scholarly journals The Konotop Campaign of 1672 to “Elect a Hetman”

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Velikanov

This article analyses the reasons for Hetman D. Ignatowich (Mnogogreshniy)’s dismissal and arrest on the night of 13 March 1672 and the election of I. Samoylowich as the new hetman. The author provides a detailed description of all the reports regarding Ignatowich’s communications with Hetman Doroshenko and his plans to launch a mutiny against the tsar and become subject of the Turkish sultan, which made Ignatowich start mobilising troops and transport his property to a safe place in advance. Additionally, the author describes the effort taken by the Russian government to keep the hetman under their rule and lack of plans to dismiss him. After the information about Ignatowich’s treason and arrest by representatives of the Cossack starshina (officership) reached Moscow, the latter supported the plotters and tried the former hetman in a court of law, sentencing him to exile in Siberia. Even though there were fears of Cossack uprisings to support Ignatowich, the appointment of a new hetman was bloodless and was not followed by any serious uprisings, which testifies to the lack of support towards him personally or the policy he carried out. On 17 June 1672, the 30‑yearold Samoylowich was elected hetman at the Konotop Rada. He did not enjoy any support of the starshina or Cossacks in general and was dependent on the support of the tsarist authorities and Cossack elites. The conditions of the Konotop articles signed at the Rada were identical to the Glukhov articles from 1669 and provided the hetmanate with broad autonomy and a very limited tsarist military and administrative participation. The only addition was that the authorities were requested to arbitrate any possible disputes between the hetman and the Cossack starshina. In order to demonstrate the military support for the tsar’s candidate, the authorities sent Prince Romodanovsky’s army to the place where the Rada was to be held and deployed additional troops along the hetmanate’s borders.

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
L. I. Tsedilin

Russia and Germany use fundamentally different models of science funding. Russian government has inherited planning and distribution system’s principles in this sphere, when the development of the military-industrial complex was an absolute priority. The modern Russian model of R&D financing is also characterized by the predominance of the state research funding and insignificant business participation in R&D investment. The German model of science financing with the predominance of the business sector in the structure of investment in science shows more significant results and contributes more to the transformation of science into a real productive force. These fundamental differences directly affect the export performance of high-tech products (in Germany it is 20 times higher). The comparison of approaches to R&D financing and the results of their application lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to reform the Russian model of financing usage.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (02) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Elena Shahmuhametova ◽  
Malika Yusupova ◽  
Natali Solovyova ◽  
Olga Borisova

Provincial politics in the Russian Empire depended on the personality of the emperor, his views and worldview. During the years of Paul’s Government an extreme form of centralization has been established in the activities of the State apparatus. With the arrival of Emperor Alexander I, there was, in our opinion, a symbolic removal of the distance between the supreme power and its military support, which, in fact, removed obstacles to the spontaneous inclusion of the military in political activity in the next fluctuations of this monarch’s line.


2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1989471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindy Heinecken ◽  
Nina Wilén

This study focuses on soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions and the challenges they experience adapting to the home environment in the postdeployment phase. The article focuses on South African peacekeepers returning from missions in Darfur/Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi. Interviews with 50 South African peacekeepers on the challenges they face in terms of their homecoming, family reintegration, and military support were conducted. Overall, the study found that both external military factors such as deployment length and nature of mission, and internal factors specific to the soldier affected reintegration. We highlight three major findings of our study: Firstly, our analysis show that peacekeepers across gender, rank, and race identify the absence from their children as a major challenge. Secondly, while relational turbulence characterized by ambivalence and concerns about infidelity was prevalent among all, there was a clear difference in the answers between the male and female peacekeepers. Thirdly, a large majority voiced the need for more support from the military institution for their families, before, during, and after deployment.


2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1275-1282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter R. Schumm ◽  
D. Bruce Bell ◽  
Benjamin Knott

During overseas deployments, many spouses and families move away from their initial military installation, usually to live with or near relatives. Relatively little has been known about those who move away even though the issue is of importance to the military because its support systems are designed on the assumption that family members are living in proximity to those support systems. The purpose of this research was to describe the characteristics of those who actually moved away during a deployment compared to those who stayed but wanted to leave and to those who stayed. Results generally fit a social exchange model of reasons for moving, staying, or wanting to move but staying. High stress appears to lead to a desire to move but other factors act as barriers or facilitators to actually moving. Military family support did not predict moving away or staying. Implications for military support services are discussed.


Author(s):  
Aleksandr Kiselev ◽  

Introduction. The visit of the Russian envoy Osip Nepeya to London in 1556–1557 is usually considered as the beginning of the official relations between Russia and England. In the light of modern views about the sixteenth-century diplomacy, this event requires a more thorough research. Methods. The Nepeya’s trip was traditionally viewed as an insignificant episode in the context of general reviews of bilateral relations concentrated mainly on trade. The reasons and possibilities of the military and political rapprochement between England, Spain and Russia in the 1550s, which was the most likely goal of the Nepeya’s journey to England, have never been investigated. Therefore, this article is based on an analysis of numerous multilingual sources. Analysis. The author clarifies the Nepeya’s diplomatic rank and certain previously unknown details of the Muscovites’ stay in London. He analyzes Nepeya’s mission to England in the context of foreign affairs of Ivan IV, Mary Tudor and Philip II Habsburg. Results. It is concluded that the rulers of Spain and England could provide military support to Ivan IV, but they were not interested in military and political alliance with the Muscovy and the war against Turkey. However, establishing official equal relations between England and Russia at the highest level, as well as obtaining trade privileges for Russian merchants was the main result of Nepeya’s trip. This allows us to conclude that the first Russian diplomatic mission in London was successful.


2020 ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emrah Kekilli ◽  
Bilgehan Öztürk

This paper discusses Turkey’s relations with Libya, especially after the latest ground-breaking and rapid developments that took place in Libya such as Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to invade Tripoli, the signing of two memoranda of understanding between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the dramatic change in the military situation of the country. It argues that Turkey’s military support changed the positions of many domestic and external actors in Libya by tilting the balance of power in favor of the GNA.


Author(s):  
Matias Spektor

The John F. Kennedy administration took a bet on the incoming president of Brazil, João Goulart, as he took office on September 8, 1961. Goulart was not a radical socialist, but his opponents portrayed him as an unpredictable nationalist who might unadvisedly fuel the flames of social upheaval and radical revolution, turning Brazil into a second Cuba. Yet, the White House estimated that Goulart was someone they could do business with and sympathized with the idea of Reformas de Base (Goulart’s program of “basic reforms”), which included the extension of labor protections to rural workers, redistributive agrarian reform, and universal suffrage. United States support for Goulart materialized in the form of economic aid, financial assistance via the IMF, and development assistance via the Alliance for Progress partnership. Within a year, however, the tide turned as Goulart failed to comply with American demands that he ban leftists from his cabinet. In a matter of months in 1962, the White House abandoned any hopes of engagement with the Brazilian president. While the crisis that led to Goulart’s fall in March 1964 was the making of domestic political actors within Brazil—as was the military coup to unseat the president—the likelihood and success rate of the golpe grew as the United States rolled out successive rounds of targeted actions against Goulart, including diplomatic and financial pressure, threats of abandonment, support for opposition politicians, collusion with coup plotters, signaling future military support for the plotters in the eventuality of civil war, and the granting of immediate diplomatic recognition for the incoming authoritarian military leaders after the coup. After Goulart, Brazil remained under authoritarian rule for two consecutive decades.


Author(s):  
Kaushik Roy

Accustomed to conducting low-intensity warfare before 1914, the Indian Army learnt to engage in high-intensity conventional warfare during the course of World War I, thereby exhibiting a steep learning curve. Being the bulwark of the British Empire in South Asia, the ‘brown warriors’ of the Raj functioned as an imperial fire brigade during the war. Studying the Indian Army as an institution during the war, Kaushik Roy delineates its social, cultural, and organizational aspects to understand its role in the scheme of British imperial projects. Focusing not just on ‘history from above’ but also ‘history from below’, Roy analyses the experiences of common soldiers and not just those of the high command. Moreover, since society, along with the army, was mobilized to provide military and non-military support, this volume sheds light on the repercussions of this mass mobilization on the structure of British rule in South Asia. Using rare archival materials, published autobiographies, and diaries, Roy’s work offers a holistic analysis of the military performance of the Indian Army in major theatres during the war.


Author(s):  
Bishnu Raj Upreti

Historically, the military in Nepal was closely associated with and loyal to the institution of the monarchy and was intended to operate in the interests of the palace. However, the military was forced to confront political change in 1990 as the power of the king beyond that of the constitution was scrapped and Nepal was limited to a constitutional monarchy. Consequently, the military theoretically came under civilian control with the advent of the end of a partyless political system and the establishment of a multiparty democracy. The palace reluctantly accepted this change but covertly continued consolidating power by using the military. Hence, the already cemented mistrust between political parties and the military mounted. Political parties viewed the military as a royal army and the military perceived political parties as unpatriotic and aligned with foreign powers. This hidden tension remained and was reflected in many instances until the abolition of the institution of the monarchy in May 2008 by the Nepali parliament. From 1990 to 2010, the military endured very difficult periods such as continuous combat (February 1996–November 2006) with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)], the royal massacre (the entire family of King Birendra was assassinated), sharp criticisms of its armed conflict related to human rights violations, a cessation of military support from the international community, the abolition of the monarchy, which had existed in Nepal for 240 years, confinement along with CPN(M) ex-combatants per the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), tensions with the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), attempts by the CPN(M) government to politicize the military, and the removal of the military chief. In all these events, the military was indirectly and directly dragged in political maneuvering. In some cases, it fully dragged while in others only partially so, and in some cases, it failed entirely. Further, in the past three decades, from 1990 to 2020, the military has been sharply criticized for engagements in business beyond its traditional military role and for not respecting civilian supremacy. However, the military has also been highly praised for its acceptance of the republican system. All Nepali citizens have praised the military’s natural disaster relief work during floods, earthquakes, avalanches, fires, landslides, air and other transportation disasters, its search and rescue operations, medical assistance and evacuation efforts, air rescues and mass evacuations, flood control, reconstruction of damaged vital infrastructures, and construction of temporary shelters for homeless citizens. It is clear that the Ministry of Defense and the military require further security sector reforms and better civil–military relations as well as ensuring parliamentary oversight in the spirit of the National Security Policy and Nepal’s constitution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Nan LI

The fear of political vulnerability stemming from an over-reliance on the military for containing COVID-19 led the civilian leadership to deploy the level and type of military support that were deliberately measured and technically specialised; the timings of this support were also carefully planned. The concern about COVID-19 causing significant infections among PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ranks that may hamper PLA response to the perceived external security challenges also proved to be premature.


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