scholarly journals EVOLUTION OF US POLICY TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN XXI CENTURY: FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT TRUMP

Author(s):  
P. Sinovets ◽  
V. Gergiieva

Since 2002 until now, the Iranian nuclear program remains one of the hottest international problems despite the efforts of three US presidential administrations, which ruled during this time to solve the Iranian issue. This article analyses and compares the policy toward Iran of three US presidents George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, discusses the positive and negative consequences of their attempts to solve the Iranian nuclear issue, and outlines the future prospects of US-Iran communication over the nuclear deal. President Trump's policy on Iran was somewhat similar to that of President Bush, both presidents rejected the policy of any concessions to Iran and focused on the policy of pressure. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA influenced not only the relations between the US and Iran, but also the relations of European countries, as since its release in 2018, Europe has tried to save the JCPOA and deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. In general, Trump's policies not only canceled the nuclear deal, which was the result of long negotiations by the Obama administration, but also complicated further negotiations with Iran. Despite the victory of Democrat Joe Biden, who is a follower of Obama's policies, signing a new agreement with Iran may be even more difficult than it was in 2013-2015, because Iran's missile program has become even more developed, as well as distrust of international treaties as well. The article analyzes the possible consequences of Trump's policies and options for returning to dialogue and agreement. The next crucial stage in Iran-US relations is the upcoming elections in Iran in 2021, the results of which will affect the readiness of any concessions to ease sanctions and establish a dialogue. Key words: Iranian nuclear program, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), economic sanctions.

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (85) ◽  
pp. 30-62
Author(s):  
Paulina Matera ◽  
Rafał Matera

Abstract In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21st century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As to whether the effectiveness of the sanctions through the cooperation has been enhanced, the answer is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cooperating transatlantic partners managed to coerce Iran through isolating the country from international economic contacts and negotiated the JCPOA. On the other hand, Trump’s renouncement of this agreement brought many negative consequences and undermined the earlier joint effort.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 297
Author(s):  
Satwika Paramasatya ◽  
Sigit Wiranto

Iran Nuclear Agreement or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)was the result of diplomatic negotiations achieved by the United States,United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany, and Iran in 2015. Thenewly elected president of the United States Donald Trump brought newpolicies to the Iran’s nuclear issue. On May 8, 2018 The US governmentunilaterally withdraw themselves from the JCPOA agreement anddecided to reimpose the sanctions for Iran. This research tries to analyzewhy the US changed its policy to withdraw from the nuclear agreement byusing analytic eclecticism, with the combination of the security dilemmaand cognitive consistency theory. The result of this research shows thatthe US’ withdrawal from JCPOA psychologically caused by Trump’scognitive consistency. He thought that Iran’s nuclear agreement is a badand unreliable agreement because under this nuclear agreement, US andits allies still feel the security dilemma. Therefore, it pushed Trump toincrease the pressure to Iran by withdrawing themselves from the nuclearagreement.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


China Report ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruan Zongze ◽  
Debasish Chaudhuri

The trend of Bush's policy and its impact in international affairs is worth noting during the second presidential term of George Bush. The US, besides persisting in pushing forward its ‘democratisation plan in the greater Middle East’, has been intensifying its attempt to penetrate into Central Asia. For some time now, the main focus of US foreign policy has been Iraq, the Gulf and the Middle East, but it has given equal importance to containing the so-called ‘North Korean nuclear weapon’ and to the ‘Iranian nuclear issue’. There were new developments in China-Russia-India tripartite relations. China and India agreed to establish a strategic partnership, greatly promoting bilateral relations between them. The developmental process in these countries, Russia-China and India, has provided ample scope for strengthening trilateral cooperation among them.


Significance US President Donald Trump declined to certify on October 13 that continued sanctions relief for Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is in the US national interest. Reintroducing nuclear-related sanctions targeting third-country companies doing business with Iran -- ‘secondary sanctions’ -- could have a significant impact on European investments in Iran. Impacts With financing a requirement for business engagement, banks’ hesitation to engage with Iran will curb European investments. Transatlantic sanctions policy coordination is likely to deteriorate further, with the private sector caught in the crossfire. High-value hydrocarbons and aircraft contracts may make investing in Iran worth the risk for large firms, but other sectors may not follow.


Author(s):  
Nabel Ashraf Anwar

Iran’s nuclear issue has been one of the core issues of International politics. Concurrently, the issue of survival of the State of Israel and the threat perception of the US allies in the Middle East pushed Washington to attenuate  Iran’s inchoate nuclear policy. Incubus period during Obama administration even brought about erratic companionship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This asymmetry-in the span of mere years- has rekindled long-simmering protectionist impulses and Trump administration elected. A new page began being written on the Iran’s nuclear issue.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.


Author(s):  
V. Gergiieva ◽  
D. Levinson

The current confrontation between the State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not an exceptionally new phenomenon; however, it is noticeable that escalation around the “Iran nuclear deal” makes this issue one of the most urgent on the current political agenda. This article focuses on countries’ strategic culture as both public and non-state actors see and respond to challenges and opportunities international system − which is the result of cultural perception. Iranian and Israeli strategic cultures have some similarities - consideration of which is necessary to understand the specifics of the relationship between the two states and Jerusalem's possible response to a potential nuclearization of Tehran. Cultural details are often overlooked when we are trying to analyze the policy of a particular state, however, this analysis can provide an understanding of a particular country's response to challenges and threats. Learning more about how and why actors use force in the system is an important topic to which strategic culture may provide some answers but the process of applying it is difficult. In this article, we overview historical preconditions of Iran-Israel relations, Israel's specific view of its ambitions in the region, and nowadays escalation between two countries. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is still on the agenda between the two countries, while negotiations in Vienna continue, Iran increased its enrichment up to 60 percent – the highest level in Iranian history. Iranian nuclear program is a cornerstone in the US-Iran and Iran-Israel relations, but the strategic culture of Israel still cannot adopt improvement of relations between the US and Iran, as Iranian progress in its nuclear ambitions. 


The circumstances of Iran’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed between Iran and the six great powers in 2015, were considered. It is indicated that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and US economic sanctions against Iran were the main reasons for Tehran’s phased withdrawal from the nuclear deal. It was noted that the assassinations of two well-known Iranian figures at the beginning and at the end of 2020 – General Qasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh provoked Iran to completely abandon the provisions of the JCPOA and to radicalize its nuclear policy. The implications of Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the nuclear deal for the security of Euro-Atlantic structures are analyzed. It has been proven that the risks associated with the development of the Iranian nuclear program were relatively insignificant during 2019. However, these risks began to increase in 2020 and especially at the beginning of 2021. The circumstances of Iran’s decision on possible increasing the uranium enrichment level to 20% and on the probable limiting the access to Iranian nuclear facilities for international inspectors were considered. It is analyzed whether such a decision of Iran can bring this country closer to obtaining nuclear weapons. It is concluded that, most likely, despite the technical capabilities, Iran will not make a political decision to produce an atomic bomb in the near future to avoid its complete isolation. Therefore, the potential nuclear conflict with Iran does not yet threaten to Euro-Atlantic security. Differences in attitudes towards the Iranian nuclear program between the United States and its European NATO allies during Donald Trump’s presidency are traced. The prospects for a change in the American position toward Iran during Joseph Biden’s presidency are assessed. The article analyzes the difficulties that the United States and its allies may face in the course of negotiations with Iran during the presidency of J. Biden. It is indicated that the influential conservative elements in Iran may delay Iran’s return to the nuclear deal in order to bargain for better conditions. It is concluded that the United States and its allies should respond to possible Iranian provocations by economic sanctions rather than by forceful actions, which could lead to an escalation that is dangerous for the Euro-Atlantic security.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Cheban ◽  

The article stresses on the importance to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program during Joe Biden’s presidency and suggests using the experience of the past nuclear talks with Iran to find a solution of this issue. The article notes that its purpose is to analyze the experience of past negotiations on resolving the problem of Iran’s nuclear program and the prospects of practical application of this experience to solve this problem in the future. The method of system analysis, method of comparative analysis and method of content analysis were used in the article. The article considers the experience of the negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program that took place in 2013 – 2015 and successfully ended by signing the nuclear deal with Iran – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is analyzed in the article what the lessons could be drawn from those past negotiations and how these lessons could be used by President Joe Biden and other western leaders to achieve a good nuclear deal with Iran. It is concluded that the preconditions for the nuclear talks with Iran in the mid-2010s significantly differed from the situation around Iran’s nuclear program in the early 2020s and at the beginning of Joe Biden’s presidency. The article mentions that unlike in the mid-2010s, in the early 2020s the international community and even the NATO allies did not have a united position toward Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, Joe Biden’s administration faced much more developed and modernized Iran’s missile and space program than Barak Obama’s administration did. The article proves that those two main obstacles (absence of the united international position regarding Iran’s nuclear program and much more developed missile program) hindered Joe Biden’s administration to bring the United States back to the JCPOA immediately after presidential inauguration in January 2021. The article also mentions another obstacle for recovering JCPOA – Iran’s regional policy that harms US interests as well as the interests of US partners in the Middle East. It is reminded in the article that that obstacle was already present during Barak Obama’s presidency and did not hinder to achieve the JCPOA. The article supposes that in a similar way Joe Biden’s administration could postpone solving the regional contradictions with Iran in order to close at least nuclear issue at the beginning. It is reminded in the article that some provisions of the JCPOA will expire soon, and this opens an opportunity to start already now negotiating the new nuclear deal with Iran that would take into account concerns regarding Iran’s missile program and its regional policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document