scholarly journals Canada and the Manhattan Crisis in the Arctic (1968–1970)

Author(s):  
Dmitry Volodin

The discovery of a giant oil field in Alaska in 1968 sparked great interest in the United States in the Northwest Passage as a possible route for the delivery of Alaska's oil to the more southern states of the United States. In 1969-1970 American oil companies with the support of the U.S. authorities organized two voyages of the tanker Manhattan across these waters to test the viability of this route. Although Canada supported this project and took part in it, but at the same time the Canadian government of P. Trudeau adopted two new laws, which sharply strengthened Canada's control over shipping in the Northwest Passage. In an effort to prevent an open conflict with the United States, Canada did not declare all the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as its internal waters, but made a choice in favor of the so-called functional sovereignty, that is, the ability to exercise a certain set of rights over a specific territory.

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rex J. Zedalis

On March 7, 1995, Conoco oil company of Houston, Texas, announced that it had entered into a contract with Iran to have a Netherlands-based affiliate assist in the development of the Sirri Island oil field. In response, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order No. 12,957, prohibiting participation by U.S. entities in the development of Iranian petroleum resources. Eventually, Conoco withdrew from its contract, but in early May of 1995 the administration stepped up its pressure on Iran by issuing Executive Order No. 12,959, prohibiting U.S. entities from using foreign entities they owned or controlled to make investments in or conduct trade transactions with Iran. On July 13 of that year, the French oil company Total S.A. entered into an agreement with Iran to replace Conoco in developing the Sirri Island field, and over the next several months Iran struck nearly a dozen petroleum development agreements worth in excess of $50 million each with other foreign oil companies. Within a couple of months, both Houses of the U.S. Congress took up consideration of proposals to complicate Iran’s ability to develop its hydrocarbon resources. By the end of 1995, the proposals, which even extended to wholly foreign entities organized and operating outside the United States, had come to include Libya as well. Final passage of one of the proposals, specifically, H.R. 3107, took place in the Senate and the House in July 1996. It was signed into law as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 703
Author(s):  
Megan Drewniak ◽  
Dimitrios Dalaklis ◽  
Anastasia Christodoulou ◽  
Rebecca Sheehan

In recent years, a continuous decline of ice-coverage in the Arctic has been recorded, but these high latitudes are still dominated by earth’s polar ice cap. Therefore, safe and sustainable shipping operations in this still frozen region have as a precondition the availability of ice-breaking support. The analysis in hand provides an assessment of the United States’ and Canada’s polar ice-breaking program with the purpose of examining to what extent these countries’ relevant resources are able to meet the facilitated growth of industrial interests in the High North. This assessment will specifically focus on the maritime transportation sector along the Northwest Passage and consists of four main sections. The first provides a very brief description of the main Arctic passages. The second section specifically explores the current situation of the Northwest Passage, including the relevant navigational challenges, lack of infrastructure, available routes that may be used for transit, potential choke points, and current state of vessel activity along these routes. The third one examines the economic viability of the Northwest Passage compared to that of the Panama Canal; the fourth and final section is investigating the current and future capabilities of the United States’ and Canada’s ice-breaking fleet. Unfortunately, both countries were found to be lacking the necessary assets with ice-breaking capabilities and will need to accelerate their efforts in order to effectively respond to the growing needs of the Arctic. The total number of available ice-breaking assets is impacting negatively the level of support by the marine transportation system of both the United States and Canada; these two countries are facing the possibility to be unable to effectively meet the expected future needs because of the lengthy acquisition and production process required for new ice-breaking fleets.


Logistics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Rebecca Sheehan ◽  
Dimitrios Dalaklis ◽  
Anastasia Christodoulou ◽  
Megan Drewniak ◽  
Peter Raneri ◽  
...  

The analysis in hand provides a brief assessment of the United States’ and Canada’s marine transportation system and relevant search and rescue (SAR) support in relation to the Northwest Passage, with the purpose of examining to what extent these countries’ relevant infrastructure resources are able to meet the expected growth of shipping operations and business activities in the Arctic. Through an extensive literature review, this assessment will specifically describe the most important influences upon the maritime transportation system, with the issue of certain geographical details and the capabilities of existing ports standing out. Additionally, vessel activity trends and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives will be examined. Furthermore, the SAR infrastructure details and means to render assistance to people in distress along the Northwest Passage will be discussed. The reality remains that port characteristics are limited and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives and upgrades to SAR assets are commendable but slow-paced. It is true that both the United States and Canada are taking proper measures to build up infrastructure needs, but they both may run out of time to put adequate infrastructure in place to deal effectively with the changing environment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (06) ◽  
pp. 520-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.R. Harrell ◽  
Thomas L. Gardner

Summary A casual reading of the SPE/WPC (World Petroleum Congresses) Petroleum Reserves Definitions (1997) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) definitions (1978) would suggest very little, if any, difference in the quantities of proved hydrocarbon reserves estimated under those two classification systems. The differences in many circumstances for both volumetric and performance-based estimates may be small. In 1999, the SEC began to increase its review process, seeking greater understanding and compliance with its oil and gas reserves reporting requirements. The agency's definitions had been promulgated in 1978 in connection with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and at a time when most publicly owned oil and gas companies and their reserves were located in the United States. Oil and gas prices were relatively stable, and virtually all natural gas was marketed through long-term contracts at fixed or determinable prices. Development drilling was subject to well-spacing regulations as established through field rules set by state agencies. Reservoir-evaluation technology has advanced far beyond that used in 1978;production-sharing contracts were uncommon then, and probabilistic reserves assessment was not widely recognized or appreciated in the U.S. These changes in industry practice plus many other considerations have created problems in adapting the 1978 vintage definitions to the technical and commercial realities of the 21st century. This paper presents several real-world examples of how the SEC engineering staff has updated its approach to reserves assessment as well as numerous remaining unresolved areas of concern. These remaining issues are important, can lead to significant differences in reported quantities and values, and may result in questions about the "full disclosure" obligations to the SEC. Introduction For virtually all oil and gas producers, their company assets are the hydrocarbon reserves that they own through various forms of mineral interests, licensing agreements, or other contracts and that produce revenues from production and sale. Reserves are almost always reported as static quantities as of a specific date and classified into one or more categories to describe the uncertainty and production status associated with each category. The economic value of these reserves is a direct function of how the quantities are to be produced and sold over the physical or contract lives of the properties. Reserves owned by private and publicly owned companies are always assumed to be those quantities of oil and gas that can be produced and sold at a profit under assumed future prices and costs. Reserves under the control of state-owned or national oil companies may reflect quantities that exceed those deemed profitable under the commercial terms typically imposed on private or publicly owned companies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Maria L. Andersen ◽  
Samantha H. Valone ◽  
Valeriia K. Vakhitova ◽  
Vir Chachra ◽  
Paul Martin Sommers

The authors use simple bilinear regression to assess changes in the geographical movement (latitude and longitude) of mass shootings in the United States between 1982 and 2017.  The path taken by the location of the ninety-five mass shootings over the 36-year period has shifted south.  An analysis of differences by census region and blue/red state distinctions within each census region reveals disproportionately many mass shootings in Midwestern states between 2000 and 2008, and disproportionately many in red Southern states over the past three-plus decades.  


1987 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-129
Author(s):  
Ralph E. Bierlen ◽  
David Blandford

Canadian exports of fresh carrots to the United States have increased substantially in recent years. The depreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar has been a major factor. Canadian government subsidies also may have had an impact by accelerating the construction of cold storage facilities. These have permitted the marketing period to be extended. However, an analysis of costs and returns suggests that cold storage of carrots is commercially profitable. Storage capacity would probably have increased without government aid. The returns to storage and the change in exchange rates are the primary factors contributing to the expansion of Canadian exports.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-88
Author(s):  
Donald R. Rothwell

AbstractArctic Ocean shipping is on the brink of becoming a critical legal, geopolitical and security issue as a result of the impacts of climate change and increased interest in the Arctic Ocean from States that traditionally did not operate within the region. The law of the sea throughunclosprovides the key legal framework for the regulation of Arctic Ocean shipping, supplemented and extended by relatedimoconventions and national laws and regulations. This framework has been relied upon by the two major North American Arctic States – Canada and the United States – to develop the legal regime for the Northwest Passage and the Bering Strait. There have been historic disagreements between Canada and the United States with respect to the Northwest Passage, and while not resolved they have to date been managed through legal and political responses. Other straits may become more strategically significant as a result of climate change, including Nares Strait between Canada and Greenland.eezand high seas Arctic Ocean navigation by foreign flagged vessels also needs to be anticipated. Multiple issues are raised with respect to maritime security and the adequacy of the existing legal regime, including how Canada and the United States will respond to interest being expressed in Arctic shipping by Asian States such as China.


Significance The Arctic memorandum signals greater concern in the US defence community and Congress over rising great-power competition in the region. Russia has become more assertive militarily, while China is seeking greater presence, including in 2018 expressing interest in building airfields in Greenland. Impacts Trump’s scepticism about NATO will make coordinating with allies over the Arctic more difficult. China and the United States will both seek access to Arctic natural resources. Greater US focus on the Arctic could cause tensions with Canada over the Northwest Passage.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Olson

In the last two decades, the search for untapped oil reserves led to many innovations in oil and gas exploration. As new technology continues to open new horizons, oil companies are increasingly able to drill at deeper ocean depths to tap offshore reserves. Offshore drilling poses problems where oil reserves hundreds of miles from shore cross an international boundary line. While American courts typically apply the rule of capture to determine who owns the subsoil resources, international law requires countries to work together to maximize the efficient, safe extraction of the resources. In 2012, the United States and Mexico drafted a treaty that would govern the unitization of an offshore transboundary oil field. Today, Mexico’s energy laws are very different. A new administration threatens to unravel recent liberal reforms, and the United States has become more hostile to Chinese investment in the region. With these political challenges in mind, the treaty is very vague on critical issues, particularly its dispute resolution clause, which the United States and Mexico must strengthen if the treaty is to be effective and shared transboundary resources develop efficiently to the benefit of both nations. The treaty creates a body called the Joint Commission to create much of the treaty’s policy and procedure. In order to maintain good relations and a healthy energy sector, the Joint Commission needs to create subsidiary committees subject to its control and comprised of various experts to ensure the treaty is implemented impartially.


Author(s):  
Dmitry Volodin

During World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War the United States carried out a number of major military projects in the Canadian Arctic. The Canadian government faced a difficult choice. These projects could seriously weaken the country's sovereignty in the High North. On the other hand, Canada’s refusal to participate in their implementation threatened that the United States would implement these projects alone. As a result the Canadian government approved all these projects, believing that it is really possible to defend Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic only through cooperation with the United States in the defense of the continent.


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