The Moral Legacy of Marxism

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Geuss

AbstractMarx would not have anything much to contribute to contemporary discussions of ‘normativity’, because he would reject various of the assumptions on which they rest. Thus, he does not believe it possible to isolate ‘moral normativity’ as a distinct object of decontextualised study so as to derive from it rationally grounded imperative to individual action. This does not mean that Marx can provide no orientation for human action, but this has a different nature and structure. Marx suspicions of ethical theories are well founded, but his own productivist assumptions should be revisited.

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-39
Author(s):  
Carolina Miranda Cavalcante ◽  
Emmanoel De Oliveira Boff

The article considers the possible compatibility (in epistemological and ontological terms) of the conceptions of convention and institutions in the thought of John Maynard Keynes, Thorstein Veblen and Douglass North. We argue, first, that while Veblen suggests an approach to institutions based on instincts, North sustains an approach to institutions based on rational choice, which implies distinct conceptions about institutions and the social world. We then present Keynes's ontological commitments and the epistemological implications of his ontology. We conclude that there is a background ontological compatibility between Keynes and the late North in that both accept that the socioeconomic world is fundamentally uncertain and non-ergodic; also that Keynes is epistemologically closer to North than Veblen in studying the economy as a market system embedded in social institutions; and finally that Keynes's treatment of individual action is closer to Veblen’s than North’s, in that both Keynes and Veblen see human action as based on instincts and not only on rationality.


Author(s):  
Tad Brennan

Telos is the ancient Greek term for an end, fulfilment, completion, goal or aim; it is the source of the modern word ‘teleology’. In Greek philosophy the term plays two important and interrelated roles, in ethics and in natural science; both are connected to the most common definitional account of the telos, according to which a telos is that for the sake of which something is done or occurs. In ethical theory, each human action is taken to be directed towards some telos (i.e. end), and practical deliberation involves specifying the concrete steps needed to attain that telos. An agent’s life as a whole can also be understood as aimed at the attainment of the agent’s overall telos, here in the sense of their final end or summum bonum (‘highest good’), generally identified in antiquity as eudaimonia (happiness). Rival ancient ethical theories are distinguished primarily by their rival specifications of the end; the Epicurean telos is pleasure, the Stoic telos is life according to nature, and so on. In the natural science of Aristotle, the telos of a member of a species is the complete and perfect state of that entity in which it can reproduce itself (so, insects reach their telos when they become adults). The telos of an organ or capacity is the function it plays in the organism as a whole, or what it is for the sake of; the telos of the eye is seeing. Carrying on the tradition of Anaxagoras and Plato, Aristotle centres his scientific methodology around the claim that there are ends in nature, i.e. that some natural phenomena occur for the sake of something; Galen and the Stoics enthusiastically second this; Epicurus rejects it.


Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evgenia Mylonaki

Philippa Foot (b. 1920–d. 2010) is one of the leading philosophers of 20th-century analytic philosophy. Her two collections of essays and her one monograph include important contributions to debates concerning the objectivity of morality, the meaning of moral terms, the logical status of moral judgments, the nature of practical rationality, the place of human action and reason in nature, the limitations of consequentialism, the rationality of justice and morality, the connection between virtue and happiness, the relation between reasons and desires, the character and the pervasiveness of moral dilemmas, the threat of immoralism, etc. But the contribution of her work extends past these interventions in discussions that were already underway. Foot’s thought was part of what reoriented the focus of analytic philosophy from a partial view of morality as a system of rules concerning the relation between individuals and between individuals and society to a wider view of the human good as what it is to be good at being at work in being human. Her contribution to this shift in analytic philosophy was often overlooked (hence the scarce exegetic literature on her work) or misunderstood. When it was misunderstood, her thought contributed to the rise of the virtue-ethics alternative to the utilitarian and deontological normative ethical theories. But when it was properly appreciated, it contributed to the emergence of neo-Aristotelianism in practical philosophy in general (life, action, rationality, normativity, etc.). The substance of Foot’s philosophy is Aristotelian: her exploration of the human good through the lenses of the virtues, her conception of the human virtues as forms of goodness which don’t depart logically from forms of goodness in plant and animal life, and her account of practical rationality as the cognitive element of the virtues. The spirit in which she does philosophy is Wittgensteinian: her treatment of moral subjectivism by constantly bringing attention back to the grammar of moral concepts, as well as the construal of her positive view concerning the human good in terms of the nature of the representation of that good; especially in her later work. Given her wide-ranging contribution to philosophy, it is a shame that Philippa Foot is largely known for thought experiments such as the Trolley Problem. Luckily, excellent recent systematic and exegetic philosophy on her work is promising to correct this unfortunate circumstance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-60
Author(s):  
David Egner

The article seeks the cognition of the essence of the political through the phenomenological analysis of its object.With reference to Kant, Schopenhauer and Husserl, the article first clarifies how the world is constructed in human consciousness, thereby differentiating three levels of constitution. In a second step it shows respectively how specific motives of action are constituted on these three levels, deducing three ideal types of human action. In a third step, the phenomenological analysis is extended to the political, understood as collective action, following Hannah Arendt. For a collective action to be constituted, beside the acts of consciousness necessary for the constitution of individual action, the acts of articulation and representation of the common will are required. It can be shown that it is the political institutions of the executive, legislature and judiciary which represent this will on the three differentiated levels of constitution of action.


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire E. Sterk ◽  
Kirk W. Elifson ◽  
Katherine P. Theall

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus N. Morrisey ◽  
M. D. Rutherford ◽  
Catherine L. Reed ◽  
Daniel N. McIntosh

“We regard the recent science –based consensual reports that climate change is, to a large extend, caused by human activities that emit green houses as tenable, Such activities range from air traffic, with a global reach over industrial belts and urban conglomerations to local small, scale energy use for heating homes and mowing lawns. This means that effective climate strategies inevitably also require action all the way from global to local levels. Since the majority of those activities originate at the local level and involve individual action, however, climate strategies must literally begin at home to hit home.”


Author(s):  
Aji Sulistyo

Television advertisement is an effective medium that aims to market a product or service, because it combines audio and visuals. therefore television advertisement can effectively influence the audience to buy the product or service. Advertisement nowadays does not only convey promotional messages, but can also be a medium for delivering social messages. That is one form of the function of the media, which is to educate the public. The research entitled Representation of Morality in the Teh Botol Sosro Advertisement "Semeja Bersaudara" version analyzed the morality value in a television advertisement from ready-to-drink tea producers, Teh Botol Sosro entitled "Semeja Bersaudara" which began airing in early 2019. In this study researchers used Charles Sanders Peirce's Semiotics theory with triangular meaning analysis tools in the form of Signs, Objects and Interpretations. In addition, researchers also use representation theory from Stuart Hall in interpreting messages in advertisements. The results of this study found that the "Semeja Bersaudara" version of Teh Botol Sosro advertisement represented a message in the form of morality. There are nine values of morality that can be taken in this advertisement including, friendly attitude, sharing, empathy, help, not prejudice, no discrimination, harmony, tolerance between religious communities and cross-cultural tolerance. The message conveyed in this advertisement is how the general public can understand how every human action in social life has moral values, so that the public can understand and apply moral values in order to live a better life.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-21
Author(s):  
Amanda Dennis

Lying in ditches, tromping through mud, wedged in urns, trash bins, buried in earth, bodies in Beckett appear anything but capable of acting meaningfully on their environments. Bodies in Beckett seem, rather, synonymous with abjection, brokenness, and passivity—as if the human were overcome by its materiality: odours, pain, foot sores, decreased mobility. To the extent that Beckett's personae act, they act vaguely (wandering) or engage in quasi-obsessive, repetitive tasks: maniacal rocking, rotating sucking stones and biscuits, uttering words evacuated of sense, ceaseless pacing. Perhaps the most vivid dramatization of bodies compelled to meaningless, repetitive movement is Quad (1981), Beckett's ‘ballet’ for television, in which four bodies in hooded robes repeat their series ad infinitum. By 1981, has all possibility for intentional action in Beckett been foreclosed? Are we doomed, as Hamm puts it, to an eternal repetition of the same? (‘Moments for nothing, now as always, time was never and time is over, reckoning closed and story ended.’)This article proposes an alternative reading of bodily abjection, passivity and compulsivity in Beckett, a reading that implies a version of agency more capacious than voluntarism. Focusing on Quad as an illustrative case, I show how, if we shift our focus from the body's diminished possibilities for movement to the imbrication of Beckett's personae in environments (a mound of earth), things, and objects, a different story emerges: rather than dramatizing the impossibility of action, Beckett's work may sketch plans for a more ecological, post-human version of agency, a more collaborative mode of ‘acting’ that eases the divide between the human, the world of inanimate objects, and the earth.Movements such as new materialism and object-oriented ontology challenge hierarchies among subjects, objects and environments, questioning the rigid distinction between animate and inanimate, and the notion of the Anthropocene emphasizes the influence of human activity on social and geological space. A major theoretical challenge that arises from such discourses (including 20th-century challenges to the idea of an autonomous, willing, subject) is to arrive at an account of agency robust enough to survive if not the ‘death of the subject’ then its imbrication in the material and social environment it acts upon. Beckett's treatment of the human body suggests a version of agency that draws strength from a body's interaction with its environment, such that meaning is formed in the nexus between body and world. Using the example of Quad, I show how representations of the body in Beckett disturb the opposition between compulsivity (when a body is driven to move or speak in the absence of intention) and creative invention. In Quad, serial repetition works to create an interface between body and world that is receptive to meanings outside the control of a human will. Paradoxically, compulsive repetition in Beckett, despite its uncomfortable closeness to addiction, harnesses a loss of individual control that proposes a more versatile and ecologically mindful understanding of human action.


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