Zur vermeintlichen vorkritischen Moralphilosophie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft

Kant-Studien ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-298
Author(s):  
Georg Geismann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Highest Good

Abstract Time and again, one finds in the literature the view that Kant held a pre-critical or semi-critical moral philosophy in the canon chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is shown, firstly, by the fact that practical freedom is understood as cognized through experience and, secondly, by the fact that Kant not only allows a sensuous incentive for the observance of the moral law, but considers it necessary. Against that, it is argued in this essay that, firstly, moral philosophy as such is not addressed in the canon at all and, secondly, that the canon by no means approves of sensuous incentives with regard to the morally required promotion of the highest good. What is indeed addressed, although only in the second section of the canon, is moral theology.

Paradigmatic Immorality

1975 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-695
Author(s):  
Justin Leiber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
List Type ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Paradigm Case ◽  
The Status ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Anglo American

The notion of moral philosophy that has been dominant in Anglo-American philosophizing since G.E. Moore is peculiar. Reviewing traditional works such as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Hume's Treatise, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and Mill's Utilitarianism, one is tempted to call this new notion of moral philosophy a different subject; and if one does this, it is less peculiar. However, let us accept that this new sort of moral philosophy does belong to the previous tradition; granted this, I shall explain why I think it peculiar through considering the status of the judgement that Hitler was a bad man.Consider the sentential function ‘x is (was) a bad man’. ‘Hitler’ seems an obviously suitable substitution for ‘x, at least in the most important sense. That is, one wants to say that if it is not proper or true to say that ‘Hitler was a bad man’ or ‘Hitler was bad’, it fs never proper or true to issue a sentence of this form, restricting x to human beings. Hitler seems indeed, in this most important sense, to be a paradigm case. One wants to say: if Hitler was not a bad man, who could be?

Regulative principles and ‘the Wise Author of Nature’

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE PASTERNACK
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Theological Argument ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThere is much more said in the Critique of Pure Reason about the relationship between God and purposiveness than what is found in Kant's analysis of the physico-theological (design) argument. The ‘Wise Author of Nature’ is central to his analysis of regulative principles in the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ and also appears in the ‘Canon’, first with regards to the Highest Good and then again in relation to our theoretical use of purposiveness. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the physico-theological argument before moving on to the Appendix and the Canon. Finally, it will consider some changes to the role of the Wise Author in the Critique of Judgement.

The Ideal of the Highest Good and the Objectivity of Moral Judgment

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-148
Author(s):  
Nataliya Palatnik
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Ideal World ◽  
The Core ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractMany Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good – an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness – as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity.

scholarly journals La posición de Hans Kelsen ante la aplicación del artículo 48 de la Constitución de Weimar a la luz de la doctrina del derecho kantiana = Hans Kelsen’s Position About the Enforcement of Art. 48 WRV in the Light of the Kantian Doctrine of Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Alba Jiménez Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Theoretical Position ◽  
Main Work ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Hans Kelsen

Resumen: En este artículo se presenta una contribución acerca de la interpretación de Hans Kelsen sobre la sentencia del Tribunal Estatal de 25 de octubre de 1932 que le enfrentó en Weimar a autores como Hermann Heller o Carl Schmitt. El trabajo tiene como objetivo poner de manifiesto cómo la posición de Kelsen se vertebra en conexión con algunas teorías claves de la filosofía práctica kantiana tales como su concepto de imputación (Zurechnung) o su teoría de la política como doctrina ejecutiva del derecho, expuestos tanto en su obra capital Crítica de la razón pura como en los Mitschriften de sus lecciones de filosofía moral y derecho natural incluidos en el curso de las últimas décadas en el corpus de la edición académica de la obra kantiana. Palabras clave: Kelsen, Kant, Constitución de Weimar, causalidad, imputación, decisión, legitimación, derecho, política. Abstract: This paper sets out a contribution to the interpretation offered by Hans Kelsen to the Staatsgerichtshof decision on 25th.10.1932, about which he confronted with authors like Hermann Heller and Carl Schmitt. The work aims to make clear how Kelsen´s theoretical position is constructed in connection to several key assumptions of Kant´s Practical Philosophy, such as his concept of Imputation (Zurechnung) or his vision of Politics as Executive Doctrin of Law. These thesis are exposed in his main work Critique of Pure Reason (KRV), as also in the Mitschriften of his lessons on Moral Philosophy and Natural Law, included in the last decades in the Academic edition of the Kantian opus.Keywords: Kelsen, Kant, Weimar Constitution, Causality, Imputation, Decision, Legitimacy, Law, Politics. 

Über drei Deduktionen in Kants Moralphilosophie - und über eine vierte, die man dort vergeblich sucht. Zur Rehabilitierung von Grundlegung III

Kant-Studien ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Ludwig Bernd
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Practical Reality

Abstract: Since H. J. Paton’s famous commentary from 1947, Kant’s interpreters have considered a ‘deduction of the categorical imperative’ a challenge. This is quite puzzling since Kant himself never talks about such a deduction - and the famous ‘deduction’ he does mention in Groundwork III.4 is, as a close reading shows, not at all the deduction of a law but the deduction of a concept, of the idea of a pure lawgiving will: Only the reality of this idea can explain the possibility of - prima facie impossible - categorical imperatives and thus of morality as autonomy. The presupposition of the validity of the moral law, however, was already a cornerstone of Kant’s critical metaphysics in 1781: Moral theology (which replaces all speculative proofs of immortality and of God’s existence) depends on the moral law’s being an undisputed datum without any need for philosophical justification (‘deduction’). While in the Groundwork (1785) Kant tried to show the practical reality of the idea of a pure will with the help of a speculative deduction of freedom (which a reviewer described as being ‘uncritical’ in May 1786), in the second Critique (1787/88) the reality of that very idea, and with it the idea of freedom, depends (as did immortality and God’s existence in 1781) on the aforementioned practical datum, which, from that point on, Kant called a “Factum der reinen Vernunft” [fact of pure reason].

A Kantian View of Moral Luck

Philosophy ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 65 (253) ◽  
pp. 297-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Better Than

Some of the most interesting questions about Kant, and more particularly about his moral philosophy, arise when he is placed alongside the giants of antiquity. Where does he come together with Plato? Where with Aristotle? Where does he diverge from each?He comes together with Plato in a shared conception of Ideas. When he first outlines how he is using the term ‘Idea’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, he insists that he is using it in none other than its original Platonic sense; and he explains away certain discrepancies with the comment:It is by no means unusual… to find that we understand [an author] better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken… in opposition to his own intention.

Die Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
The Given ◽  
Moral Convictions

Within the Kantian ethics consciousness of the moral principle is a fact of reason which cannot be grounded in any antecedent data, empirical or rational. Hegel however argues that the fact of reason is necessarily embedded in the fact of „Sittlichkeit“, that a pure reason is an empty and chimerical construction, that moral knowledge is unavoidably rootet in the contingent moral convictions of the given cultural and social environment. This essay defends Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and – by generalizing Hegel’s hermeneutic approach – sketches the outlines of an explicatory concept of ethics which contradicts the scientistic understanding of moral philosophy characteristic for Kant, the utilitarianism and the supporters of discourse ethics likewise.

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

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