scholarly journals The geopolitics of the European Green Deal

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-235
Author(s):  
Mark Leonard ◽  
◽  
Jean Pisani-Ferry ◽  
Jeremy Shapiro ◽  
Simone Tagliapietra ◽  
...  

The European Green Deal is a plan to decarbonise the EU economy by 2050, revolutionise the EU’s energy system, profoundly transform the economy and inspire efforts to combat climate change. But the plan will also have profound geopolitical repercussions. The Green Deal will affect geopolitics through its impact on the EU energy balance and global markets; on oil and gas-producing countries in the EU neighbourhood; on European energy security; and on global trade patterns, notably via the carbon border adjustment mechanism. At least some of these changes are likely to impact partner countries adversely. The EU needs to wake up to the consequences abroad of its domestic decisions. It should prepare to help manage the geopolitical aspects of the European Green Deal. Relationships with important neighbourhood countries such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players including the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, are central to this effort, which can be structured around seven actions: 1) Help neighbouring oil and gas-exporting countries manage the repercussions of the European Green Deal. The EU should engage with these countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could in the future be exported to Europe; 2) Improve the security of critical raw materials supply and limit dependence, first and foremost on China. Essential measures include greater supply diversification, increased recycling volumes and substitution of critical materials; 3) Work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members will apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. All countries, including China, would be welcome to join if they commit to abide by the club's objectives and rules; 4) Become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. Requiring compliance with strict environmental regulations as a condition to access the EU market will be strong encouragement to go green for all countries; 5) Internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund, and EU development policy; 6) Promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, for example through a global coalition for the permafrost, which would fund measures to contain the permafrost thaw; 7) Promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action to share lessons learned and best practices.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11212
Author(s):  
Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu ◽  
Siyami Alp Limoncuoglu ◽  
Muhittin Hakan Demir ◽  
Johannes Reichl ◽  
Katrin Burgstaller ◽  
...  

The Climate Pact and the European Green Deal constitute the main components of the European Union (EU)’s climate change policy. Energy transition, that is, transformation to a zero-carbon global energy system, is one of the main pillars of climate change mitigation policies. This transformation, coupled with the empowerment of individuals within the energy system, shifts citizens from their roles as customers towards a more active role. Within this framework, energy communities stand out as significant facilitators for the participation of individuals and communities in the energy system, promoting self-consumption and contributing to the social acceptance of renewable energy initiatives, among other direct and indirect benefits. The main directives introducing energy communities into the EU legal system are RED II and ED 2019. This study, conducted as a part of a Horizon 2020-funded eCREW project, assessed the adaptability and implementability of these two directives within national legislation, along with the associated legal and administrative frameworks, utilizing evidence from Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. The comparative analysis also enhances the understanding of the concept of renewable energy communities and citizen energy communities, both in the EU and in nonmember countries. The results of the analysis revealed that none of the countries studied had yet completed the process of harmonizing their legislation concerning energy communities.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osamah Alsayegh

Abstract This paper examines the energy transition consequences on the oil and gas energy system chain as it propagates from net importing through the transit to the net exporting countries (or regions). The fundamental energy system security concerns of importing, transit, and exporting regions are analyzed under the low carbon energy transition dynamics. The analysis is evidence-based on diversification of energy sources, energy supply and demand evolution, and energy demand management development. The analysis results imply that the energy system is going through technological and logistical reallocation of primary energy. The manifestation of such reallocation includes an increase in electrification, the rise of energy carrier options, and clean technologies. Under healthy and normal global economic growth, the reallocation mentioned above would have a mild effect on curbing the oil and gas primary energy demands growth. A case study concerning electric vehicles, which is part of the energy transition aspect, is presented to assess its impact on the energy system, precisely on the fossil fuel demand. Results show that electric vehicles are indirectly fueled, mainly from fossil-fired power stations through electric grids. Moreover, oil byproducts use in the electric vehicle industry confirms the reallocation of the energy system components' roles. The paper's contribution to the literature is the portrayal of the energy system security state under the low carbon energy transition. The significance of this representation is to shed light on the concerns of the net exporting, transit, and net importing regions under such evolution. Subsequently, it facilitates the development of measures toward mitigating world tensions and conflicts, enhancing the global socio-economic wellbeing, and preventing corruption.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 772-784
Author(s):  
Yury V. Borovsky

In the early 2020s the worlds transition from carbon-intensive to climate-neutral energy use has already become a discernible and a difficult-to-reverse process. With Joe Bidens election as US president, the United States have returned to the Paris Climate Agreement and have become a key driver of this process (along with the EU and China). As a result, the international community has reached a consensus on the ongoing energy transition. This process will require considerable effort and may take several decades. Nevertheless, the impact of energy transition on traditional approaches to energy security, which emerged largely as a result of the global oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s and are centered around the supply of fossil fuels, is already a relevant research topic. This problem is examined relying on the relevant terminological, theoretical and factual material. The article concludes that energy transition will ultimately undermine the carbon paradigm that has underpinned energy security policies since the 1970s. Rapid development of renewable and other low-carbon energy sources will certainly remove key energy security risks of energy importers and, possibly, allow them to achieve energy independence. However, a post-carbon era may also generate new risks. For countries that rely heavily on oil, gas and coal exports, energy transition will result in the loss of markets and revenues. It may present an energy security threat for them as well as it will require a costly and technologically complex process of the energy sector decarbonization. Some exporters, especially those with high fuel rents and insufficient financial reserves, may face serious economic and social upheavals as a result of energy transition. The EU and the US energy transition policies reflect provisions of all three fundamental international relations theoretical paradigms, including realism. This means that the EU and the US policy, aimed at promoting climate agenda, may be expected to be rather tough and aggressive. China as the third key player in energy transition is still following a liberal course; however, it may change in the future.


2021 ◽  
Vol 705 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Arıboğan Deniz Ülke ◽  
Ibrahim Arslan

In the studies carried out within the scope of geopolitical discipline, the expression "geography is destiny" is frequently used and it is claimed that geography has unchangeable, irreversible qualities and the policies implemented are shaped through this assumption. This assumption ignores the humanitarian interventions over the geography and makes it difficult to understand the results produced by these interventions at both regional and global level. Similarly, the dynamic nature of international relations reveals new actors in the international system in times of bounce and collapse, and the borders that expand or narrow with each transformation can differentiate the geopolitical view with new sovereign countries. In the historical process, transportation accessibility, trade, search for raw materials, security and alliance relations have caused the same geography to be interpreted differently in different periods. This situation also applies to the geography of Turkey had been the homeland of empires. The developments in the Middle East over the past two decades has created a sensitivity in the relations between Turkey and the West, especially the United States. Competing interests with the EU and the US in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, has necessitated a reassessment of Turkey's geography.


Author(s):  
Michael B. McElroy

The discussion in chapter 2 addressed what might be described as a microview of the US energy economy— how we use energy as individuals, how we measure our personal consumption, and how we pay for it. We turn attention now to a more expansive perspective— the use of energy on a national scale, including a discussion of associated economic benefits and costs. We focus specifically on implications for emissions of the greenhouse gas CO2. If we are to take the issue of human- induced climate change seriously— and I do— we will be obliged to adjust our energy system markedly to reduce emissions of this gas, the most important agent for human- induced climate change. And we will need to do it sooner rather than later. This chapter will underscore the magnitude of the challenge we face if we are to successfully chart the course to a more sustainable climate- energy future. We turn later to strategies that might accelerate our progress toward this objective.We elected in this volume to focus on the present and potential future of the energy economy of the United States. It is important to recognize that the fate of the global climate system will depend not just on what happens in the United States but also to an increasing extent on what comes to pass in other large industrial economies. China surpassed the United States as the largest national emitter of CO2 in 2006. The United States and China together were responsible in 2012 for more than 42% of total global emissions. Add Russia, India, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Iran to the mix (the other members of the top 10 emitting countries ordered in terms of their relative contributions), and we can account for more than 60% of the global total. Given the importance of China to the global CO2 economy (more than 26% of the present global total and likely to increase significantly in the near term), I decided that it would be instructive to include here at least some discussion of the situation in China— to elaborate what the energy economies of China and the United States have in common, outlining at the same time the factors and challenges that set them apart.


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 548
Author(s):  
Gavin Thompson

How will the global energy system move sharply towards a pathway compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement by 2030? Despite great efforts on cost reductions in renewables, alternative technologies, advanced transportation and supportive government policies, progress to date is not enough. The challenge is now one of scalability. Although some technologies required for a 2°C future are economic and proven, many others are not. Optimists look at the cost of solar and wind and say we have all we need to achieve our targets. The reality is that significant additional investment is needed to get them to material scale, globally. And too often huge challenges are downplayed in sectors beyond power and transport, including industry, aviation, shipping, heating and agriculture. Given the criticality of climate change, these multiple challenges must now be addressed. Consequently, any accelerated pace of decarbonisation represents an existential challenge to the oil and gas industry, including in Australia. If companies are to remain investible through the long term, all will need to transition to business models that are aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. This paper considers what the path to decarbonisation could look like and how oil and gas companies must respond in order to prosper through the energy transition.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacopo Torriti ◽  
Ragnar Lofstedt

In times of low economic growth and post-Copenhagen climate talks, a number of reasons for regulatory competition and cooperation between the United States and the European Union coexist. This paper discusses the role of Impact Assessment between the US and the EU on responses to the economic downturn and climate change. It is argued that, in the future, IAs will be an instrument through which it will be possible to read the level of cooperation and competition between the US and the EU, particularly on economic trade and environmental regulation.


Significance The United States has already committed, in an unprecedented deal with China in November 2014, to reducing its emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 (an improvement on its previous 17% goal). China in return pledged that its emissions would peak around 2030. This agreement is a game-changer for combating global climate change, since the two countries are the world's largest sources of carbon emissions, together accounting for 40% of the total, and were not covered under the now-expired Kyoto Protocol. Impacts Washington is poised to reclaim its place, lost after Kyoto, as a leader in global efforts against climate change. US-China climate cooperation initiatives could serve as templates for other developing countries. There are new opportunities for trilateral cooperation involving the EU. Fears that the bilateral agreement makes the UNFCCC obsolete are unwarranted, but it could preclude more ambitious efforts.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (17) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren E. Hay ◽  
Steven L. Markstrom ◽  
Christian Ward-Garrison

Abstract The hydrologic response of different climate-change emission scenarios for the twenty-first century were evaluated in 14 basins from different hydroclimatic regions across the United States using the Precipitation-Runoff Modeling System (PRMS), a process-based, distributed-parameter watershed model. This study involves four major steps: 1) setup and calibration of the PRMS model in 14 basins across the United States by local U.S. Geological Survey personnel; 2) statistical downscaling of the World Climate Research Programme’s Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 climate-change emission scenarios to create PRMS input files that reflect these emission scenarios; 3) run PRMS for the climate-change emission scenarios for the 14 basins; and 4) evaluation of the PRMS output. This paper presents an overview of this project, details of the methodology, results from the 14 basin simulations, and interpretation of these results. A key finding is that the hydrological response of the different geographical regions of the United States to potential climate change may be very different, depending on the dominant physical processes of that particular region. Also considered is the tremendous amount of uncertainty present in the climate emission scenarios and how this uncertainty propagates through the hydrologic simulations. This paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned and potential for future work.


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