Nepal: The Role of the Military in Politics, 1990–2020

Historically, the military in Nepal was closely associated with and loyal to the institution of the monarchy and was intended to operate in the interests of the palace. However, the military was forced to confront political change in 1990 as the power of the king beyond that of the constitution was scrapped and Nepal was limited to a constitutional monarchy. Consequently, the military theoretically came under civilian control with the advent of the end of a partyless political system and the establishment of a multiparty democracy. The palace reluctantly accepted this change but covertly continued consolidating power by using the military. Hence, the already cemented mistrust between political parties and the military mounted. Political parties viewed the military as a royal army and the military perceived political parties as unpatriotic and aligned with foreign powers. This hidden tension remained and was reflected in many instances until the abolition of the institution of the monarchy in May 2008 by the Nepali parliament. From 1990 to 2010, the military endured very difficult periods such as continuous combat (February 1996–November 2006) with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)], the royal massacre (the entire family of King Birendra was assassinated), sharp criticisms of its armed conflict related to human rights violations, a cessation of military support from the international community, the abolition of the monarchy, which had existed in Nepal for 240 years, confinement along with CPN(M) ex-combatants per the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), tensions with the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), attempts by the CPN(M) government to politicize the military, and the removal of the military chief. In all these events, the military was indirectly and directly dragged in political maneuvering. In some cases, it fully dragged while in others only partially so, and in some cases, it failed entirely. Further, in the past three decades, from 1990 to 2020, the military has been sharply criticized for engagements in business beyond its traditional military role and for not respecting civilian supremacy. However, the military has also been highly praised for its acceptance of the republican system. All Nepali citizens have praised the military’s natural disaster relief work during floods, earthquakes, avalanches, fires, landslides, air and other transportation disasters, its search and rescue operations, medical assistance and evacuation efforts, air rescues and mass evacuations, flood control, reconstruction of damaged vital infrastructures, and construction of temporary shelters for homeless citizens. It is clear that the Ministry of Defense and the military require further security sector reforms and better civil–military relations as well as ensuring parliamentary oversight in the spirit of the National Security Policy and Nepal’s constitution.

Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414021989757 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 001041402198975

Author(s):

Polina Beliakova

Keyword(s):

Comparative Analysis ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Intrastate Conflict ◽

Large N ◽

Military Relations ◽

Comprehensive Framework ◽

The Military ◽

New Framework

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

Civil–Military Relations and Human Rights

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x211006835 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 0095327X2110068

Author(s):

Sam R. Bell ◽

K. Chad Clay ◽

Ghashia Kiyani ◽

Amanda Murdie

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Military Leadership ◽

Human Right ◽

Principal Agent Theory ◽

Military Conflict ◽

Agent Theory ◽

Lack Of Control ◽

Military Relations ◽

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.

To ‘midwife’ – and abort – a democracy: Mauritania's transition from military rule, 2005–2008

The Journal of Modern African Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022278x08003765 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 47 (1) ◽

pp. 129-152 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Boubacar N'Diaye

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Political System ◽

Third Republic ◽

Transition Process ◽

Military Coup ◽

Military Rule ◽

Electoral Outcomes ◽

Military Relations ◽

ABSTRACTThe 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.

Civilian perception of the role of the military in Nigeria’s 2014 Ebola outbreak and health-related responses in the North East region

BMJ Military Health ◽

10.1136/bmjmilitary-2020-001696 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. e001696

Author(s):

Chris M A Kwaja ◽

D J Olivieri ◽

S Boland ◽

P C Henwood ◽

B Card ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Health Services ◽

North East ◽

East Region ◽

Catchment Areas ◽

Key Informant ◽

Military Relations ◽

Epidemic Response ◽

IntroductionCivilian–military relations play an important yet under-researched role in low-income and middle-income country epidemic response. One crucial component of civilian–military relations is defining the role of the military. This paper evaluates the role of Nigerian military during the 2014–2016 West African Ebola epidemic.MethodsFocus groups and key informant interviews were conducted throughout three states in North East region of Nigeria: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Participants were identified through mapping of stakeholder involvement in Nigerian epidemic response. English-translated transcripts of each key informant interview and focus group discussion were then coded and key themes were elucidated and analysed.ResultsMajor themes elucidated include developing inclusive coordination plans between civilian and military entities, facilitating human rights reporting mechanisms and distributing military resources more equitably across geographical catchment areas. The Nigerian Military served numerous functions: 37% (22/59) of respondents indicated ‘security/peace’ as the military’s primary function, while 42% (25/59) cited health services. Variations across geographic settings were also noted: 35% (7/20) of participants in Borno stated the military primarily provided transportation, while 73% (11/15) in Adamawa and 29% (7/24) in Yobe listed health services.ConclusionsRobust civilian–military relations require an appropriately defined role of the military and clear civilian–military communication. Important considerations to contextualise civilian–military relations include military cultural–linguistic understanding, human rights promotion, and community-based needs assessments; such foci can facilitate the military’s understanding of community norms and civilian cooperation with military aims. In turn, more robust civilian–military relations can promote overall epidemic response and reduce the global burden of disease.

The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

Journal of Latin American Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022216x0000465x ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 25 (2) ◽

pp. 283-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Jorge Zaverucha

Keyword(s):

Third World ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Political ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Political Autonomy ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Third World ◽

The Military ◽

Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Burundi: Assessing Military Institutional Reforms Post-Arusha

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1798 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Astrid Jamar ◽

Gerard Birantamije

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Public Institutions ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Peace Agreement ◽

Institutional Reforms ◽

Security Forces ◽

Rebel Groups ◽

Military Politics ◽

Military politics have been entangled with the trajectory of Burundian public institutions, experiences of violence, and the army formation. From 1994 to 2009, the peace process brought together different political parties, security forces, and rebel groups to negotiate ceasefires and major institutional reforms. Adopted in 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement contained some of the most ambitious and sophisticated security reforms. While most literature emphasizes mostly on the Arusha Peace Agreement, 22 agreements were signed by different sets of parties, including political parties and rebel groups during these 15 years of peace meditation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provides for complex security arrangements: (a) a strictly defined role, structure, and mandate of the army and other security forces; (b) sophisticated power-sharing arrangements for both leadership and composition of the army and other security forces; (c) demobilization, disarmament, integration, and training of armed forces; (d) transformation of armed groups into political parties; and (e) ceasefires. The peace talks integrated various armed political groups into Burundian institutions. Responding to four decades of violence and military dictatorship, these reforms of the military and other security forces aimed to disentangle the military from politics. Initially contested, the agreements shaped the reading of the historical contexts that justified these institutional military reforms. Indeed, provisions of these agreements also framed a narrative about violence and imposed fixed interpretations of political mobilization of violence. These imposed interpretations neglected key elements that enabled and, continue to enable, the political use of violence as well as the emergence of new forms of military politics. The main institutional approaches adopted to tackle issue of inclusion and correct imbalances in armed forces was the introduction of power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic dimensions. The formulation and further implementation of ethnic quotas reinforced the binary elements of ethnic identities, rather than promote a more fluid understanding that would appreciate intersecting elements, such as gender, political affiliation, and class and regional dimensions in the undertaking of power, alliance, and relations between executive and military institutions. Security reforms continue to affect the functioning of public institutions, with limited effects for disentangling politics and military.

The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil–Military Relations

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1874 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Florina Cristiana Matei ◽

Carolyn Halladay

Keyword(s):

Law Enforcement ◽

Democratic Governance ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Century Model ◽

Security Sector ◽

Control Effectiveness ◽

Law Enforcement Officials ◽

Military Relations ◽

Civil–military relations—particularly the principles and practices of civilian control of the security sector—have changed significantly since the 1990s as more and more states around the world seek to consolidate democracy. The scholarly focus and the policy that it informs remain stuck in a mid-20th-century model, however. While civilian control remains central, this civilian oversight must, itself, uphold the requirements of democratic governance, ensuring that the uniformed forces are well integrated into the democracy that they are sworn to protect. Moreover, this democratic civilian control also must ensure the effectiveness of the security sector in the sense that soldiers, law enforcement officials, and intelligence agencies can fulfill the range of their missions. Thus, democratic civilian control requires ongoing attention from both the civilian and the military sides.

Conclusion

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 283-298

Author(s):

Risa Brooks

Keyword(s):

Future Research ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Us Military ◽

The Individual ◽

Military Relations ◽

Military Activity ◽

The Military ◽

The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0015 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 263-282

Author(s):

Sarah Sewall

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Gray Zone ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Face ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x19877211 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Julián González Guyer ◽

Nicole Jenne

Keyword(s):

Empirical Test ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Policy Management ◽

Democratic State ◽

Democratic Rule ◽

Per Capita ◽

Military Relations ◽

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.