerable approval, its strategy of nonalignment has been debated in the West, and even in India since the open appearance in 1959 of the Sino-Indian dispute. The criticism has included questions about the wisdom of nonalignment, doubts as to its feasibility, and charges that its application has shown preference for the communist states during periods of the Cold War. The Indian defense includes assertions that nonalignment serves India's welfare and often the world's, answers about its workability, and claims that application has been consistent with professed ideals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Öner Buçukcu

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 709-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Outi Korhonen

The “post”-phase of a conflict has become the justification for both the possible action and the inaction of the Western states. It is not so much any longer that we would be averse to war in any circumstances, as the non-use of force principle in its absolute sense would require. Again, after a good fifty years of the UN and its raison d'etre – the guardianship of peace – we seem to have arrived at an era where ideological contestation no more has the deterrent effect that it did during the Cold War and, consequently, there are cases of the use of force that are accepted and even regarded as just as long as they are quick. When looking back at the NATO bombings of FRY in 1999 as the response to atrocities in Kosovo many are able to accept that ‘though illegal they were legitimate’ in some sense. This is the conclusion irrespective of whether one, at the time, was for action or inaction. Such a ‘condoning condemnation’ has become the popular middle road as so many other paradoxes in world politics. Through the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq the paradox has gained in strength. Although there is quite strong and unequivocal opposition to the wars and a condemnation for their illegality, the political elite of the West seems to be quick in forgetting scruples and taking a keen interest in the “post”-management of the targets, i.e. the states that are about to be or already have been ‘bombed into the stone age’ or into shambles in any case. There is a general rush to the “post”-phase; both in the sense that the tacit requirement for the condoning condemnation is that the action be quick – the use of force should be very limited in time – and, secondly, in the sense that already before the bombs fall (or during) the major reconstruction plans and projects are dealt. This article outlines some points of critique that could be launched at the phase when the majority cannot be bothered to re-analyze the wrongs committed ex ante.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-60
Author(s):  
N. N. Neklyudov

The study of Russia’s foreign policy poses something of a paradox. On the one hand, Russia’s actions are viewed as aimed at revising the existing rules-based order built by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, on numerous occasions, one pinpoints that Russia has devised a language similar to the Western nations to justify its foreign policy. I call the phenomenon that explains this paradox the game of interpretation. The article illustrates how Russia is engaged in the game of interpretation with the West in the post-Cold War order by Russia’s appliance to the norm of humanitarian interventions. By analyzing the Russian discourse during the Russo-Georgian War (2008), I demonstrate how the Russian foreign policy leadership reproduces similar narrative patterns used by the West during the Kosovo War (1999). Exemplifying the game of interpretation by humanitarian interventionism is not accidental. Humanitarian interventionism is studied in the literature as being characteristic of the Western ‘ethical foreign policy’ originated by the end of the Cold War, with Russia being depicted as either skeptical or as an unequivocal opponent of such an approach in world politics. Methodologically, the work builds on quantitative and qualitative analysis of selected texts compiled from the archives of NATO and the US State Department, as well as the website “Kremlin.ru” and the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.


Author(s):  
Noor Mohammad Osmani ◽  
Tawfique Al-Mubarak

Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) claimed that there would be seven eight civilizations ruling over the world in the coming centuries, thus resulting a possible clash among them. The West faces the greatest challenge from the Islamic civilization, as he claimed. Beginning from the Cold-War, the Western civilization became dominant in reality over other cultures creating an invisible division between the West and the rest. The main purpose of this research is to examine the perceived clash between the Western and Islamic Civilization and the criteria that lead a civilization to precede others. The research would conduct a comprehensive review of available literatures from both Islamic and Western perspectives, analyze historical facts and data and provide a critical evaluation. This paper argues that there is no such a strong reason that should lead to any clash between the West and Islam; rather, there are many good reasons that may lead to a peaceful coexistence and cultural tolerance among civilizations


2020 ◽  
Vol 145 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
EIRINI DIAMANTOULI

Ideologically motivated attempts to elucidate Shostakovich’s political views and to determine whether and how they may be coded into his compositions have come to characterize the Western reception of the composer’s works since his death in 1975. Fuelled by the political oppositions of the cold war, Shostakovich’s posthumous reputation in the West has been largely shaped by two conflicting perspectives. These have positioned him on the one hand as a secret dissident, bent and broken under the unbearable strain of totalitarianism, made heroic through his veiled musical resistance to Communism; and on the other hand as a composer compromised by his capitulation to the regime – represented in an anachronistic musical style. Both perspectives surrender Shostakovich and his music to a crude oversimplification driven by vested political interests. Western listeners thus conditioned are primed to hear either the coded dissidence of a tragic victim of Communist brutality or the sinister submission of a ‘loyal son of the Communist Party’.1 For those prepared to accept Shostakovich as a ‘tragic victim’, the publication of his purported memoirs in 1979, ‘as related to and edited by’ the author Solomon Volkov, presents a tantalizing conclusion: bitterly yet discreetly scornful of the Stalinist regime, Shostakovich was indeed a secret dissident and this dissidence was made tangible in his music.


Author(s):  
Beate Jahn

Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding operations have become an integral part of world politics—despite their continuing failures. This chapter provides an account of peacebuilding operations in practice and identifies cycles of failure and reform, namely the successful integration of peacebuilding into the fabric of the world order despite its continuing failures. It traces these dynamics back to the internal contradictions of liberalism and argues that the main function of peacebuilding operations lies in managing the tensions and contradictions inherent in a liberal world order. Peacebuilding—in one form or another—is therefore likely to persist for the duration of a liberal world order.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Astrid Hedin

Much social theory takes for granted that transnational people-to-people dialogue is inherently liberal in process and content – a haven of everyday authenticity that shelters ideas of human rights and democratic reform. In contrast, this contribution shows how communist regimes built and institutionalised an encompassing administrative state capacity to control and shape micro-level professional contacts with the West. This extensive but secret system of coercion, which was brought to light only with the opening of former communist regime archives, set a markedly illiberal framework for everyday East–West deliberations during the Cold War. Effectively, the travel cadre system may not only have delayed the demise of Soviet bloc communism, by isolating the population from Western influences. It was also intended to serve as a vehicle for the discursive influence of Soviet type regimes on the West. The article provides one of the first and most detailed English language maps of the administrative routines of a communist regime travel cadre system, based on the East German example. Furthermore, drawing on social mechanisms methodology, the article sets up a micro-level ‘how it could work’ scheme over how travel cadre systems can be understood as a state capacity, unique to totalitarian regimes, to help sway political discourse in open societies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Inglot

This paper examines international influences of the Western welfare state on social policy ideas, institutions and reforms in the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. It identifies three types of Eastern reactions to or interactions with the West: “condemnation” of various “bourgeois” conceptions of social welfare; “competition” or increased attention to redistribution and social needs of the population stemming from the demonstrable successes of Western welfare states; and “creative learning” or implicit acknowledgment that every industrial society, including the Soviet style centrally planned economies, had to adopt at least some elements of modernized social welfare models or policy originally developed in the West. Paradoxically, first the explicit and later more implicit rejection of the Western welfare state, including the social-democratic and various “third way” models, eventually led to the rise of neoliberal and anti-welfare attitudes among many Eastern social policy reformers during the last decade of communist rule and beyond, after 1989.


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