scholarly journals Vigilando al vigilante: el Tribunal Constitucional y sus circunstancias = Guarding the guardian: The constitutional court and its circumstances

2017 ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel Alegre Martínez
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Will ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The One ◽  
The Guardian

<p>El escaso uso de los mecanismos de reforma constitucional ha hecho recaer sobre el Tribunal Constitucional, casi en exclusiva, la tarea de actualizar la Constitución española de 1978, a través de la interpretación evolutiva de la misma. En este trabajo, nos ocupamos, por una parte, de las dificultades a las que el Tribunal Constitucional ha tenido que enfrentarse en el desempeño de sus funciones; y, por otra, en el mayor o menor acierto en el ejercicio de las mismas. Reflexionamos sobre la delicada posición del Tribunal Constitucional, situado en el límite entre interpretar la voluntad del poder constituyente y sustituirla; así como en la frontera entre el activismo y la autocontención. Intentamos establecer la incidencia de algunas de sus decisiones sobre los problemas que afectan actualmente a nuestro sistema constitucional, en especial al Estado de las Autonomías.</p><p> </p><p>The limited use of the mechanisms of constitutional reform has made to rest on the Constitutional Court, almost exclusively, the task of updating the Spanish Constitution of 1978, through its evolutive interpretation. In this paper, we attend to, on the one hand, the difficulties to which the Constitutional Court has had to face in the development of its functions; and, on the other hand, the greater or lesser success in the exercise of the same. We reflect about the delicate position of the Constitutional Court, located on the border between interpreting the will of the constituent power or replace it; as well as on the border between activism or self-restraint. We are trying to establish the incidence of some of its decisions on the problems that currently affect our constitutional system, in particular to the State of Autonomies.</p>

scholarly journals Penataan Kelembagaan Pengujian Norma Hukum di Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 206
Author(s):  
Tanto Lailam
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Guardian

Artikel ini membahas tentang penataan kelembagaan pengujian norma hukum di Indonesia, yang diawali dengan pembahasan problematika kelembagaan dan praktik pengujian norma hukum saat ini dan gagasan penataaan lembaga kedepan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa beberapa persoalan, meliputi (1) kelembagaan yang tidak ideal dan tidak sesuai dengan checks and balances system, hal ini terbukti banyaknya lembaga yang terlibat dalam pengujian norma, yakni MK, MA, dan Mendagri–Gubernur (Wakil Pemerintah Pusat); (2) persoalan objek pengujian yang tidak memiliki batasan yang jelas; (3) dalam praktik, persoalan tolok ukur pengujian terjadi kerumitan, terutama dalam penggunaan tolok ukur dalam menilai pertentangan norma hukum. Gagasan penataan kelembagaan ini di desain untuk kelembagaan satu atap pada MK, yang didasari argumentasi bahwa: MK sebagai pengawal Pancasila dan UUD 1945, dalam rangka penataan kelembagaan yang berbasis pada mekanisme checks and balances system, mewujudkan hierarkisitas peraturan perundang-undangan yang berkelanjutan, implementasi pengujian formil dalam praktik pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang, penataan regulasi menjadi lebih tersistem, pengujian produk hukum tertentu merupakan pintu masuk untuk melihat semua persoalan pertentangan normanya pada setiap hierarki. Pada sisi yang lain, objek dalam sistem pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan juga belum terintegrasi menurut konstitusi dan belum mengarah pada penataan sistem heirarki norma hukum dan upaya harmonisasi norma hukum. Sistem konstitusi dengan paradigma “the supreme law of the land” mengharuskan seluruh peraturan dibawahnya harus bersumber dan tidak boleh bertentangan, dengan berpijak pada prinsip “tidak boleh satu detik pun ada peraturan perundang-undangan yang berpotensi melanggar konstitusi tanpa bisa diluruskan atau diuji melalui pengujian yudisial”.This article is discussed the institutional arrangement of regulation reviews in Indonesia. It’s begins with a discussion of the institutional problems and practice of regulations review and the design of institutional arrangement in the future. The results of the study shows several issues including: (1) institutions which are not ideal and contradicted with checks and balances system, it’s proofed by amount of institutions has authority about the functions, namely: Judicial review (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court), and Executive Review (Minister of Home Affairs and Governor; (2) the object of review doesn’t clear boundaries; (3) in practice, the problems of standard reviews is complicated, especially in the use of judging standard in the conflict of legal norm. The idea of institutional arrangement is designed for one institutionalization at the Constitutional Court, which is based on the argument: The Constitutional Court as the guardian of the Pancasila (ideology of state) and the 1945 Constitution, in the framework of institutional arrangement based on checks and balances system, realizing the sustainable in the heirarchy of regulation, in practice of formal review to reviewing regulations under a law, arrangements of regulations more systematic and comprehsnsive, regulations review is the entrance to see all the issues of it’s conficting in each hierarchy. On the other hand, the object in the system of regulation reviews is also not integrated according by the constitution, and it’s not in accordance with the arrangement system in hierarchy of the regulation and efforts to harmonize the legal norms. The constitutional system with the “supreme law of the land” paradigm requires that all the regulations below should be sourced and not be contradictions, with the principle of “no regulations may be conflict againts the constitution without judicial review.

En torno a la práctica desaparición de una competencia. El art. 149.1.6 CE y las especialidades procesales autonómicas

2012 ◽  
pp. 103-124
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ
Keyword(s):  
Civil Law ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Narrow Line ◽  
Autonomous Communities ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Substantive Law

LABURPENA: Konstituzioak, 149.1.6 artikuluan, ez zion atea itxi nahi izan autonomia- erkidegoen parte-hartzeari araudi prozesalaren erregulazioan, eta, berez, Estatuari legegintza prozesalaren gainean eman zion eskumen esklusiboa mugatua da; izan ere, beren zuzenbide substantiboaren berezitasunetatik eratorritako espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena aitortu baitzien, aldi berean, autonomia-erkidegoei. Eskumen hori batez ere zuzenbide zibil propioa duten erkidegoetan erabiltzekoa zen, baina ez haietan bakarrik, ez eta soilik gai honi dagokionean ere. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, baina, hain modu murriztailean jokatu du konstituzio-arau hori interpretatu eta aplikatu behar izan duenean (47/2004 epaia da salbuespen bakarra), non autonomia-erkidegoen espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena ezerezean geratu baita. Artikulu honen asmoa honako hau da: alde batetik, egoera honetara nola heldu garen aztertzea; bestetik, 21/2012 epaia analizatzea, zeinak Konstituzio Auzitegiaren ildo murriztailea berresten duen; eta, azkenik, gaurko egoeran beste hautabide batzuk eskaintzea, autonomia-erkidegoek espezialitate prozesalen gainean daukaten eskumena (haietako batzuk erabiltzen ari direna) desagertzeko zorian dago-eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren jurisprudentzian. RESUMEN: La Constitución, en su art. 149.1.6, no quiso cerrar la puerta a la intervención de las CCAA en la regulación de la normativa procesal y otorgó al Estado una competencia exclusiva sobre legislación procesal cuya exclusividad es, en realidad, limitada, dada la simultánea atribución a las CCAA de la competencia para dictar las necesarias especialidades procesales derivadas de las particularidades de su derecho sustantivo. Ello debía ser especialmente útil en aquellas comunidades con Derecho civil propio, aunque no solo en estas ni únicamente respecto de este ámbito material. Ocurre sin embargo que el Tribunal Constitucional, en las ocasiones en que ha debido interpretar y aplicar el mencionado precepto constitucional, lo ha hecho de modo tan restrictivo que, con la única y aislada excepción de la STC 47/2004, la competencia autonómica relativa a las especialidades procesales ha quedado reducida a la nada. El propósito de este artículo es, por un lado, el de examinar cómo se ha llegado a este punto; por otro, estudiar el último de los casos relevantes, la STC 21/2012, que confirma la citada línea restrictiva seguida por el Tribunal; y finalmente apuntar algunas alternativas a la situación a la que se ha llegado, en que la competencia de las CCAA en materia de especialidades procesales (que por otra parte algunas están ejerciendo) se halla condenada a la práctica desaparición en la jurisprudencia constitucional. ABSTRACT: The Constitution in section 149.1.16 has not closed the door to the Autonomous Communities intervention in the regulation of the procedural provisions and conferred the State the exclusive power over the procedural legislation albeit its exclusivity is limited by the simultaneous allocation to the Au tonomous Communities of the power to enact the necessary procedural specifities that come from the special features of its substantive law. That should be extremely useful in those Communities with their own Civil law, even though not only in those and not solely regarding this material field. But what happens is that when the Constitutional Court had to interpret and apply the aforementioned constitutional provision, it has done it so narrowly that with the only and sole exception of the Constitutional judgment 47/2004 the power is almost reduced to nothing. The purpose of this article is on the one hand to examine how this is been reached; and on the other hand, to study the last relevant ruling, judgment 21/2012, which confirms the aforementioned narrow line of interpretation followed by the Court; and finally to point at some alternatives to the situation that has been created in which the power of the Autonomous Communities regarding the procedural specificities (and which they are exercising anyway) is doomed to the practical disappearance according to the constitutional caselaw.

The Sovereign Person

Sovereignty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 96-123
Author(s):  
Hermann Heller
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Present Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Decision Making Unit ◽  
The Will ◽  
The One ◽  
Dominant Theory

This chapter attempts to secure a sovereign person to positivize the supreme legal principles, one who is capable of making consciously evaluative decisions. This person must, on the one hand, eventually become a real bearer of the will, while, on the other, must be an independent, law-creating authority. A person equipped with these characteristics is unknown to the present theory of the state. In Germany, the dominant theory since Hegel maintains that the sovereign person is the state; sovereignty is a characteristic of state power or, in a relationship that is not entirely clear, the state’s will or state personality. The state can only be considered the sovereign person, however, if it is seen, with objective necessity, as a unified reality of will or decision-making unit.

scholarly journals The Role of the People in the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution Based on Democratic Constitution Making: Future Prospects

2020 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 19-42
Author(s):  
Muhammad Jamaluddin
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The People ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
Democratic Constitution

The amendments to the 1945 Constitution allegedly are not in line with the expectations of a democratic constitution. In fact, the role of the people in four amendments to the 1945 Constitution was very limited. The people who were involved in the amendment processes represented limited number of groups. Incidentally, only people with important and dominant powers were involved. The people were also not involved from the beginning of the amendment processes. Therefore, the role of the people in the amendments had not been carried out optimally. The results of the study show that the role of the people directly and actively in the amendment could increase transparency and public trust towards the government. The people are expected to be more responsive, accommodating, aspirational, and participatory to give rise to a match between the will of the people and the wishes of the government in the realization of the ideals of the Indonesian nation. The direct and active role of the people can be realized through conventional media, print media, and electronic media in a structured and systematic manner. It is expected that the people’s role will be able to strengthen the Indonesian constitutional system and economic, political, social, and cultural stability, as well as the defense and security of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, the direct involvement of the people is expected to be in line with the optimization of the role of the Constitutional Court as the ‘guardian of the constitution’ to maintain the purity of the 1945 Constitution.

Reflexiones para una nueva regulación constitucional del Defensor del Pueblo

2013 ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Laura DÍEZ BUESO
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Essential Nature ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The One ◽  
Selection Of

LABURPENA: Herriaren Defendatzailea Espainiako ordenamenduan sortu zenetik hogeita hamar urtetik gora igaro diren honetan, artikulu honek haren diseinu konstituzionala berriz taxutzea proposatzen du bi irizpideok oinarri hartuta: alde batetik, gure sistema instituzionalaren beharretara gehien egokitzen den Ombudsman eredua; bestetik, Defendatzaileak nola bete duen eskubideen bermatzaile-eginkizuna. Hortik abiatuta, erreforma-proposamenak bi ataletan biltzen dira. Lehendabizikoan, funtsezkoak izateagatik, Herriaren Defendatzailearen balizko erreforma konstituzionalean nahitaez kontuan hartu beharko liratekeen ezaugarriak jasotzen dira; haien artean, azpimarratzekoa da hura aukeratzeko gehiengoaren eta haren agintaldiaren iraupenaren zehaztapena. Bigarren atalean, erreforma konstituzionalean Estatuko erakundeak ahalik gehiena arautzea aukeratuko balitz, zer ezaugarri gehitzea komeniko litzatekeen jasotzen da; haien artean, erregelamendu-autonomia eta ofiziozko espedienteak abiarazteko duten ahalmena nabarmentzen dira. RESUMEN: Tras más de treinta años desde la incorporación del Defensor del Pueblo al ordenamiento español, este artículo propone una reformulación de su diseño constitucional partiendo de dos criterios: por un lado, cuál es hoy el modelo de Ombudsman que más se ajusta a las necesidades de nuestro sistema institucional; y, por otro, la forma en que el Defensor ha desarrollado su función como garante de derechos. A partir de aquí, las propuestas de reforma se agrupan en dos apartados. El primero dedicado a aquellos caracteres que, por su carácter esencial, deberían incluirse necesariamente en una eventual reforma constitucional del Defensor del Pueblo; entre ellos destaca la concreción de las mayorías para elegirlo y la duración de su mandato. El segundo apartado recoge los rasgos que convendría incorporar si la opción de la reforma constitucional fuera la de concretar al máximo la regulación de las instituciones estatales; entre ellos sobresale la autonomía reglamentaria y su capacidad para iniciar expedientes de oficio. ABSTRACT: After more than thirty years since the inclusión of the Ombudsman within the Spanish legal order, this article proposes a new design as of two criteria: on the one hand, which model of Ombudsman approaches nowadays better to the necessities of our institutional system; and on the other hand, the way by which the Ombudsman has developed its activities as guarantor of rights. From this point on, the proposals for reform can be put into two parts. The first one devoted to those features that due to its essential nature should necessarily be included in a prospective constitutional reform of the Ombudsman; among them it stands out the majorities required for the selection of the Ombudsman and the length of its office. The second part reflects the characteristics that should have if the option for the constitutional amendment would be to specify to the maximum the regulations of the State institutions; among them the statutory autonomy and its capacity to open administrative files.

scholarly journals FUNGSI PENCATATAN PERKAWINAN DIKAITKAN DENGAN UPAYA PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP ANAK SETELAH PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI NOMOR: 46/PUU-VIII/2010

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atikah Rahmi ◽  
Sakdul
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One ◽  
State Registration ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
Two Sides

Registration of marriage is very important for the parties in the household, as a requirement for recognition or non-recognition of marriage by the state. Registration of marriages provides authentic evidence against a person's legal status through marriage publication book or marriage certificate. Marriages that are not listed will lead the legal status of the parties to the marriage are not clear. Pursuant to Article 43 of Law No. 1 in 1974, the children born of the marriage were not recorded, did not receive judicial protection. Constitutional Court Decision No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010 implicates on changing values in society regarding the status and rights of children outside of marriage. The Constitutional Court makes decision as two sides of a coin. On the one hand protect the rights of children outside of mating, but on the other hand the decision may weaken impressed marriage function and can lead to the institution of marriage becomes less are not sacred.

Kroniek van een aangekondigd ontslag. Twee opmerkelijke brieven van Alfons Van de Perre betreffende zijn afscheid als volksvertegenwoordiger in 1919

2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Luc Vandeweyer
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
First World War ◽  
Source Material ◽  
The Other ◽  
World War ◽  
The First World War ◽  
The Will ◽  
The One ◽  
First World ◽  
Member Of Parliament

In deze bronnenpublicatie ontleedt Luc Vandeweyer de parlementaire loopbaan van de geneesheer-politicus Alfons Van de Perre: hoe hij in 1912 feitelijk  tegen wil en dank  volksvertegenwoordiger werd, zich anderzijds blijkbaar naar behoren kweet van zijn taak en tijdens de eerste verkiezingen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1919) zijn mandaat hernieuwd zag maar meteen daarop ontslag nam. Volgens de bekende historiografische lezing was de abdicatie van de progressieve politicus een daad van zelfverloochening die enerzijds werd ingegeven door gezondheidsmotieven en  anderzijds was geïnspireerd door de wil om de eenheid binnen de katholieke partij te herstellen. De auteur komt op basis van nieuw en onontgonnen bronnenmateriaal tot de vaststelling dat Van de Perres spontane beslissing tot ontslag in de eerste plaats een strategische keuze was: in het parlement, waar hij zich overigens niet erg in zijn schik voelde, kon hij minder invloed uitoefenen op de Vlaamse beweging dan via de talrijke engagementen waarvoor hij voortaan de handen vrij had. Eén ervan was die van bestuurder én publicist bij het dagblad De Standaard.________Chronicle of the announcement of a resignation. Two remaekable letters by Alfons Van de Perre concerning his resignation as a Member of Parliament in 1919In this source publication Luc Vandeweyer analyses the parliamentary career of the physician-politician Alfons Van de Perre and he describes how Van de Perre became a Member of Parliament in 1912 actually against the grain, yet how he apparently did a good job carrying out his duties. During the first elections after the First World War (1919) Van de Perre found that his mandate was renewed, but he handed in his resignation immediately afterwards. According to the familiar historiographical interpretation the abdication of the progressive politician was an act of self-denial, which was prompted on the one hand by health reasons and on the other hand inspired by the will to restore unity within the Catholic political party. On the basis of new and so far unexplored source material the author concludes that the spontaneous decision by Van de Perres to hand in his resignation was above all a strategic choice: in the Parliament, which he did not much enjoy anyway, he could exert less influence on the Flemish movement than via his numerous commitments, which he was now free to take on. One of these was the post of director as well as political commentator of the newspaper De Standaard.

Bastard Feudalism and the Framing of Thirteenth-Century England

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Coss
Keyword(s):  
Middle Ages ◽  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
Twelfth Century ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Great Work ◽  
Early Middle Ages ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

In the introduction to his great work of 2005, Framing the Early Middle Ages, Chris Wickham urged not only the necessity of carefully framing our studies at the outset but also the importance of closely defining the words and concepts that we employ, the avoidance ‘cultural sollipsism’ wherever possible and the need to pay particular attention to continuities and discontinuities. Chris has, of course, followed these precepts on a vast scale. My aim in this chapter is a modest one. I aim to review the framing of thirteenth-century England in terms of two only of Chris’s themes: the aristocracy and the state—and even then primarily in terms of the relationship between the two. By the thirteenth century I mean a long thirteenth century stretching from the period of the Angevin reforms of the later twelfth century on the one hand to the early to mid-fourteenth on the other; the reasons for taking this span will, I hope, become clearer during the course of the chapter, but few would doubt that it has a validity.

scholarly journals Territoriality Beyond the State: The EU’s Territorial Claims and the Search for Their Legitimacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 650-672
Author(s):  
Josef Weinzierl
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Political Community ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
European Level ◽  
Territorial Claims ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Eu

AbstractQuite a few recent ECJ judgments touch on various elements of territorial rule. Thereby, they raise the profile of the main question this Article asks: Which territorial claims does the EU make? To provide an answer, the present Article discusses and categorizes the individual elements of territoriality in the EU’s architecture. The influence of EU law on national territorial rule on the one hand and the emergence of territorial governance elements at the European level on the other provide the main pillars of the inquiry. Once combined, these features not only help to improve our understanding of the EU’s distinctly supranational conception of territoriality. What is more, the discussion raises several important legitimacy questions. As a consequence, the Article calls for the development of a theoretical model to evaluate and justify territoriality in a political community beyond the state.

O potrzebie wprowadzenia ustawy referendalnej do systemu prawnego w Polsce

2021 ◽  
Vol 1(162) ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Piotr Uziębło
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System

The problems raised in the doctrine of constitutional law related to the implementation of a decision taken in a referendum in matters of particular importance to the state, as well as the generally marginal use of the institution of popular vote in the constitutional prac-tice, give rise to reflection on the introduction of the institution of a referendum law into the Polish constitutional system. In this article the author considers the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution, analyzing at the same time contemporary normative regulations concerning such acts in other countries. The research leads to the conclusion that despite the risks involved, the refer-endum law should appear in the Polish constitutional system in the future, as it would not only give a chance for a more complete reflection of the will of the collective subject of sovereignty without the necessity of its decoding by the parliament, but it could also be an impulse for the development of the referendum practice in the Republic of Poland. However, it is important to introduce proce-dural barriers that will prevent depreciation of this institution.

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