Long-Term Storage and Radioactive Waste Retrieval from Historical Radon-Type Storage Facility

MRS Advances ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 283-291
Author(s):  
Alexander Smetnik

ABSTRACTWithin the framework of the IAEA project “CRAFT” (2011-2014), specialists of JSC “VO “Safety” participated in working group “Safety assessment of the Radon-type facilities”. The IAEA GSG-3 methodology was used in order to address the issue of safety assessment of radioactive waste removal from historical near-surface storage facility of the Radon type. SAFRAN tool (Sweden) was used for safety assessment of a historical Radon type storage facility. Practical experience of SAFRAN application has shown that it can play a significant role in managing records and knowledge on radioactive waste, nuclear facility site, characteristics of geological environment and safety barriers. It can provide reliable long-term storage and effective management of safety related records for the purposes of safety reassessments, review and supervision.

2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-64
Author(s):  
Josef Neubauer

At the Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf, there are several facilities in stalled for treatment of waste of low and intermediate radioactivity level (radwaste). A separate company within Centers, Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf, has been formed recently, acting as a centralized facility for treatment, conditioning and storing of such waste within the country. The relevant treatment technology is applied depending on the waste category. In total about 6900 m3 of solid waste of low and intermediate radioactivity level originating from Austria was treated in the period between 1976 and 2002. Presently, there exists no final repository for radwaste in Austria. A study is under way to identify the structure for a long term storage facility.


Author(s):  
Bjo̸rn Borgaas ◽  
Ingar Amundsen ◽  
Ole Reistadt

This paper describes the cooperation and inspection arrangements for verifying the dismantlement of non-strategic Russian submarines, including waste handling, in accordance with the provisions given in the bilateral agreement between the Governments of Russia and Norway and the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. The main concerns during the project implementation are nuclear safety, the individual safety of workers and the safe and secure handling of radioactive and toxic wastes. Based on data provided by the shipyard on individual exposure, one dismantlement project results in average in an effective dose for shipyard workers between 1,1 and 1,9 mSv, depending on the scope of the work for each worker. The main conclusion is that the present handling of solid radioactive waste is not optimal as such waste now is being put into the reactor compartments without the possibility for adequate control, including the retrieval for repacking or transfer to adequate storage facilities, after the reactor compartments have been placed in the long term storage facility in Saida Bay. Today there is no repository in Northwest-Russia for defence-related radioactive waste.


Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Koulikov ◽  
Rinat A. Nizamutdinov ◽  
Andrey N. Abramov ◽  
Anatoly I. Tsubanikov

Having about 200 tons of solid radioactive waste aboard, the Volodarskiy Floating Technical Base (FTB) is a potential radiation pollution source for the Murmansk region and Kola Bay, as her long-term berthing negatively affects the hull structures. Thereby, Atomflot collaborated with ANO Aspect-Konversia and JSC NIPTB Onega within the frameworks of Federal Special-purpose Program “Assurance of Nuclear and Radiation Safety for 2008 and for the period up to 2015” and developed the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling concept. In 2008 in the course of development of the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling concept the following works were carried out: 1) vessel condition survey, including SRW radiological analysis; 2) feasibility study of the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling alternatives. In this regard the following alternatives were analyzed: – formation of the package assembly in the form of vessel’s undivided hull for durable storage in the Saida long-term storage facility (LTSF); - formation of individual SRW package assemblies for durable storage in the Saida LTSF; - comprehensive recycling of all solid radioactive waste by disposal in protective containers. 3) selection and approval of the dismantling alternative. The alternative of formation of individual SRW package assemblies for durable storage in the Saida LTSF was selected by the Rosatom State Corporation. In this case the works will be performed on a step-by-step basis at the Atomflot enterprise and SRE Nerpa. The conceptual dismantling technology was developed for the selected Volodarskiy FTB dismantling option. The proceedings contain description of options, analysis procedure and proposal for further study of mentioned challenge.


Author(s):  
Zoran Drace ◽  
Michael I. Ojovan

The IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on cementitious materials for radioactive waste management was launched in 2007 [1, 2]. The objective of CRP was to investigate the behaviour and performance of cementitious materials used in radioactive waste management system with various purposes and included waste packages, wasteforms and backfills as well as investigation of interactions and interdependencies of these individual elements during long term storage and disposal. The specific research topics considered were: (i) cementitious materials for radioactive waste packaging: including radioactive waste immobilization into a solid waste form, (ii) waste backfilling and containers; (iii) emerging and alternative cementitious systems; (iv) physical-chemical processes occurring during the hydration and ageing of cement matrices and their influence on the cement matrix quality; (v) methods of production of cementitious materials for: immobilization into wasteform, backfills and containers; (vi) conditions envisaged in the disposal environment for packages (physical and chemical conditions, temperature variations, groundwater, radiation fields); (vii) testing and nondestructive monitoring techniques for quality assurance of cementitious materials; (viii) waste acceptance criteria for waste packages, waste forms and backfills; transport, long term storage and disposal requirements; and finally (ix) modelling or simulation of long term behaviours of cementations materials used for packaging, waste immobilization and backfilling, especially in the post-closure phase. The CRP has gathered overall 26 research organizations from 22 Member States aiming to share their research and practices on the use of cementitious materials [2]. The main research outcomes of the CRP were summarized in a summary report currently under preparation to be published by IAEA. The generic topical sections covered by report are: a) conventional cementitious systems; b) novel cementitious materials and technologies; c) testing and waste acceptance criteria; and d) modelling long term behaviour. These themes as well as all contributions of participating organizations were further developed in the individual reports to be presented in the IAEA publication. The CRP facilitated the exchange of information and research co-operation in resolving similar problems between different institutions and contributed towards improving waste management practices, their efficiency and general enhancement of safety.


Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta

In a radioactive material (RAM) packaging, the formation of eutectic at the Pu/SS (plutonium/stainless steel) interface is a serious concern and must be avoided to prevent of leakage of fissile material to the environment. The eutectic temperature for the Pu/SS is rather low (410°C) and could seriously impact the structural integrity of the containment vessel under accident conditions involving fire. The 9975 packaging is used for long term storage of Pu bearing materials in the DOE complex where the Pu comes in contact with the stainless steel containment vessel. Due to the serious consequences of the containment breach at the eutectic site, the Pu/SS interface temperature is kept well below the eutectic formation temperature of 410°C. This paper discusses the thermal models and the results for the extended fire conditions (1500°F for 86 minutes) that exist in a long term storage facility and concludes that the 9975 packaging Pu/SS interface temperature is well below the eutectic temperature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-105
Author(s):  
V. V. Suskin ◽  
◽  
I. V. Kapyrin ◽  
F. V. Grigorev ◽  
◽  
...  

The article evaluates the impact of a “buried wall” barrier on the long-term safety during the long-term storage1 or in-situ disposal of nuclear legacy facilities, in particular, industrial reservoirs, as well as during the development of near-surface disposal facilities for radioactive waste (RWDF). For assessment purposes, filtration and mass transfer processes have been numerically modelled in the GeRa code based on a case study of a reference near-surface facility. The study explores in which way the available covering screen affects the dynamics of contaminant spread. It evaluates the sensitivity of the results to the dispersion parameter commonly characterized by a high degree of uncertainty.


Author(s):  
Robert S. Dyer ◽  
Ella Barnes ◽  
Randall L. Snipes ◽  
Steinar Ho̸ibra˚ten ◽  
Valery Sveshnikov ◽  
...  

Northwest Russia contains large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that potentially threaten the environmental security of the surrounding Arctic Region. The majority of the SNF from Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines is currently stored either onboard submarines or in floating storage vesssels in Northwest Russia. Some of the SNF is damaged, stored in an unstable condition, or of a type that cannot currently be reprocessed. Most of the existing storage facilities being used in Northwest Russia do not meet health and safety and physical security requirements. Existing Russian transport infrastructure and reprocessing facilities cannot meet the requirements for moving and reprocessing this fuel. Therefore, additional interim storage capacity is required. The removal, handling, interim storage, and shipment of the fuel pose technical, ecological, and security challenges. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Oak Ridge National Laboratory, along with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, is working closely with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (RF) to develop an improved and integrated management system for interim storage of military SNF in NW Russia. The cooperative effort consists of three subprojects involving the development of: (1) a prototype dual-purpose, metal-concrete container for both transport and long-term storage of RF military SNF, (2) the first transshipment/interim storage facility for these containers, and (3) improved fuel preparation and cask loading procedures and systems to control the moisture levels within the containers. The first subproject, development of a prototype dual-purpose container, was completed in December 2000. This was the first metal-concrete container developed, licensed, and produced in Russia for both the transportation and storage of military SNF. These containers are now in serial production. Russia plans to use these containers for the transport and interim storage of military SNF from decommissioned nuclear submarines at naval installations in the Arctic and Far East. The second subproject, the design, construction, and licensing of the first transshipment/interim storage facility in Russia, was completed in September 2003. This facility can provide interim storage for up to nineteen 40-tonne SNF containers filled with SNF for a period not to exceed two years. The primary objective of building this transshipment/interim storage facility in Murmansk, Russia was to remove a bottleneck in the RF transportation infrastructure for moving containers, loaded with SNF, from the arctic region to PO “Mayak” for reprocessing or longer-term storage. The third subproject addresses the need to improve fuel conditioning and cask operating procedures to ensure safe storage of SNF for at least 50 years. This will involve the review and improvement of existing RF procedures and systems for preparing and loading the fuel in the specially designed casks for transport and long-term storage. This subproject is scheduled for completion in December 2003. Upon completion, these subprojects are designed to provide a physically secure, accountable, and environmentally sound integrated solution that will increase the capacity for removal and transfer of SNF from decommissioned RF submarines in the Russian Federation to PO “Mayak” in central Russia.


Author(s):  
A. Dreimanis

A unified analysis of the enlargement of the Baldone near-surface radioactive waste (RW) repository RADONS considers the interplay of the existing engineering, safety and infrastructure premises, with the foreseen newly socio-technical features. This enlargement consists in construction of two additional RW disposal vaults and in building a long-term storage facility for spent sealed sources at the RADONS territory. Our approach is based on consecutive analysis of following basic elements: - the origin of enlargement – the RADONS safety analysis and a set of optimal socio-technical solutions of Salaspils research reactor decommissioning waste management; - the enlargement – a keystone of the national RW management concept, including the long-term approach; - the enlargement concept – the result of international co-operation and obligations; - arrangement optimization of new disposal and storage space; - environmental impact assessment for the repository enlargement – the update of socio-technical studies. The study of the public opinion revealed: negative attitude to repository enlargement is caused mainly due to missing information on radiation level and on the RADONS previous operations. These results indicate: basic measures to improve the public attitude to repository enlargement: the safety upgrade, public education and compensation mechanisms. A detailed stakeholders engagement and public education plan is elaborated.


Author(s):  
Jan Medved ◽  
Ladislav Vargovcik

The paper deals with experience, techniques and new applied equipment durig undergoing decommissioning process of the A-1 NPP long-term pool storage and the follow-up decommissioning plan. For rad-waste disposal of the long-term pool storage (where most of the contaminants had remained following the removal of spent fuel) special equipment has been developed, designed, constructed and installed. The purpose of this equipment is the restorage, drainage and fragmentation of cartridges (used as a spent fuel case), as well as treatment of sludge (located at the pool bottom) and of the remaining liquid radwaste. The drainage equipment for cartridges is designed for discharging KCr2 solution from cartridges with spent fuel rods into the handling storage tank in the short-term storage facility and adjustment of the cartridges for railway transport, prior to the liquidation of the spent fuel rod. The equipment ensures full remote visual control of the process and exact monitoring of its technical parameters, including that of the internal nitrogen atmosphere concentration value. Cartridges without fuel and liquid filling are transferred to the equipment for their processing which includes fragmentation into smaller parts, decontamination, filling into drums with their sealed closing and measurement of radioactive dose. For the fragmentation, special shearing equipment is used which leaves the pipe fragment open for the following decontamination. For cleaning the cartridge bottom from radioactive sludge water jet system is used combined with slow speed milling used for preparing the opening for water jet nozzle. The sludge from the cartridge bottom is fixed into ceramic matrix. Nuclear Power Plant JE A-1 (since 1980 in decommissioning) is situated in the locality of Jaslovske´ Bohunice. So far the decommissioning of the Long-term storage was carried out within Stage I of A-1NPP decommissioning. This year the Stage I of decommissioning finished, and the performance of Stage II of decommissioning was started. Decommissioning of the long-term storage facility continues within Stage II of the A-1 NPP decommissioning process.


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