scholarly journals Spory wokół Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w Polsce w latach 1981-1985

2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-224
Author(s):  
Lech Mażewski
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Independent State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
State Body

The creation of the Constitutional Tribunal (1981, 1985), instead of a separate chamber of the Supreme Court, was accompanied by numerous discussions and sometimes even disputes. The process took place between 1981 and 1985. It was decided that in case of analyzing whether a law is constitutional and legal, the most important element is the existence of an independent state body such as the Constitutional Tribunal. Moreover, jurisdiction activity was brought into the purview of the Tribunal. In order to achieve this, the Parliament (Polish Sejm) had to enact a proper statutory law and to select judges for the Constitutional Tribunal. However, regardless ofall the legal deficiencies which accompanied the legal regime of the new body, it should be considered an important step in the construction of the constitutional judiciary in Poland. The jurisdiction activity of the Tribunal between 1986 and 1989 also attests to that. The constitutional legislator created such a model of the Tribunal which prevented it from being fully recognized as a constitutional court. The rationale behind this was thenecessity of preserving the Parliament’s superior position in the system of state bodies. The Tribunal was rather founded as a body to analyze the legality of law in order to ensure the supremacy of constitutional acts in the system of law sources. However, even such a legal solution had its significance from the point of view of protection of civil and political rights as well as of civil liberties.

Human Rights Minus Liberty?

Worldview ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 21 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 26-36
Author(s):  
Sidney Liskofsky
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Third World ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Organizations ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
The U.S

AbstractInternational agreements, of the United Nations as well as of the West European and Inter-American regional organizations, affirm commitments to such personal liberties as freedom of thought and religion, of opinion and expression, of assembly and association, and of emigration. But these liberties, until recently considered central to the concept of human rights, are under increasing threat within the U.N. system.In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, followed in 1966 by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both focused on these values. Forty-eight nations have ratified the Covenant, including nearly all the Communist and some radical leftist Third World states—but not, paradoxically, the U.S., even though this, more than any other U.N. convention, reflects the Western civil liberties tradition.

scholarly journals The prohibition of wearing veil in public schools in Egypt: an analysis of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court jurisprudence

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Arafa
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Liberal Rights ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
Insight Into

Case No.8 of 1996 is a landmark decision of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (“SCC”) and represents one of the most significant judicial rulings of a structural remedy for the interpretation of Article 2 of Egypt 2014 Constitution. The jurisprudence of the SCC is essential to advance a moderate (liberal), rights-protecting interpretation of Sharie‘a. In this case, the SCC held that a rule on face-veiling in public schools is compatible not only with Islamic law, but with certain human rights guaranteed by the Constitution:, as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. This decision dealt with the SCC’s view on Islamic ijtihad (legal reasoning), and, gives insight into the Court’s views on civil and political rights context.

Opinion on the amendment - we move away from Europe

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-126
Author(s):  
Bartosz Wysocki
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Professional Groups ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Venice Commission ◽  
Political Turmoil ◽  
Selection Of

Legal confusion which caused political turmoil surrounding the selection of judges of the Constitutional Court continues in Poland for almost a year. Unfortunately, we still do not see the finals of the dispute. In an attempt to solve it involved not only professional groups, and citizens. Very hard in an attempt to resolve the conflict have joined international organizations. Especially those for whom democratic values ​​are the foundation of the modern state. In his work focuses on the analysis of the Opinion of the Venice Commission, which concerns the Act of 22 December amending the Constitutional Tribunal Act 2015. From the point of view zaistniałego conflict, it is very important hug. Expert sheds light on the issue which is a political attempt sprzeciwieniu to democratic rule. It is the opinion of so much importance that expressed by a group of experts. The institution, which enjoys the opinions presented an extraordinary recognition and respect, and her opinions in democratic circles are treated very seriously. Often the institutions of the European Union treat the opinions of the Commission as the result to formulate its own position. Therefore, for Polish it is important because from her perspective will assess our democratic Europe. This is how Poland will respect the recommendations of the Commission, as will be seen in Europe.

scholarly journals Ejecutividad y prescripción de las sanciones administrativas en las Leyes 39/2015, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas y 40/2015, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público

2018 ◽  
pp. 57-95
Author(s):  
Carmen CHINCHILLA MARÍN
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court

LABURPENA: Sektore Publikoaren Araubide Juridikoari buruzko 40/2015 Legeak arau berria sartu du zigorrak preskribitzeko epearen zenbaketaren inguruan, zigorren aurka jarritako gora jotzeko errekurtsoak administrazioaren isiltasunaren bidez ezesten diren kasuetarako. Hala, lege horren 30.3. artikuluan ezarritakoaren arabera, errekurtsoa ustez ezesten bada, errekurtso horren ebazpena emateko legez aurreikusi den epea amaitu eta hurrengo egunetik aurrera hasi behar da zenbatzen zigorra preskribitzeko epea. Preskripzioari buruzko arau berri horrek, zentzuzkoa denez, ondorioak eduki behar ditu zigorrak betearazteko araubidearen gainean, zigorra bete behar izatea baita zigorra preskribatzeko oinarria. Artikulu honetan, bi berritasun horien berri ematen da, eta kontraesan-arazoa aztertzen, Konstituzio Auzitegiak eta Auzitegi Gorenak errekurtso-bideko isiltasunaren eta isiltasun horrek zigorren preskripzioaren eta bete behar izatearen gainean dituen ondorioen —hobeto esanda, «ondorio-ezaren»— inguruan duten jurisprudentziari dagokionez. RESUMEN: la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen jurídico del Sector público, ha introducido una nueva regla sobre el cómputo del plazo de prescripción de las sanciones en los casos en los que el recurso de alzada interpuesto contra las mismas se desestima por silencio administrativo. Así, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 30.3 de esta ley, en el caso de desestimación presunta del recurso, el plazo de prescripción de la sanción comenzará a computarse desde el día siguiente a aquel en el que finalice el plazo legalmente previsto para la resolución de dicho recurso. Esta nueva regla sobre la prescripción lógicamente tiene que producir consecuencias sobre el régimen de ejecutividad de las sanciones, pues la ejecutividad de la sanción constituye el presupuesto de la prescripción de la misma. En este artículo se da cuenta de ambas novedades y se analiza el problema de su contradicción respecto de la jurisprudencia —del Tribunal constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo— sobre el silencio en vía de recurso y sus efectos (más bien, sus «no efectos») sobre la prescripción y la ejecutividad de las sanciones. ABSTRACT: The Act 40/2015 of the legal regime of the Public Sector has introduced a new rule on the calculation of the limitation period to be applied to sanctions in cases where hierarchichal appeal filed against them had been rejected by administrative silence. Thus, within the meaning of section 30.3 of this Act, in case of implied rejection of the appeal, the calculation of the limitation period of the sanction shall begin from the day following the deadline legally established to resolve that appeal. This new rule about the limitation period has logically to have consequences over the enforceability of sanctions, since enforceability of the sanction as such is a prerequisite for the limitation period of it. This article deals with both novelties and analyzes the problem of their contradiction with the case law —by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court— regarding the silence within the appeal and its effects (or rather lack of effects) about the limitation period and enforceability of sanctions.

scholarly journals Rozważania na temat represyjnych i prewencyjnych elementów odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej na przykładzie instytucji odszkodowania karnego (punitive damages) w świetle orzeczenia Sądu Najwyższego oraz Trybunału Konstytucyjnego

2019 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Maciej Kochanowski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Punitive Damages ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
German System ◽  
Polish Law

The verdict of the Supreme Court of 11 October 2013 (fi le I CSK 697/12) and the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 2015 (fi le SK 32/14) are discussed and their signifi cance for the understanding of punitive damages analysed. The main problem discussed in this paper is the question whether there is room under Polish law for punitive damages modelled a common law system and whether the adoption of this solution could possibly infl uence the basic premises constituting the liability for damages already adopted. The main focus has been put on the argumentation of the Supreme Court presented in its verdict regarding the possibility of enforcing by Polish courts a judgment in which a foreign court awarded punitive damages, and the arguments of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding the constitutionality of a legal provision establishing a possibility of fl at-rate damages, being awarded and increased in the event of the determination of guilt by the breaching party. Certain detailed provisions that are contradictory from the point of view of the fundamental assumptions underlying the liability for damages in Polish law and the laws of most European legal systems (and the German system in particular) are also examined. Further, a synthetic analysis of the positive and negative aspects of punitive damages identifi ed by other researchers is presented. This is followed by a mention of other institutions available under Polish law which may constitute an alternative to punitive damages, at least when it comes to the provision of an adequate preventive and punitive measure in the event of gross or culpable damage.

scholarly journals Tinjauan Yuridis Putusan Constitutional Review Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Hak Mantan Narapidana Untuk Menjadi Pejabat Publik Yang Dipilih

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nanang Nur Wahyudi ◽  
Nynda Fatmawati Octarina
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Universal Declaration ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

Hak Politik dilindungi hukum, baik secara internasional maupun nsional. secara internasional, hak politik diatur Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) dan International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). hak politik juga dilindungi konsitusi kita dan beberapa peraturan Perundang-Undangan lainnya, serutama Undang-Undang no 39 tahun 1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia. Adanya ketentuan yang merupakan syarat untuk mencalonkan diri pada pemilihan yang jelas membatasi bahkan meniadakan hak seseorang untuk ikut serta dalam menggunakan hak azasinya. Hal ini jelas merupakan pelanggaran terhadap hak azasi seseorang, yang dalam hal ini hak politik yang dimiliki oleh seorang mantan narapidana khususnya pada kasus korupsi. Apabila kita mencermati ketentuan UUD 1945, maka seorang mantan narapidana juga sebagai warga negara yang memiliki hak politik yang sama dengan warga negara lainnya. Hak Uji materiel terhadap peraturan yang  bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, maka kewenangan hak menguji ada pada Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK). Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi memberi kepastian hukum bahwa seorang mantan Narapidana kasus korupsi masih diperbolehkan untuk mencalonkan diri pada pemilihan kepala daerah karena mantan narapidana masih memiliki hak politik sebagai warga negara. Untuk dapat mencalonkan diri pada pemilihan kepala daerah, maka mantan narapidana setelah melewati masa 5 (lima) tahun  selesai menjalani masa hukuman dan telah kembali kepada kehidupan masyarakat sebagaimana kehidupan masyarakat lainnya. Menghormati hak politik mantan narapidana kasus korupsi sebagai pengakuan terhadap hak azasi manusia dalam negara Republik Indonesia yang merupakan hak konstitusional yang diatur dalam UUD Tahun 1945. Kata Kunci : Narapidana, Judisial Review, Hak, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi ABSTRACTPolitical rights are protected by law, both internationally and nationally. Internationally, political rights are regulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Political rights are also protected by our constitution and several other laws and regulations, especially Law No. 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights. There is a provision which is a requirement to run for election which clearly limits and even negates a person's right to participate in exercising their human rights. This is clearly a violation of a person's human rights, which in this case the political rights of an ex-convict, especially in cases of corruption. If we look at the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, an ex-convict is also a citizen who has the same political rights as other citizens. The right to judicial review of regulations that are contrary to the 1945 Constitution, the authority of the right to examine lies with the Constitutional Court (MK). The Constitutional Court's decision provides legal certainty that a former convict in a corruption case is still allowed to run for regional head elections because ex-convicts still have political rights as citizens. To be able to run for regional head elections, ex-convicts after passing through a period of 5 (five) years have finished serving their sentence and have returned to community life as other people's lives. Respect the political rights of ex-convicts of corruption cases as an acknowledgment of human rights in the Republic of Indonesia which are constitutional rights regulated in the 1945 Constitution. Keywords: Prisoners, Judicial Review, Rights, Constitutional Court Decisions

The Rights of Majorities and of Minorities in the 1961 Term of the Supreme Court

1963 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-115
Author(s):  
Benjamin F. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
State Legislation ◽  
Annual Survey ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Guardian

But for two decisions, the 1961 term of the Supreme Court could have been characterized as one of the least interesting in recent years. Apart from Baker v. Carr and Engel v. Vitale no decision stands out as a major interpretation either of the Constitution or of national or state legislation. Not that there was any shortage of constitutional cases. In at least thirty such the Court gave decisions and written opinions. In a number of instances, some of which will be examined presently, acts of state legislation were held invalid. Some 63 cases involved the interpretation of acts of Congress; in none was a statute held unconstitutional. There was, in other words, a continuation of the point of view which the Court adopted in the spring of 1937, rather than a hostile disposition toward both state and national legislation dealing positively with the social and economic problems coming in the wake of that new (to the United States) combination of factors, the industrialization of much of the country and the acceptance of most assumptions of nineteenth century humanitarianism.Last year Professor McCloskey, writing in this Review on the 1960 term, quite properly limited himself to the consideration of cases dealing with civil rights. Yet before Charles Evans Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930, so few such cases arose that no one would have devoted even a major portion of an annual survey to them. Indeed, before the Civil War there was only one obscure case in which an act of a territorial legislature was held void as contrary to the guarantees of civil rights in the Constitution, and none involving either Congressional or state legislation. A few emerged in the decade after that War, but it was only with such cases as Strormberg v. California, Near v. Minnesota, Powell v. Alabama, Grosjean v. American Press Co., and DeJonge v. Oregon that the Supreme Court actively began to be the guardian of civil liberties.

The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the “Southwest Case”

1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Leibholz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Republic

The new German Constitution, the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic of May 23, 1949, provides in Article 92 that the highest judicial power shall be vested in a Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Bonn Basic Law thus created a new institution, it is an institution with a precedent in the former Weımar Constitution of 1919. In accordance with the latter, the Constitutional Tribunal (Staatsgerichtshof) had jurisdiction over constitutional controversies within any Land which had no tribunal of its own for the adjustment of such controversies, as well as over controversies, other than civil law matters, among the various Laender or between the Reich and one of the Laender. And the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), as the highest authority, could establish finally whether disputed Land statutes were compatible with the federal Constitution.The Basic Law, however, grants the new Federal Constitutional Court considerably wider jurisdiction than that accorded either to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the Supreme Court under the Weimar Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court must, above all, arbitrate both disputes which may arise among the constitutional organs of the Republic, the so-called “federal constitutional” cases, and the so-called “conflicting rules” (Normenkollisionen) cases—the latter designating disputes involving the compatibility of the written federal law or Land law with the Basic Law, as well as the compatibility of the Land law with the federal law.

The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Israeli Legal System: Present and Future

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Benvenisti
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
International Human ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Since Israel's independence, the Supreme Court has been very active in establishing and securing an impressive edifice of human rights. Lacking a written constitution, the Court has based its constitutional jurisprudence on the democratic character of the state. It has developed an “Israeli made” bill of rights, relying on comparative studies, yet with little reference to the standards set in international human rights instruments.Two legal events of the last three years may change the judicial attitude towards international human rights. The first major event was the Israeli government's ratification of important human rights conventions during 1991, first and foremost among them the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been named the “International Bill of Rights” (hereinafter: the 1966 Covenant).

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