The Ideal of the Highest Good and the Objectivity of Moral Judgment

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-148
Author(s):  
Nataliya Palatnik

AbstractMany Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good – an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness – as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity.

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa Zinkin

AbstractThis article discusses the concept of publicity in Kant’s moral philosophy. Insofar as the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ can describe our relations with others, they can be considered to be moral concepts. I argue that we can find in Kant a moral duty not to keep our maxims of action private, or secret. Whereas Korsgaard argues that sometimes in the face of evil it is permissible to sidestep the moral law, I argue that it is rather through publicity that we can deal with evil in the non-ideal world. Moreover, by being open with our maxims, moral progress is possible.


Author(s):  
Owen Ware

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-298
Author(s):  
Georg Geismann

Abstract Time and again, one finds in the literature the view that Kant held a pre-critical or semi-critical moral philosophy in the canon chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is shown, firstly, by the fact that practical freedom is understood as cognized through experience and, secondly, by the fact that Kant not only allows a sensuous incentive for the observance of the moral law, but considers it necessary. Against that, it is argued in this essay that, firstly, moral philosophy as such is not addressed in the canon at all and, secondly, that the canon by no means approves of sensuous incentives with regard to the morally required promotion of the highest good. What is indeed addressed, although only in the second section of the canon, is moral theology.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (135) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Gabriel Almeida Assumpção

Resumo: A leitura da Crítica da Razão Prática permite perceber que a moral kantiana não consiste em mero formalismo, abrindo espaço para uma discussão sobre os fins morais. O fim último a que o ser racional cuja vontade é determinada pela lei moral se propõe a produzir é o conceito de sumo Bem, ligação sintética a priori entre virtude como causa e felicidade moralmente condicionada como efeito. Ciente das dificuldades para a produção do objeto proposto, Kant recorre aos postulados da razão prática pura (liberdade, imortalidade da alma e existência de Deus) e estabelece um contraponto entre o cristianismo e escolas pagãs da antiguidade que não aceitariam tais pressuposições (na visão de Kant), os estóicos e os epicuristas. Buscamos mostrar, com o presente estudo, a fecundidade do diálogo entre Kant e o cristianismo, bem como o esforço kantiano de tentar fazer jus a diferentes dimensões do ser humano: tanto a afetividade quanto a moralidade.Abstract: Reading the Critique of Practical Reason enables us to realize that Kantian morality is not mere formalism, but is rather an opening to discuss moral ends. The ultimate goal of the rational being, whose will is determined by moral law, is the concept of the Highest Good, the a priori synthetic connection between virtue as a cause and a morally conditioned happiness as an effect. Aware of the difficulties related to the proposed object, Kant resorts to the postulates of practical reason (freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God) and counterpoints Christianity with two ancient pagan schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans, which, according to the philosopher, would not accept such assumptions. The present study aims to show there is a fecund dialogue between Kant and Christianity, as well as the author’s attempt to do justice to the following dimensions of the human being: affectivity and morality.


SATS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Noller

Abstract Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”) helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” (sensus communis) in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing.


Romanticism ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-189
Author(s):  
Rolf Lessenich

Though treated marginally in histories of philosophy and criticism, Byron was deeply involved in Romantic-Period controversies. In that post-Enlightenment, science-orientated age, the Platonic-Romantic concept of inspiration as divine afflatus linking the prophet-priest-poet with the ideal world beyond was no longer tenable without an admixture of doubt that turned religion into myth. As a seriously-minded Romantic sceptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition and commuter between the genres of sensibility and satire, Byron often refers to the prophet-poet concept, acting it out in pre-Decadent poses of inspiration, yet undercutting it with his typical Romantic Irony. In contrast to Goethe, who insisted on an inspired poet's sanity, he saw inspiration both as a social distinction and as a pathological norm deviation. The more imaginative and poetical the creation, the more insane is the poet's mind; the more realistic and prosaic, the more compos it is, though an active poet is never quite sane in the sense of Coleridge's ‘depression’, meaning his non-visitation by his ‘shaping spirit of imagination’.


Author(s):  
Simon Robertson

Nietzsche is one of the most subversive ethical thinkers of the Western canon. This book offers a critical assessment of his ethical thought and its significance for contemporary moral philosophy. It develops a charitable but critical reading of his thought, pushing some claims and arguments as far as seems fruitful while rejecting others. But it also uses Nietzsche in dialogue with, so to contribute to, a range of long-standing issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The book is divided into three principal parts. Part I examines Nietzsche’s critique of morality, arguing that it raises well-motivated challenges to morality’s normative authority and value: his error theory about morality’s categoricity is in a better position than many contemporary versions; and his critique of moral values has bite even against undemanding moral theories, with significant implications not just for rarefied excellent types but also us. Part II turns to moral psychology, attributing to Nietzsche and defending a sentimentalist explanation of action and motivation. Part III considers his non-moral perfectionism, developing models of value and practical normativity that avoid difficulties facing many contemporary accounts and that may therefore be of wider interest. The discussion concludes by considering Nietzsche’s broader significance: as well as calling into question many of moral philosophy’s deepest assumptions, he challenges our usual views of what ethics itself is—and what it, and we, should be doing.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 8 explores the Austere and Hybrid Responses to the problem of error. The two types of response are described in both ideal and non-ideal versions. Both are found wanting, but the Austere Response emerges as best. Codes endorsed by the Austere approach cannot be shown to meet the “goal-oriented” desiderata of maximizing social welfare, facilitating social cooperation and long-range planning, or guaranteeing the occurrence of the ideal pattern of actions. But Austere-endorsed codes do satisfy the conceptual desiderata for “usable” moral theories in the core (but not the extended) sense of “usability.” They are usable despite the agent’s false beliefs, and they provide agents with the opportunity to live a successful moral life according to the modest conception of this life. This chapter concludes that the only remedy for the problem of error is an Austere code containing a derivative duty for agents to gather information before acting.


Author(s):  
T. M. Rudavsky

Chapter 9 is concerned with social and political behavior. Even in the context of moral philosophy, Jewish philosophers discuss issues within the wider context of a rational scientific perspective. This chapter begins with specific moral codes developed by Jewish thinkers, focusing in particular upon the works of Ibn Gabirol, Baḥya ibn Paquda, Maimonides, and Crescas. Can there be ethical dictates independent of the commandments? The rabbis already worried whether there existed a domain of “right behavior” that pre-dates, or exists independently of, divine commandment. Does Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean apply to divine law? Furthermore, can all humans achieve intellectual perfection? Is the road the same, and open, to all? And is there only one road to ultimate felicity, or are there many routes? The chapter ends with a discussion of whether human felicity can be achieved in this life, and whether the prophet best represents the ideal model for such achievement.


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