scholarly journals Inércia Legislativa e Ativismo Judicial: A Dinâmica da Separação dos Poderes na Ordem Constitucional Brasileira / Legislative Inaction and Judicial Activism: the Dynamics of Separation of Powers in the Brazilian Constitutional Order

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glauco Salomão Leite
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political System ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Dimensional Approach ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Supreme ◽  
Do So

Resumo:O trabalho analisa o movimento rumo ao ativismo judicial por parte do Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento dos mandados de injunção. A partir de uma abordagem neutra, institucional e multidimensional do ativismo judicial, investiga qual tem sido a postura do Tribunal na fiscalização das omissões inconstitucionais. Para tanto, avalia seus precedentes judiciais, identificando que o STF tem realizado uma nova configuração na relação institucional com o Poder Legislativo. Conclui ressaltando que a Corte se reconhece como órgão legítimo para avançar sobre o sistema político quando este negligencia seu dever de legislar.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial; Omissões normativas; Separação dos poderes.Abstract:The paper analyzes the movement toward judicial activism by the Federal Supreme Court in the trial of mandatory of injunction. From a neutral, institutional and multi-dimensional approach to judicial activism, investigates what has been the attitude of the Court in the surveillance of unconstitutional omissions. In order to do so, evaluates its judicial precedents, certifying that the Supreme Court has made a new setting in the institutional relationship with the Legislature power. Concludes pointing that the Court has recognized itself as legitimate branch to move forward on the political system when it neglects its duty to legislate.Keywords: Judicial activism; Legislative omissions; Separation of powers.

Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court.

1983 ◽  
Vol 98 (4) ◽  
pp. 730
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris ◽  
Arthur Selwyn Miller
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Political ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Political Role ◽  
The Supreme Court

scholarly journals Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 294
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political System ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Judicial Corruption ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Configuration

Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia

scholarly journals The Supreme Federal Court as Queen of Chess: Partisan Fragmentation and Judicial Empowerment in Brazil

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (73) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Victor de Queiroz Barbosa ◽  
Ernani Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The Political ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Multinomial Models ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Synthetic Indicator ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Party Composition ◽  
Federal Supreme

ABSTRACT Introduction: This article deals with the Supreme Federal Court’s empowerment trajectory, exploring exogenous variables in order to explain what made the Supreme Court so institutionally powerful, and how it happened. After the classic studies on the global expansion of the judicial power, that pointed to a myriad of causes as a result of the phenomenon, several recent researches have indicated the political-party fragmentation as the main cause of judicial empowerment. Seeking to corroborate these analyses, the present work analyzes the institutional empowerment of the Brazilian Judiciary from 1945 to 2015, testing the hypothesis the greater the party fragmentation, more institutional power the STF holds. Materials and Methods: As a dependent variable, a synthetic indicator was created to measure the institutional power of the Federal Supreme Court year by year. The independent variables measure the party composition of the Chamber of Deputies annually for the same period. In addition to these variables, other measures were imported from the V-Dem database. For this analysis, simple linear, generalized linear and multinomial models were used. Results: We identified significant impact of party fragmentation on institutional empowerment of the Supreme Court. In all tests, party fragmentation increased the chances of institutional empowerment of the Brazilian judiciary. Discussion: The exogenous reforms that generated this empowerment took place with the support of the Executive and the leniency of the Legislative, transforming the Brazilian Supreme Court into the Queen of the Chess.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

Judicial Review (Departmentalism) vs Supremacy: The Connection to a 17th Century Debate and a Dilemma for Today

ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Boleslaw Z. Kabala
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Legal Scholar ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Do So

AbstractProponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza’s solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.

scholarly journals The Return of Federalism and Constitutional Politics: Analyzing the Role of the Supreme Court as an Arbiter in Contemporary Political Society

Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Marjun Parcasio
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Past ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Death Experience

Since the ascendancy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the centrepiece of a new constitutional order in Canada, there has been a distinctive decline of federal discourse in the courts and within the political sphere. Traditional cases pertaining to the division of powers at the Supreme Court have been eclipsed by the novelty of rights jurisprudence that has consumed the court in the past three decades1. Moreover, constitutional issues have been considered an anathema since the failure of the negotiations at Meech Lake and Charlottetown, exacerbated by the near-death experience for federalism in the 1995 referendum in Québec. In recent years, however, the changing nature of Canada’s political dynamics has signalled a return of federalism and constitutional politics [...]

scholarly journals A influência política nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal / Political Influence in the Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-319
Author(s):  
Juvêncio Borges Silva ◽  
Fernanda Morato da Silva Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Body ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Niklas Luhmann ◽  
Political Issue ◽  
The Law ◽  
Federal Supreme

A presente pesquisa analisa a influência política nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal, particularmente o cumprimento da Constituição Federal e seus ideais principiológicos pela Corte Suprema e sua atuação contramajoritária e representativa. Nesse sentido, questiona a interpretação aberta da Constituição no que se refere “poder” ou “dever” conferido ao órgão. Pretende-se elucidar a separação dos poderes e a crise política instalada no país, de maneira a suscitar a judicilialização e o ativismo judicial, este último como instrumento do judiciário para legislar em favor/contra determinada questão política. Orienta-se pelo método hipotético-dedutivo, lastreado em livros, artigos científicos e publicações em sites institucionais, referenciada pela teoria sistêmica de Niklas Luhmann. Ao cabo, conclui-se que a separação dos poderes, a observância dos códigos que orientam o direito e a política e o equilíbrio de atuação de cada um são indispensáveis para manutenção da República. O modelo ideal não estará em nenhum dos dois extremos, nenhuma ou total influência política. O direito deve ser autônomo à política, pois essa autonomia é essencial para a subsistência do conceito de Estado de direito e para a confiança da sociedade nas instituições judiciais.   Abstract: This research analyzes the political influence in the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, particularly, the fulfillment of the Federal Constitution and its ideological ideologies by the Supreme Court and its counter majoritarian and representative action. In this sense, it questions the open interpretation of the Constitution regarding "power" or "duty" conferred on the body. It seeks to elucidate the separation of powers and the political crisis installed in the country, in order to raise judicialization and judicial activism, the latter as an instrument of the judiciary to legislate for / against a particular political issue. It uses the hypothetical-deductive method, backed by books, scientific articles and publications on institutional sites, referenced by the systemic theory of Niklas Luhmann. The study led to the conclusion that the separation of powers, the observance of the codes that guide the law and the policy and the balance of action of each one are indispensable for the maintenance of the Republic. The ideal model will not be at either extreme, no or total political influence. The law must be autonomous to politics, since this autonomy is essential for the survival of the concept of the rule of law and for the trust of society in judicial institutions.

scholarly journals ENTRE O ATIVISMO E (IN) OPERÂNCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERAÇÃO E LEGITIMIDADE DAS DECISÕES DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL EM SEDE DE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE EM UM CONTEXTO DE NOVOS ARRANJOS INSTITUCIONAIS E DE REVISÃO DA TEORIA DA SEPARAÇÃO DOS PODERES

2014 ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Bruno Denis Vale Castro ◽  
Paulo Roberto Barbosa Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Creation ◽  
New Devices

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a deliberação interna e legitimidade das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de Controle de Constitucionalidade, observada uma conjuntura de revisão da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes e necessidade de criação de novos arranjos institucionais. Neste aspecto, tem-se como objetivo geral repensar o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal em um modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como sua legitimidade, justificação de suas decisões e deliberação interna, superando a dicotomia ativismo judicial/ deferência ao legislativo, tendo em vista a necessidade de readequação da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, de modo que se leve a Constituição a sério e se responda ao anseio de desenvolvimento democrático-social brasileiro.Por fim, considera-se que a necessidade de que algum órgão delibere em sede de controle de constitucionalidade não significa que esta deva ser permanente ou que não possa haver alguma espécie de diálogo entre os poderes, concebendo assim, que Supremo Tribunal Federal não detém o monopólio da guarda da Constituição, havendo a possibilidade de um papel mais protagonista do legislativo, a partir da utilização dos mecanismos já existentes ou mesmo da criação de novos dispositivos que permitam diálogos institucionais.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial. Diálogos institucionais. Controle de constitucionalidadeBETWEEN THE ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE (IN) EFFICIENY: DELIBERATION AND LEGITIMACY OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN OFFICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERSABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the internal deliberation and legitimacy of decisions of the Supreme Court in place of Judicial Review, observed a conjuncture Revision Theory of Separation of Powers and the need to create new institutional arrangements. In this respect, it has the general objective to rethink the role of the Supreme Court in a model of judicial review, as well as its legitimacy, justification of their decisions and internal deliberation, overcoming the dichotomy judicial activism /deference to the legislature, with a view the need to readjust the Theory of Separation of Powers, so that light the Constitution seriously and respond to the yearning of Brazilian democratic and social de-velopment. Finally, it is considered that the need for some body deliberates on seat of judicial review does not mean that it must be permanent or may not be some sort of dialogue between the powers, conceived so that the Supreme Court does not hold monopoly of safeguarding the Constitution , with the possibility of a more protagonist role of the legislature, from the use of existing or even the creation of new devices that allow institutional dialogue mechanisms.KEYWORDS: Judicial activism. Institutional dialogues. Judicial review.ENTRE EL ACTIVISMO Y LA (IN) OPERANCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERACIÓN Y LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS DECISIONES DE LA CORTE SUPREMA EN LA SEDE DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD, EN UN CONTEXTO DE NUEVOS ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES Y LA REVISIÓN DE LA TEORÍA DE LA SEPARACIÓN DE PODERESRESUMEN: El articulo intenta analizar la deliberación interna y la legitimidad de las decisiones del Supremo Tribunal Federal en sede de Control de Constitucionalidad, observada una coyuntura de revisión de la Teoría de la Separa-ción de los Poderes y la necesidad de creación de nuevas relaciones institucionales. En ese aspecto, tiene como objetivo general pensar de otra forma el papel del Supremo Tribunal Federal en un modelo de control de constitu-cionalidad, y también su legitimidad, justificación de sus decisiones y deliberación interna, con la superación de la dicotomía activismo judicial/deferencia al legislativo, teniendo en vista la necesidad de readecuación de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes, de forma que se lleve a Constitución en serio y se presenta una respuesta a los deseos de desarrollo democrático-social brasileño. Al final, tiene en consideración la necesidad de que algún órgano delibere en sede de control de constitucionalidad no significa que este debe ser permanente o que no pueda haber alguna suerte de dialogo entre los poderes, concibiendo así, que el Supremo Tribunal Federal no detiene el mono-polio de la guardia de la constitución, habiendo la posibilidad de un papel más protagonista do legislativo, a partir de la utilización de los mecanismos ya existentes o mismo de la creación de nuevos dispositivos que vengan a permitir diálogos institucionales.PALABRAS CLAVE: Activismo judicial. Diálogos institucionales. Control de constitucionalidad

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