scholarly journals A magyar állampénzügyi rendszer rezilienciája a COVID–19 járvány kapcsán

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-315
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Recovery Period ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Wage Dynamics ◽  
Macroeconomic Conditions ◽  
Active Involvement ◽  
Family Benefits

Összefoglaló. A COVID–19 járvány a magyar gazdaság teljesítményeit és pénzügyi egyensúlyát is gyengítette, ám a korábbról stabil államháztartási alapok következtében a negatív hatások csak átmenetinek vélelmezhetők. Magyarország 2010–2019 között egy sikeres állampénzügyi reformot hajtott végre, amely jó alapot ad a válság elleni védekezéshez. Ugyanakkor a járványválság még erősebben ráirányítja a figyelmet a magyar nemzetgazdaság versenyképességének erősebb javítására, az infláció fékezésére, a költségvetési egyensúly megfelelő keretek között tartására, és a kis- és középvállalati szektor mérethatékonyságának növelésére. A tanulmány bemutatja a válság alatti fiskális és jegybanki intézkedések vázát, és egyúttal utal a válság utáni időszak kihívásaira, amelyek a nemzetközi térből, s különösen a jegybanki politika megváltozásából fakadnak. Summary. The COVID-19 epidemic hit the position of the otherwise strong Hungarian economy. We could see an economic downturn and financial imbalance developed in the last one and half years. As in the recovery (post-crisis) period of the 2010 decade, the crisis is being addressed with the active involvement of the state and the central bank. However, in the course of managing the crisis, it arises that on the new growth trajectory to be built after the recovery period, the competitiveness aspects, especially in the small and medium-sized enterprise category, which plays a major role in Hungary, should be more efficient than in the previous decade. It is necessary to improve the size efficiency, liquidity and capital efficiency of the SME sector by means of fiscal regulation, and the allocation of state resources should be more strongly linked to the requirements of export capacity and innovative business conduct. The decade after the 2007–2008 crisis – the previous recovery period – was characterized by the weak enforcement of fiscal policies in regulating and improving competitiveness, especially in Hungary, where change is essential. After 2013, Hungarian monetary policy also caught up with the international practice of quantitative easing, achieving significant results in improving both the financial balance and economic growth. However, the previous quantitative easing of the central bank, as well as the increase of budget expenditures on epidemiological expenditures, investments, normative budget annual subsidies from the European Union and subsidies from the European Reconstruction Fund, and even investment loans from our Eastern economic partners, generates an overheated economy, inflationary pressures, and external and balance of payments deficits. Added to this is the wage dynamics of the population, and the permanent and even increasing disbursement of family benefits during the crisis. All in all, in the 2020s we will face a new financial-debt crisis, unemployment and labor shortage problems, the competitiveness problems of the small business sector, culminating in the reorganization of the world economy, new competitiveness aspects, it will be a rather complex task. Thus, the turn of competitiveness that has essentially failed in the context of an abundance of resources and consolidated macroeconomic conditions (2010-2019) must be implemented “uphill”, it is only the time, will and opportunity to take its first steps. But the main lesson of the crises caused by the epidemics (also) is that the remaining economic entities have become stronger. And perhaps there is a chance to avoid falling into the trap of medium development through a new central bank policy that moderates inflation and truly enforces modernization considerations, as well as improving financial positions and improving economic positions (competitiveness).

scholarly journals The ‘Haircut’ of Public Creditors under EU Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
Active Involvement ◽  
European Central ◽  
State Financing ◽  
The Eu

Haircut of public creditors as next step in the escalation of the euro debt crisis? – Exploring the boundaries set by the EU Treaty on debt restructuring – Limitations imposed by no-bailout clause and prohibition of monetary state financing – Standards set inPringleandGauweiler– Haircut on nominal debt infringes no-bailout clause – Active involvement by European Central Bank violates ban on monetary state financing – Other forms of ‘soft haircuts’ may be compatible with EU law

scholarly journals Die Zinslast des Bundes in der Schuldenkrise: Wie lukrativ ist der „sichere Hafen“?

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
Jens Boysen-Hogrefe
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
Yield Curve ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Macroeconomic Conditions ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Interest Payments

Abstract In the aftermath of the Great Recession and during the debt crisis in the euro area yields on German federal bonds have been exceptionally low. This analysis tries to calculate the profits that the federal government makes due to these low yields. The interest payments that are due to emissions of bonds and bills made between 2009 and 2012 are approximated and compared to several benchmark scenarios. Compared to the mean yields of the years 1999-2008 profits of the federal government are quite high (68 billion euros). Application of yield curve models show that most of these profits are due to the macroeconomic conditions in the euro area and to low central bank rates. To a much smaller extend these profits are due to flight into safety, which, however, has become more relevant recently.

scholarly journals The European Central Bank’s intricate independence versus accountability conundrum in the post-crisis governance framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Amtenbrink
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Governance Framework ◽  
European Central ◽  
Main Determinants ◽  
New Generation

In the wake of the European financial and sovereign debt crisis there is a revived interest in the constitutional position of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the European Union legal order, notably its independence and democratic legitimacy. A new generation of researchers, witnessing and in part affected by the course of events during the crisis, is currently discovering this field of research. These contemporary contributions are more than reiterations of debates at the time of the establishment of the European System of Central Banks. Indeed, the (legal) landscape pertaining to the position of the ECB has transformed significantly during the crisis, not only raising concerns about the legitimacy of the position and actions of the ECB, but, somewhat paradoxically, also about the compatibility of its functions and actions with the basic EU Treaty preference for an independent, inflation-averse and thus, conservative central bank. This contribution provides a broader picture of the independence-versus-accountability conundrum in the post-crisis governance framework by discussing main determinants of the independence and democratic legitimacy of the ECB today, as well as identifying risks emanating from the ECB’s position in the EU legal order. Based on this assessment areas of improvement are identified.

scholarly journals How Memoranda of Understanding Have Affected EU Democratic Institutions in Southern EU Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Anastasia Chr. Lekka
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Eu Member States

The recent recession having emerged in 2007 has been the worst economic downturn since the time of Great Depression of 1929 in USA and spread across the European continent. In many European countries this led to severe sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2010 and was followed by implementation of austerity measures with significant impact on public, social and employment sector. Those tough austerity measures resulted in structural reforms of welfare and labor market especially in Southern EU countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy representing the most prominent examples. These policies were imposed to a large extend through the so called “Troika” which was an interaction between internal EU and external Organizations, like the European Union, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund respectively.Citizens realize that their national economic institutions are no longer responsible for the decision making on major social and economic policies, on economic and welfare policies, on privatization and sale of public assets. Consequently, citizens tend to question if this constrained democracy deserves further support. This is enhanced by the fact that National Parliaments no longer develop policies but rather align with policies dictated by the above stated Institutions and are forced to accept such deals without asking the opinion of citizens. Nevertheless the EU intends to promote civil society participation in decision making and program policies applied. This contradiction needs to be analyzed in order to determine if there is a democratic deficit in EU member states.  

DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND UKRAINE

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (6) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Zhang DONGYANG ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Cooperation ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Association Agreement ◽  
The Eu

The status and prospects of development of trade and economic relations between Ukraine and China are considered. It is proved that bilateral cooperation in the trade and economic sphere has made significant progress. In 2012–2017, China was the second largest trading partner of Ukraine after Russia. However, the problem of imbalance in imports and exports between Ukraine and China has not yet been resolved. In addition, the scale and number of projects in which Ukraine attracts Chinese investment is much less than investments from European countries and the United States. It is justified that trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and China is at a new historical stage. On the one hand, Ukraine signed the Association Agreement with the European Union, and on January 1, 2016, the rules of the free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU entered into force. This helps to accelerate the integration of Ukrainian economy into European one. On the other hand, the global economic downturn requires the introduction of innovations in the model of cooperation. The Chinese initiative “One belt is one way” is one of the variants of the innovation model of cooperation. Its significance is to unite the Asia-Pacific region with the EU in order to join the Eurasian Economic Union, create a new space and opportunities for development and achieve prosperity with the Eurasian countries. All this forms unprecedented opportunities for development of bilateral economic and trade relations. It seems that to fully open the potential of Ukrainian economy and expand bilateral trade and economic cooperation, it is necessary to take into account such proposals as the establishment of the Sino-Ukrainian industrial park, the promotion of cooperation in the field of electronic commerce, the formation of the Sino-Ukrainian free trade zone and enhanced interaction within multilateral mechanisms (for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the interaction of China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 16 + 1 format).

Dramatis Institutiones

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Regime Complex ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
Institutional Conflict

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.

scholarly journals The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Member States ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
European Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Collective Action Clauses

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.

Eurobonds: Three Lessons from China’s “Debt Centralization/Decentralization” Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Previous Series

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.

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