scholarly journals Protest Blues: Public opinion on the policing of protest in South Africa

Author(s):  
Benjamin James Roberts ◽  
Narnia Bohler-Muller ◽  
Jare Struwig ◽  
Steven Lawrence Gordon ◽  
Ngqapheli Mchunu ◽  
...  

The policing response to rising protest action in the country has received increased attention in the last decade. This is particularly owing to concerns over confrontations during which protesters have been arrested, injured and in some instances killed by the police. Despite the criticism voiced by various stakeholders about the manner in which the police manage crowd gatherings, relatively little is known about the views of South African adults on the policing of protest action and the factors that shape such attitudes. To provide some insight, this article draws on data from a specialised module on protest-related attitudes and behaviour that was fielded as part of the 2016 round of the Human Sciences Research Council’s South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series. This nationally representative survey included specific questions probing the public’s overall evaluation of the performance of the police in dealing with protests, and the justifiability of the use of force in policing protest action. The article will present a national picture of people’s views on the policing of protest, based on these measures, and then determine the extent to which there are distinct underlying socio-demographic cleavages in these data. A combination of bivariate and multivariate analysis is undertaken in order to understand how perceptions of effectiveness, acceptability and reported participation in protest (especially disruptive and violent actions) shape people’s views regarding policing of protest. The article concludes with a discussion that reflects on the implications of the research for the policing of protest action in future, given the appreciable rise in the incidence of protest since the mid-2000s and the mounting tensions between state institutions and communities over the political, moral and constitutional arguments for and against such actions.

Author(s):  
Narnia Bohler-Muller ◽  
Benjamin James Roberts ◽  
Jare Struwig ◽  
Steven Lawrence Gordon ◽  
Thobeka Radebe ◽  
...  

This article focuses on providing new insights into the nature of public opinion about protest action in South Africa. Since the mid-2000s the country has experienced one of the world’s highest levels of popular protest and strike action, combined with the recent resurgence of an active student protest movement. Sociological research into these protests has suggested that they represent distinct phenomena and that local protests have assumed plural forms that cut across simple violent/non-violent and orderly/disorderly binary distinctions. Despite the rapid growth of literature on South African protests, surprisingly little is known about public opinion relating to various forms of protest. Consequently, this article aims to examine differences with regard to the acceptability, perceived effectiveness and participation in respect of three categories of protest action, namely orderly, disruptive and violent protests. The article uses data from a protest module included as part of the 2016 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative series conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council. Apart from determining the nature and extent of variation in opinion regarding the three types of protest action on aggregate, the article explores patterns of similarity and differentiation across societal groups, based on class, age, race, gender and geography. Finally, we analyse how and for whom perspectives on the three forms of protest have changed over the course of a generation by drawing on functionally equivalent data collected in 1995. The article concludes by reflecting on whether the evidence supports key hypotheses regarding the ‘rebellion of the poor’1 in the country.


1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
ORIEL SULLIVAN

There are only a limited number of studies comparing housework among couples and individuals in different marital statuses, and the focus of attention has tended to be on married compared to cohabiting couples. This article focuses on differences between couples where one or more partner is remarried or recohabiting and those where both partners are in their first married or cohabiting relationships, using nationally representative survey data from Britain. It is shown in multivariate analysis that women in their second-plus partnerships contribute less in terms of their proportion of total housework time than women in their first partnerships. However, there is no effect for the man's number of previous partnerships or for current marital/cohabiting status. It is argued that the significant issue is interaction and negotiation with a subsequent partner in the light of experience gained from the breakdown of one or more previous married/cohabiting relationships.


2021 ◽  
pp. 78-116
Author(s):  
Michael Hoffman

This chapter reveals how changing political circumstances---a new axis of political competition---dramatically altered the political interests of Lebanon's sects and therefore adjusted the effect of communal prayer on regime preferences. Using an original, nationally-representative survey of over 1,200 Lebanese respondents, I show that the Syrian conflict has centered political contestation around the Sunni-Shi`a cleavage, with Christians divided on their relationship with each of these sects and on the Syrian conflict itself. Sunnis, relatively better-represented and wealthier than Shi`a, now have reason to fear Shi`a ascendance in Lebanese politics. Since the new lines of political conflict have created a zero-sum situation between these two sects, democracy is no longer a palatable option for many Sunnis. Consequently, the effect of communal prayer on regime attitudes has shifted: for Shi`a, mosque attendance continues to have a pro-democratic effect, but for Sunnis, this effect has reversed; fearing Shi`a dominance, practicing Sunnis now tend to oppose democracy more than their less observant counterparts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anye-Nkwenti Nyamnjoh ◽  
Sharlene Swartz ◽  
Benjamin Roberts ◽  
Jare Struwig ◽  
Steven Gordon

Given the urgency of redressing South Africa’s unjust legacies of the past, we interrogate the nature of support and opposition to restitution in South Africa. Informed by responses to the nationally representative South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), we contend that South Africa remains deeply polarised when it comes to addressing these unjust legacies, with race being the major fault line. When it comes to restitution, South Africans are worlds apart on three levels. We are worlds apart across racial groups; we are worlds apart within racial groups, and we are worlds apart in the kind of language we wish to use in framing our pursuit of equality. In the final analysis, while South Africans may be unified in the acknowledgement that the inequality gap is too high, and perhaps even unified in a desire for change, there is a fundamental disagreement about the desirable vehicles we hope to employ.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-27
Author(s):  
Edward Aspinall ◽  
Sally White ◽  
Amalinda Savirani

This article analyses barriers to women’s political representation in Indonesia and the ways that women candidates overcome them. Surveying the literature and drawing on three data sources – findings of thirteen teams of researchers studying women candidates running in the 2019 election, a survey of 127 such candidates, and a nationally representative survey of Indonesian citizens – the article identifies widespread patriarchal attitudes as one significant barrier, alongside structural disadvantages. It highlights two distinctive methods by which women candidates aim to overcome these barriers: one group of candidates target women voters and draw on women’s networks to mobilise what has been called “homosocial capital”; another group of dynastic candidates rely on the political and financial resources of (often male) relatives. The article briefly surveys the place of political Islam in both impeding and facilitating women’s representation. By surveying these issues, the article introduces this special issue on women’s political representation and the 2019 election.


Author(s):  
أ.د.عبد الجبار احمد عبد الله

In order to codify the political and partisan activity in Iraq, after a difficult labor, the Political Parties Law No. (36) for the year 2015 started and this is positive because it is not normal for the political parties and forces in Iraq to continue without a legal framework. Article (24) / paragraph (5) of the law requires that the party and its members commit themselves to the following: (To preserve the neutrality of the public office and public institutions and not to exploit it for the gains of a party or political organization). This is considered because it is illegal to exploit State institutions for partisan purposes . It is a moral duty before the politician not to exploit the political parties or some of its members or those who try to speak on their behalf directly or indirectly to achieve partisan gains. Or personality against other personalities and parties at the expense of the university entity.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Sophie Hacquin ◽  
Sacha Altay ◽  
Emma de Araujo ◽  
Coralie Chevallier ◽  
Hugo Mercier

A safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine is our only hope to decisively stop the spread of the SARS-CoV-2. But a vaccine will only be fully effective if a significant share of the population agrees to get it. Five consecutive surveys of a large, nationally representative sample (N = 1000 for each wave) surveyed attitudes towards a future COVID-19 vaccine in France from May 2020 to October 2020. We found that COVID-19 vaccine refusal has steadily increased, reaching an all-time high with only 23% of participants willing to probably or certainly take a future COVID-19 vaccine in September 2020. Vaccine hesitant individuals are more likely to be women, young, less educated, to vote at the political extremes, to be dissatisfied with the government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis, and to feel less at risk of COVID-19. The reasons why French people would refuse to take the COVID-19 vaccine are similar to those offered for other vaccines, and these reasons are strikingly stable across gender, age and educational level. Finally, most French people declare they would not take the vaccine as soon as possible but would instead rather wait or not take it at all.


Author(s):  
Simeon J. Yates ◽  
Eleanor Lockley

This chapter reviews prior work on technology acceptance and then reports on a nationally representative survey of UK employees exploring both employee’s personal experiences of digital technologies at home and work and their evaluations of the effectiveness of the technologies and the “digital culture” in their organization. Presenting the results of 3040 UK workers, it seeks to explore the factors that influence digital roll-outs by focusing on the experiences and perceptions of the UK workforce as a whole, with the expectation that introducing new technology alone isn’t enough. This research explores how “digitally ready” organizations are in the UK in terms of people, processes, and company culture. It concludes that a large proportion of the UK workforce are not seeing the benefits of digital technologies. Importantly, there is a need for organizations to understand that making digital solutions a success is a process of cultural change in their organization.


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