scholarly journals Quasi-Regulatory Role of the Legal Opinions of the Supreme Court on the Example of the Case of Compensation for Non-Pecuniary Damage in the Family Dispute

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 79-86
Author(s):  
Mykhailo Shumylo

Judgments of the Supreme Court, their legal nature, tasks and importance have repeatedly been the subject of discussions among the legal scholars and the legal practitioners, so this issue will not be the main point of the article.Quasi-regulation as one of the most significant functions of the legal opinions of the Supreme Court will be described in the article on the example of family dispute cases.The legal opinions of the Supreme Court are generally acknowledged as quasi-precedents and the article contains the conclusion that such terminological definition is the most balanced as the Supreme Court caselaw could not be called precedent in the meaning of this definition in Anglo-Saxon law.The research has proved that quasi-precedents can set the quasi-legal regulation.In that context, however, it is important to distinguish that precedents can create legal regulation, while the quasi-precedents can provide the rule of law with additional regulatory content by its wider interpretation.This can be clearly observed when the Court of Cassation interprets in common the general and special legal provisions.It is proved that quasi-regulation, which is provided by the Supreme Court in certain cases, is the result of the several objective processes, including:–  convergence of Anglo-Saxon and Romano-Germanic Law;–  transformation of the national legal system from authoritarian soviet to democratic;–  gradual abandonment from positivistic interpretation of legal provision in favor of rule of law and faire justice (human-centered);–  more frequent application of dynamic interpretation of legal provisions.At the same time, it should be emphasized that quasi-regulation is not the prior task of the Supreme Court for the reason that ensuring the uniformity and sustainability of case law remains its basic function. Quasi-regulation is an additional instrument aimed at strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine.In this regard such an instrument is more useful when: (1) rules of positive law do not fulfill this function; (2) there is a need to use the legal regulation for resolving the conflicts of law and filling the gaps in legislation.Quasi-regulation contributes to the development of the doctrine of law and becomes an indicator for the legislator that certain relations need urgent regulation, that public relations have changed, become more complicated and need immediate legislative regulation, and that legislators demonstrate slow response tothe mentioned changes.

Author(s):  
Yu. I. Matat

The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the interpretation of law, its features, as well as the role in overcoming gaps in the law. Attention is focused and substantiated that the interpretation of legal norms, being a necessary element of the legal regulation mechanism, plays the important role in the process of overcoming gaps in law. So, by means of various methods of interpretation, in particular, formal gaps are overcome, which, in turn, may arise as a result of an unsuccessful presentation of legal norms by the legislator. It is determined that when applying the rule of law by analogy, such a rule in the particular situation should be interpreted not as part of the institution from which it is borrowed, but as part of the institution, the gap in which it is designed to overcome. This is due to the fact that the rule applied by analogy is subject to double influence: on the one hand, it generally retains its original meaning, on the other - partially adapts to the characteristics of the institution in which the gap is overcome through it. The role of official interpretation in the process of application of the law in the conditions of gaps in the legislation is clarified, the role of recommendatory explanations provided by higher courts on the issues of application of the legislation is investigated. In Ukraine, these powers, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" dated June 02, 2016, are assigned to the Plenum of the Supreme Court, in order to ensure the same application of the rules of law in solving certain categories of cases, generalizes the practice of applying substantive and procedural laws, systematizes and ensures the promulgation legal positions of the Supreme Court, as well as based on the results of the analysis of judicial statistics and generalization of judicial practice, it provides explanations of the recommendatory nature on the application of legislation in solving court cases. It is concluded that the importance of the interpretation of law is primarily to ensure full and accurate disclosure of the functions of legal acts as a source and form of existence of legal norms, other substantive elements of the legal system. The interpretation concretizes the law, which allows law enforcement agencies to ensure the resolution of legal cases in strict accordance with the constitutional principles of legal certainty, legality and the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


Author(s):  
Molly Joeck

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 52-60
Author(s):  
Zoya Pogorelova

The article, based on clarifying the content of related concepts of law-making, considers the principles of the rule-making activity as the power activity of public authorities. Such principles include the principles of humanism, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and scientific validity of rule-making decisions, which necessitates the professionalism of rule-making activities, planning, systematics, complexity, timely revision and updating of legislation, and transparency. The content of these principles is revealed, their ranking is carried out, their importance for legal science and practice is emphasized, and the positions of scientists concerning their optimal list and characteristics are analyzed. In particular, attention is drawn to the fact that the principle of humanism is reflected in the fundamental values that underlie the constitutional order, the basis of the current law and human rights enshrined in the Constitution and laws of Ukraine: human dignity, the right to self-realization, justice and freedom, non-discrimination and equality before thelaw, tolerance, responsibility and respect for others. The principle of democracy, as a fundamental principle of rule-making, legitimizes the subjects of rule-making and creates a basis for their legal activities. The rule of law is also a fundamental principle of rule-making (including its components such as the principle of direct effect of the Constitution of Ukraine, the rule of the Constitution as the Basic Law, the principle of legality, legal certainty, the equality before the law and non-discrimination, and proportionality). It is emphasized that the principle of scientific validity of rule-making decisions necessitates professionalism of rule-making activities, and ensuring a high professional level of rule-makers makes it possible to carry out rule-making activities at a high scientific level, on a planned, systematic, comprehensive basis, the legal regulation of public relations, and the implementation of state functions. Aspects of the principle of publicity of normative activity of the Parliament, the Government, and the President of Ukraine are also analyzed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
Volodymyr USTYMENKO ◽  
◽  
Ruslan DZHABRAILOV ◽  

It is noted that an important quality of legal regulation should be the effectiveness of the method and means chosen by the state to promote the achievement of the planned socio-economic result. Despite the fact that some principles of normative project work have been covered at the legislative level (in particular, on the example of legislation in the field of regulatory policy), the practice of adopting normative legal acts the effectiveness of which remains questionable continues. One of the reasons for this state of legal regulation of social relations is the improper consideration, and sometimes conscious disregard for theoretical and applied constructions that have been substantiated within the framework of legal and economic science. As a result, this leads to the establishment of an unjust order in a certain area of public relations, which threatens the further sustainable development of the state. In view of this, attention is focused on the defects of the implementation of legal principles, especially the principle of the rule of law, in the field of legal regulation of economic relations, which leads to the imaginary effectiveness of the relevant legal acts. It is proved that the effectiveness of legal regulation of public relations will be evidenced not only by the rate of achievement of the expected result at the expense of the minimum necessary resources of economic entities, citizens and the state (i.e. the economic criterion), but also the degree of compliance with the rule of law, which will allow to talk about promoting the adoption by a legal act of the ideology of justice. Based on the analysis of some examples of legislative practice in the field of taxation, it is established that the adoption of regulations contrary to the rule of law has led to the direction of tax policy to achieve socio-economic results that contradict the principles of tax policy as a type of economic policyand principles of social policy of the state in terms of income redistribution set out in strategic documents.


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