scholarly journals Experience of the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran in 2013-2015: Lessons for Joe Biden’s Administration

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Cheban ◽  

The article stresses on the importance to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program during Joe Biden’s presidency and suggests using the experience of the past nuclear talks with Iran to find a solution of this issue. The article notes that its purpose is to analyze the experience of past negotiations on resolving the problem of Iran’s nuclear program and the prospects of practical application of this experience to solve this problem in the future. The method of system analysis, method of comparative analysis and method of content analysis were used in the article. The article considers the experience of the negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program that took place in 2013 – 2015 and successfully ended by signing the nuclear deal with Iran – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is analyzed in the article what the lessons could be drawn from those past negotiations and how these lessons could be used by President Joe Biden and other western leaders to achieve a good nuclear deal with Iran. It is concluded that the preconditions for the nuclear talks with Iran in the mid-2010s significantly differed from the situation around Iran’s nuclear program in the early 2020s and at the beginning of Joe Biden’s presidency. The article mentions that unlike in the mid-2010s, in the early 2020s the international community and even the NATO allies did not have a united position toward Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, Joe Biden’s administration faced much more developed and modernized Iran’s missile and space program than Barak Obama’s administration did. The article proves that those two main obstacles (absence of the united international position regarding Iran’s nuclear program and much more developed missile program) hindered Joe Biden’s administration to bring the United States back to the JCPOA immediately after presidential inauguration in January 2021. The article also mentions another obstacle for recovering JCPOA – Iran’s regional policy that harms US interests as well as the interests of US partners in the Middle East. It is reminded in the article that that obstacle was already present during Barak Obama’s presidency and did not hinder to achieve the JCPOA. The article supposes that in a similar way Joe Biden’s administration could postpone solving the regional contradictions with Iran in order to close at least nuclear issue at the beginning. It is reminded in the article that some provisions of the JCPOA will expire soon, and this opens an opportunity to start already now negotiating the new nuclear deal with Iran that would take into account concerns regarding Iran’s missile program and its regional policy.

Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


Author(s):  
P. Sinovets ◽  
V. Gergiieva

Since 2002 until now, the Iranian nuclear program remains one of the hottest international problems despite the efforts of three US presidential administrations, which ruled during this time to solve the Iranian issue. This article analyses and compares the policy toward Iran of three US presidents George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, discusses the positive and negative consequences of their attempts to solve the Iranian nuclear issue, and outlines the future prospects of US-Iran communication over the nuclear deal. President Trump's policy on Iran was somewhat similar to that of President Bush, both presidents rejected the policy of any concessions to Iran and focused on the policy of pressure. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA influenced not only the relations between the US and Iran, but also the relations of European countries, as since its release in 2018, Europe has tried to save the JCPOA and deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. In general, Trump's policies not only canceled the nuclear deal, which was the result of long negotiations by the Obama administration, but also complicated further negotiations with Iran. Despite the victory of Democrat Joe Biden, who is a follower of Obama's policies, signing a new agreement with Iran may be even more difficult than it was in 2013-2015, because Iran's missile program has become even more developed, as well as distrust of international treaties as well. The article analyzes the possible consequences of Trump's policies and options for returning to dialogue and agreement. The next crucial stage in Iran-US relations is the upcoming elections in Iran in 2021, the results of which will affect the readiness of any concessions to ease sanctions and establish a dialogue. Key words: Iranian nuclear program, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), economic sanctions.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.


2020 ◽  
pp. 152-179
Author(s):  
Rupal N. Mehta

This chapter presents an in-depth case study analysis of the Iranian nuclear program from its inception to the country’s ultimate decision to renounce its nuclear ambitions in 2015. The chapter begins by examining the trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program and some of the initial attempts by the international community to persuade Iran to end it. Using archival and interview-based data, this analysis demonstrates the powerful role of inducements offered by the United States and other members of the international community, in conjunction with the election of President Rouhani, that provided a window of opportunity that ultimately led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The chapter concludes with an update about the long-term viability of the Iran deal.


2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”


Author(s):  
Joseph A. Giacalone

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">For the past half century, the commercial potential of space has been a major rationale for the space program in the United States and elsewhere. This paper will provide an overview of space-related industries, which accounted for global revenues in the range of $106 billion by 2006, and the drivers that impact their development. It incorporates the evolution of space policy, recent economic data, and the emergence of the private spaceflight industry.</span></span></p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 297
Author(s):  
Satwika Paramasatya ◽  
Sigit Wiranto

Iran Nuclear Agreement or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)was the result of diplomatic negotiations achieved by the United States,United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany, and Iran in 2015. Thenewly elected president of the United States Donald Trump brought newpolicies to the Iran’s nuclear issue. On May 8, 2018 The US governmentunilaterally withdraw themselves from the JCPOA agreement anddecided to reimpose the sanctions for Iran. This research tries to analyzewhy the US changed its policy to withdraw from the nuclear agreement byusing analytic eclecticism, with the combination of the security dilemmaand cognitive consistency theory. The result of this research shows thatthe US’ withdrawal from JCPOA psychologically caused by Trump’scognitive consistency. He thought that Iran’s nuclear agreement is a badand unreliable agreement because under this nuclear agreement, US andits allies still feel the security dilemma. Therefore, it pushed Trump toincrease the pressure to Iran by withdrawing themselves from the nuclearagreement.


2012 ◽  
Vol 542-543 ◽  
pp. 353-357
Author(s):  
Yu Wang ◽  
Qiang Zhao ◽  
Bao Yu Huo ◽  
Zhi Wei Cai

HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) is a system analysis method used to identify design defects and dangerousness and operability of process, , which has been widely used in the oil industry at home and abroad. In this paper the basic principle and analysis process of HAZOP analysis method were detailedly introduced. Taken the HAZOP practical application of offshore jacket platform in Jidong Oilfield for example, the defects which can lead the security and operation problems during the process of equipments design and operation were systematically identified. Combined with analyses of the achievements of this practical application, the advantages of the implementation of HAZOP method are concluded such as effectively reducing engineering design defects and safety problem of operation process; improving safe reliability of process system.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginie Grzelczyk

AbstractOver the past decade, multiple attempts have been made to curb North Korea's development of a nuclear program. Major world powers such as the United States and China have reached out to Pyongyang through bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes. The Six-Party Talks, the current negotiation mechanism used to discuss options for a potential denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, have brought back hopes that a deal might one day be reached. What type of framework is provided by the Six-Party Talks? How have parties' negotiation behaviors been influenced by the Talks, and how have they in turn impacted the process? Could this negotiation mechanism eventually become more institutionalized? Although this process has not yet emerged as a successful example of an institution that can influence North Korea's determination to become a nuclear power, it has moved beyond its infancy and should be considered a viable tool within foreign policy options.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document