scholarly journals Constitutional Analysis of Intellectual Property

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 085
Author(s):  
Andre J Van der Walt ◽  
Ray M Shay
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Fair Dealing ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Face ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
State Interference ◽  
Constitutional Analysis

This article analyses the Constitutional Court’s treatment of property interests in the face of state regulation to gain an understanding of the type of state interference that is justifiable in terms of section 25(1) of the Bill of Rights. This is done by examining the Constitutional Court’s dicta relating to the meaning of deprivation and how these inform the meaning of property in the constitutional context. The methodology that the Constitutional Court has formulated to assess if state interference complies with the provisions of section 25 is explained to show the type of state regulation that has been found legitimate. We then consider how this understanding of constitutional property and the state’s legitimate exercise of its inherent police power interact in the setting of intellectual property by contrasting the various policy objectives underlying the different statutory regimes governing intellectual property. This theoretical analysis is then applied to two contemporary examples of feasible state interference with existing intellectual property interests, namely the proposed plain packaging measures which severely restrict the use of tobacco trade marks, and a fair dealing exception allowing the use of copyright works for the purpose of parody. These examples serve to illustrate the context and manner in which intellectual property interests may come before the Court and the necessary differentiation with which these interests should be treated. The appropriate judicial assessment of the true impact that state action could have on vested property interests is explained and contrasted with the balancing exercise that is employed at the earlier stage of policy making. This discussion is concluded by highlighting some of the interpretational issues that will arise and how some constitutional values could be curtailed in the absence of legislative intervention.

scholarly journals Identifying German Legal Approaches to Terror—How the Constitution Shapes Legislation Allowing the Shooting Down of a Hijacked Plane

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-136
Author(s):  
Lukas Frederik Müller
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
State Action ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Islamic Terrorism ◽  
The Face ◽  
German Legislation ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legal Structures ◽  
Vital Element

In the face of a recent increase in the number of Islamic terrorist attacks all over the globe—particularly in Europe—counterterrorism has become a main field of political and legal activity once again. In this turbulent context, this Article will look back on how German legislation has reacted to the first significant occurrences of Islamic terrorism in Europe and the United States in the 2000s and how the Constitution has been put in place in the conflict between individual and collective interests by the Federal Constitutional Court in this context. From the wide range of counterterrorism measures that were significantly shaped along the principles of the Constitution since then, this Article takes a detailed look at the legal issues relating to a very specific measure—legislation allowing the shooting down of a hijacked plane. This issue has been vigorously debated among politicians, scholars, and courts in Germany since 2004. It constitutes a vital element of the fundamental legal structures that governs state action that violates certain legal interests in order to protect conflicting ones—a key question for other recent strategies of terrorism as well.

scholarly journals Konstitusionele voorskrifte rakende regspersone

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
Gerrit Pienaar
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
State Action ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right

The interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 contain specific provisions applicable to juristic persons. Juristic persons are also entitled to the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the extent that these rights are applicable to them. It must be kept in mind that juristic persons have peculiar characteristics and that the fundamental rights of juristic persons differ from those of natural persons. Juristic persons are also under the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of natural persons and other juristic persons to the extent provided for in the Bill of Rights. In the case of juristic persons acting as organs of state the vertical application of the Bill of Rights safeguards the fundamental rights of persons against state action or interference. The circumstances where juristic persons act as organs of state are discussed with reference to case law. Difference of opinion exists regarding the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, that is the application of the Bill of Rights to private law relationships. In terms of the interim Constitution the Bill of Rights was applied horizontally in an indirect manner. Section 35(3) provided that the common and customary law must be developed by both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court to promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, without completely abolishing the common and customary law. The final Constitution provides in section 8(2) that natural and juristic persons in private law relationships are also bound by the Bill of Rights if, and to the extent that, such rights are applicable, taking into account the nature of the rights and the nature of any duty imposed by such right. The direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is, however, limited by section 36. The extent of the rights of juristic persons and limitations on them in private law relationships are investigated, taking into account the right of freedom of association in terms of section 18. The variousprinciples to be taken into consideration in the case of clubs, religious organisations, educational institutions, political organisations and trading and professional institutions are discussed. 

scholarly journals Hedging Bets with BITS

2021 ◽  
pp. 157-175
Author(s):  
Rochelle C Dreyfuss
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Public ◽  
Dispute Settlements ◽  
The Impact

This chapter argues that bilateral investment treaties (BITS) and free trade agreements (FTAs) erect a high hedge around intellectual property rights, protecting them from the impact of state regulation. Two investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) involving IP have been resolved by final award. In both cases, the state prevailed, suggesting that the hedge may not be as impenetrable as had originally been feared. However, the chapter contends that this view is mistaken. While the awards in the decided disputes may close the door on specific contentions, they invite further challenges and maintain the heavy shadow that the hedge provided by ISDS casts on state action. In order to trim that hedge, it will be necessary for the drafters of investment obligations and the tribunals that hear ISDS disputes to take into account the intangibility of IP rights in determining when IP is sufficiently localized in a host state that it should be considered protectable by that state's investment obligations. The chapter then explores ways to trim ISDS, including the possibility of using ISDS as a mechanism for building counter-norms—hedges that protect the public and its regulatory interest.

From Property Rights to Liberty Rights: We the Corporations, A Review Essay

2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
State Action ◽  
Unequal Treatment ◽  
The People ◽  
The Right ◽  
We The People

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?

scholarly journals Mengukur Konstitusionalitas Peninjauan Kembali (PK) Kedua dalam Perkara Perdata

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474
Author(s):  
Priyo Handoko
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Criminal Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Due Process Of Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Civil Cases ◽  
Constitutional Analysis

The study aims to provide a constitutional analysis of judicial review (PK) in civil cases for more than once. The research-based is the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 in which the two judgments provide a different classification between criminal and civil cases. The method used in this research is a normative juridical with a conceptual, legislation, and case approach. The results of the study assert that: first, the opportunity for judicial review (PK) more than once in a criminal case is an effort to uphold justice substantively by the Constitutional Court. Whereas the restriction of judicial review (PK) only once in civil cases is intended to guarantee legal certainty. Secondly, there is rational inconsistency in the arguments of the Constitutional Court which is indicated in Decision No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013. Both criminal and civil cases must seek to establish and maintain substantial justice, especially since there is a due process of law principle that requires that everyone can get the same opportunity before the law.

scholarly journals The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Law

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.

scholarly journals Piracy as Labour Struggle

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Mueller
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Working Conditions ◽  
Labor Process ◽  
Bulletin Board ◽  
Digital Piracy ◽  
Electronic Bulletin Board ◽  
The Face

This paper examines the organization of digital piracy in the context of reshaping labor under neoliberalism. It discusses the practices by which enclosures of intellectual property are resisted by drawing from literature on the labor process, and examining the historical emergence of piratical practice on electronic bulletin board systems. These pirates sought, above all, to preserve autonomous, self-managed working conditions in the face of tendencies to commodify, enclose, and deskill.

Intelligente Systeme – Intelligentes Recht

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Law School ◽  
Law And Technology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Science Conference ◽  
Data Protection Law ◽  
Smart Technologies ◽  
Adaptive Technologies ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between law and technology is becoming increasingly complex due to the rapid advance of digitization and the development of new and "smart" technologies. Traditional anthropocentric concepts of law seem to be in question. Moreover, the ways in which law is made and applied are changing. In the face of new and adaptive technologies, must law and its enforcement themselves become more adaptive, and how can this be done? In their contributions to the 6th GRUR Young Science conference, young scientists will address these questions from the perspective of intellectual property, media, competition, information and data protection law and will present their theses for discussion at the online conference organized at Bucerius Law School on June 4 and 5, 2021. With contributions by Dr. Jonas Botta, Dr. Michael Denga, Prof. Dr. Philipp Hacker, Dr. Elsa Kirchner, David Korb, David Linke, Janine Marinello, Ferdinand Müller, Stefan Papastefanou, Dr. Joachim Pierer, Darius Rostam, Martin Schüßler, Florian Skupin, Sebastian Theß and Nora Wienfort.

The Diffuse and Second Look Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Second Look ◽  
The Common

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.

The Resilient Constitution

2021 ◽  
pp. 277-309
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus ◽  
Alma Diamond
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Extreme Pressure ◽  
The Face ◽  
Justice Process ◽  
The One

This chapter evaluates the so called 'transitional constitution' of South Africa and the 'permanent constitution' of Colombia. Through a comparative approach, it contends that constitutions are better understood in terms of their resilience rather than either being transitional or permanent, and that a 'resilient constitution' is the one capable of springing back even after being subjected to extreme pressure, as long as leaders maintain their commitment to governing within the limits of the law. In this sense, the differences between the Colombian transitional justice and the South African case do not stem primarily from the 'permanence' of its Constitution, but rather from the difficulties and tensions inherent to any transitional justice process, because it derives from some of the very rights it is designed to promote. The chapter then details how the jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court on transitional matters can be understood as having moved from an understanding of the Constitution as permanent, to one of resilience that does not represent a new power grabbed by the Court. Rather than that, it signals an understanding of the role of the Court in maintaining a constitutional order even in the face of existential threats to it.

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