scholarly journals The body marked by the arteriovenous fistula: a phenomenological point of view

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (6) ◽  
pp. 2869-2875 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejanilton Melo da Silva ◽  
Rose Mary Costa Rosa Andrade Silva ◽  
Eliane Ramos Pereira ◽  
Helen Campos Ferreira ◽  
Vanessa Carine Gil de Alcantara ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Arteriovenous Fistula ◽  
Venous Access ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Comprehensive Model ◽  
The Look ◽  
Social Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Point

ABSTRACT Objective: To understand the experience of people with chronic kidney disease using arteriovenous fistula. Method: Qualitative and exploratory study based on Social Phenomenology, conducted on 30 adults undergoing hemodialysis by using the fistula, interviewed in 2017. The interviews were analyzed according to the empirical-comprehensive model proposed by Amedeo Giorgi. Results: We found the categories “The changed body aesthetics”; “The perception of the other about my body”; and “The fistula as an inseparable condition for life maintenance.” Final considerations: The experience of people using fistula showed that this venous access leaves marks that change the body aesthetics, making the body imperfect. Such changes cause low self-esteem and attract the look of the other, causing embarrassment in those who have the body changed. Thus, they react by camouflaging the fistula, without which there is no life. This perception arises from the fear that works as a catalyst for self-care.

Can the Academic Self-Concept be Positive and Realistic?

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reimer Kornmann
Keyword(s):  
Academic Performance ◽  
Opposite Effect ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Self Concept ◽  
High Ability ◽  
Self Image ◽  
Other Hand

Summary: My comment is basically restricted to the situation in which less-able students find themselves and refers only to literature in German. From this point of view I am basically able to confirm Marsh's results. It must, however, be said that with less-able pupils the opposite effect can be found: Levels of self-esteem in these pupils are raised, at least temporarily, by separate instruction, academic performance however drops; combined instruction, on the other hand, leads to improved academic performance, while levels of self-esteem drop. Apparently, the positive self-image of less-able pupils who receive separate instruction does not bring about the potential enhancement of academic performance one might expect from high-ability pupils receiving separate instruction. To resolve the dilemma, it is proposed that individual progress in learning be accentuated, and that comparisons with others be dispensed with. This fosters a self-image that can in equal measure be realistic and optimistic.

scholarly journals El dolor de los marcianos. Un análisis fenomenológico contra Rorty

2014 ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Agustín Serrano de Haro
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Physiological State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Objective State ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Phenomenological Point ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
Sobre Todo

Mi ensayo trata de mostrar que es insostenible la ficción de Rorty de una civilización avanzada científicamente cuyos habitantes no sintieran el dolor como una vivencia sufrida en primera persona y que únicamente lo captaran como una excitación objetiva de su sistema nervioso. Entre otras dudas relativas a que esa captación objetiva y exacta se hallaría en indefinida reconstrucción teórica y a que ella no puede ser la experiencia primera del dolor ni siquiera en esa otra galaxia, aduzco que tener un estado fisiológico no equivale por principio a captarlo y que captar determinados rasgos objetivos no puede equivaler por principio a sufrir, a padecer. Concluyo señalando que Rorty, en su empeño por impugnar las representaciones mentales, pierde de vista cómo la experiencia del dolor manifiesta sobre todo la condición originaria del cuerpo vivido.My paper tries to show that Rorty’s fiction of a scientifically developed civilization whose inhabitants should not feel pain as a first-person experience, but would grasp it rather as an objective state of their nervous system, is unsustainable from a phenomenological point of view. I point out several doubts concerning the facts that such an objective apprehension would be in an indefinite process of theoretical reconstruction, and that even in that other galaxy it could not be valid as the original pain situation (for example, among children). But then I focus on the principles that to have a physiological state cannot be equiva-lent to grasping it, and second that to grasp several objective features cannot be equivalent to suffering or to undergoing pain. I conclude by suggesting that Rorty’s eagerness to discard mental representations made him neglect the lived body as implied in everyday experience: the body, not the mind, comes to the fore in the experience of pain.

scholarly journals Body, Possibility and Biographical Interpretation

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-87
Author(s):  
Anabela Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Discursive Construction ◽  
Visual Interpretation ◽  
Individual Interaction ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
World Perspective

The aim of this article is to demonstrate how body-representations offer an opportunity for its visual interpretation from a biographical point of view, enhancing, on the one hand, the image’s own narrative dynamics, and, on the other, the role of the body as a place of incorporation of experiences, as well as, a vehicle mediating the individual interaction with the world. Perspective founded in the works of the artists Helena Almeida and Jorge Molder, who use self-representation as an expression of these incorporated (lived) experiences, constitutes an important discursive construction and structuring of their narrative identity through visual creation, the artists enable the other with moments of sharing knowledge, creativity and subjectivity, contributing also to the construction of the contemporary, cultural and social imagery.

scholarly journals Social-Epistemic Rhetoric of (Un)certainty in Biomedical and Psychiatric Scientific Academic Writing: a Diatextual Analysis

Human Arenas ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelia Manuti ◽  
Giuseppe Mininni ◽  
Rosa Scardigno ◽  
Ignazio Grattagliano
Keyword(s):  
Medical Journal ◽  
Academic Writing ◽  
Analytical Approach ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Research Papers ◽  
The World ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Epistemic Rhetoric

Abstract In line with the general aims of scientific textuality, research papers in the biomedical and psychiatric academic domains mostly attempt to demonstrate the validity of their assumptions and to contrast with the sense of uncertainty that sometimes frames their conclusions. Moving from this premise, the present paper aimed to focus on these features and to investigate if and the extent to which biomedical and psychiatric texts convey different social-epistemic rhetoric of uncertainty. In view of this, a qualitative study was conducted adopting diatextual analysis to investigate a corpus of 298 scientific articles taken from the British Medical Journal and from the British Journal of Psychiatry published in 2013. Our analytical approach led to identifying two different types of social-epistemic rhetoric. The first one was mostly oriented to “describing” the world, accounting for the body-mind nexus as conceptualized within the “medical” point of view. On the other hand, the second one was oriented to “interpreting” the world, debating the problematic and critical features of the body-mind relationship as developed within the psychiatry discursive realm.

scholarly journals Modes of pointing to existing spaces and the use of frames of reference

Gesture ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Le Guen
Keyword(s):  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Frames Of Reference ◽  
Spatial Relationships ◽  
External Cues ◽  
The Status ◽  
Systematic Framework

This paper aims at providing a systematic framework for investigating differences in how people point to existing spaces. Pointing is considered according to two conditions: (1) A non-transposed condition where the body of the speaker always constitutes the origo and where the various types of pointing are differentiated by the status of the target and (2) a transposed condition where both the distant figure and the distant ground are identified and their relation specified according to two frames of reference (FoRs): the egocentric FoR (where spatial relationships are coded with respect to the speaker’s point of view) and the geocentric FoR (where spatial relationships are coded in relation to external cues in the environment). The preference for one or the other frame of reference not only has consequences for pointing to real spaces but has some resonance in other domains, constraining the production of gesture in these related domains.

Ownership of Organs Taken From a Living Person

1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651
Author(s):  
Gad (Guido) Tedeschi
Keyword(s):  
Bone Marrow ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Point ◽  
Living Body ◽  
The Past ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
Living Person ◽  
Different Sources

Medical recourse to organ transplants and the transfer of other material from the body of one person to that of another has increased steadily over the past few decades. This raises new legal questions, and brings once-thought purely academic questions to the forefront.Organs and other material used for transplants can either be taken from a living person (for example, bone marrow, sperm, or blood); or from a corpse, as is the case with most transplants. Certain material, in particular kidneys, can be taken from both. In Israeli law, this duality in the sources of supply is paralleled by different sources of regulation. With respect to a corpse, the Anatomy and Pathology Law attempts to solve the main problems from a practical point of view. On the other hand, the Israeli legislator has as yet to intervene with respect to the living body.

scholarly journals Understanding Autism in Schizophrenia

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaldo Ballerini
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Research ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Profound Change ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Human Presence ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Mode Of Life ◽  
Phenomenological Point

Detachment from external reality, distancing from others, closure into a sort of virtual hermitage, and prevalence of inner fantasies, are the descriptive aspects of autism. However, from an anthropological-phenomenological point of view, in schizophrenia, the autistic mode of life can arise from a person’s being confronted with a pathological crisis in the obviousness of the intersubjective world, essentially a crisis in the intersubjective foundation of human presence. The “condition of possibility” of the autistic way of being is the deficiency of the operation that phenomenology call empathetic-intuitive constitution of the Other, an Other which is the naturalness of evidence of being a subject like me. The theme of the Other, of intersubjectivity, has become so central in the psychopathological analysis of schizophrenic disorders because the modifications of interhuman encounter cannot be seen as the secondary consequences of symptoms but constitute the fundamental disorder of schizophrenic alienation. Revision of the concept of autism from the original definition, centered on the prevalence of inner fantasies, leads to the profound change with the vision of autism as “loss” and “void.” I call attention to possibility of phenomenological research to understand autistic world starting from this “void.”

scholarly journals Again on Lith. SPALVÀ: accent and etymology

2013 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Birutė Kabašinskaitė ◽  
Gert Klingenschmitt
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Grass Seed ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Semantic Development ◽  
Last Stage ◽  
Semantic Point ◽  
The One

There is no doubt that Lith. spalvà (4) ‘colour’, Latv. spalva ‘feather, plumage; hair of quadrupeds, fur; bristle; colour of fur, colour of bristles’ and their cognate Latv. spilva ‘cotton grass, seed wool (e. g of cotton grass); [pl.] down’ is derived from the IE. root *(s)pelh- ‘to split, separate, sever’. Alternative suggestions, e. g. a connexion with IE. pel- ‘to cover’, which at first sight might seem more attractive from a semantic point of view, are doomed to fail because the underlying root must have ended in a laryngeal. This is indicated by the intonation of Latv. spal-va. There are several cases where accent class 4 of Lithuanian disyllabic ā-stems matches Latvian level or broken tone. It can be demonstrated that in these cases Latvian is more conservative than Lithuanian (e. g. Lith. kalvà [4] and Latv. kalva < *kolh-ṷah₂-). Already in the IE. parent language the root (s)pelh- must have developed the special meanings: 1. ‘to separate the useless from the usable parts’; 2. ‘to remove the skin from the body of an animal’, cf. on the one hand OLith. pẽlūs pl. ‘chaff’< *pelh-u-, OInd. palāva- pl. ‘chaff’ < *pelh-oṷ- (acc. sg. *pelh-oṷ-ṃ< *pélh-oṷ-ṃ), Pruss. pelwo ‘chaff’, Sl. *'pélva ‘chaff’ < *pélh-ṷah₂-; Lith. spãlis (2) ‘shive’ < *spolh-iḭo-; on the other hand Lat. spolium ‘the skin removed from the body of an animal’ < *spolh-iḭo n. The latter meaning first resulted in ‘(generally) skin’, whence ‘parts covering the skin’, ‘hair, bristle, feathers’ and finnaly also ‘colour of the bristles of animals’. The same holds true of Latv. spilva. It seems possible that in the case of Lithuanian the last stage of the semantic development, the transition to the abstract meaning ‘colour’ is artificial.

scholarly journals Consciência de Imagem e Fantasia. Ego de observação e ego de devaneio

Phainomenon ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 16-17 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-176
Author(s):  
Pedro M. S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Story ◽  
Free Construction ◽  
Original Presentation ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
New Criteria ◽  
Phenomenological Point

Abstract I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousnesses (Bildbewusstsein) and other non-original presentations (Vergegenwiirtigungen) such as expectations, recollections or fantasies. I centre my analyses in the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy I cal! “daydream consciousness”, on the other. I stress that figurative consciousness implies apure observational ego, whereas day-dream consciousness is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of”day dream consciousness” has, nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between the several kinds of acts of non-original presentation.

scholarly journals Pojam »Metafizike spoznaje« Nicolaia Hartmanna

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darko Polšek
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Basic Difference ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Phenomenological Point ◽  
Do So

Metaphysics of knowledge is u unique name for Hartmanns epistemology. According to it, there is a basic difference between ontological and epistemological considerations. Using knowledge at the epistemic level only, epistemology generates problems that cannot be solved by means of its own methodology. The ones that rest on ontological considerations are irreducible, they belong to the very nature of things, or to the structure of mind. Hartmann calls them »metaphysical problems«. To solve the difference between ontological and epistemological judgements, describing existence of phenomena, we have to take a certain standpoint. He calls it »metaphysics of standpoint«. That is precisely what he would like to avoid. For when we do so, we take metaphysical (metaphenomenological) assumptions, illegitnimate from the phenomenological point of view. According to him, minimum of assumptions makes a maximum of metaphysics, valid for a narrow field of phenomena only, and the other way around. The prior emphasis of his »metaphysics of knowledge« is an approval of maximum of phenomena, no matter whether they can be explained or not. That is why he names his epistemology an »outline« for a broader ontological concern. The question is to be raised, nevertheless, whether the paradoxies we delt with, on the epistemological grounds, can be solved simply by taking an ontological standpoint, or does this switch of attitude at the same time produce a »maximum of methaphysics«.

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