scholarly journals The Analysis of White House Occupant and Political Polarization in the United States

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
OLUWOLE OWOYE ◽  
MATTHEW DABROS

<p>This paper examines a previously unidentified causal factor – White House Occupant (WHO) – in political polarization and then investigates its impact on legislative productivity and the aggregate economy. Objective pundits would agree that the United States has entered a new phase of “pandemic political polarization” because Congressional Republicans had racial resentment of Obama and they did everything to obstruct his policy agenda; and now, in retaliation and on policy issues, Democrats resent Trump. In view of the changing American electorate, we consider WHO’s race or gender or perceived religious affiliation or policy positions to be an important causal factor that will contribute to extreme political polarization in the foreseeable future. We model how political polarization will in turn depress economic growth. In addition to introducing a novel element to the ongoing research on the consequences of political polarization, this paper contributes to the broader literature by asserting that a WHO is one of the determinants of political polarization and Congressional productivity; and that the remarkable contraction in Congressional productivity during Obama’s presidency, which we found to be statistically and significantly different from the other three two-term presidents who served in the past four decades, supported this assertion.  </p>

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 736-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Duhaime ◽  
Evan P. Apfelbaum

Scholars, politicians, and laypeople alike bemoan the high level of political polarization in the United States, but little is known about how to bring the views of liberals and conservatives closer together. Previous research finds that providing people with information regarding a contentious issue is ineffective for reducing polarization because people process such information in a biased manner. Here, we show that information can reduce political polarization below baseline levels and also that its capacity to do so is sensitive to contextual factors that make one’s relevant preferences salient. Specifically, in a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and a preregistered replication (Study 2), we find that providing a taxpayer receipt—an impartial, objective breakdown of how one’s taxes are spent that is published annually by the White House—reduces polarization regarding taxes, but not when participants are also asked to indicate how they would prefer their taxes be spent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Philip S. Brenner

AbstractSurvey estimates of the religiously unaffiliated in the United States—between 20% and 25%—make this group one of the largest “religious” categories in the country. Recent research argues that political polarization pushes political liberals and moderates to report no religious affiliation to distance themselves from religious conservatives. One key point of polarization behind this phenomenon is sexuality-focused politics, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer (LGBQ) rights and discrimination. The current research uses a split-ballot survey experiment to investigate sexuality-focused political polarization as a cause of the reports of religious nonaffiliation. A sample of 2,238 respondents, stratified by sexual orientation (half LGBQ, half straight), completed a brief web survey starting with two randomly ordered series of questions on religion and sexuality. Findings suggest that sexuality-focused political polarization is not likely to be a primary cause of survey respondents’ claims of religious nonaffiliation.


2021 ◽  
pp. e1-e4
Author(s):  
Mark A. Rothstein ◽  
Wendy E. Parmet ◽  
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss

When the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided to grant emergency use authorization (EUA) for the first two vaccines for COVID-19, the United States’ response to the pandemic entered a new phase. Initially, the greatest challenge is having enough doses of vaccine and administering them to all who want it. Yet even while many wait expectantly for their turn to be vaccinated, a significant minority of Americans are hesitant. Lack of information or misinformation about the vaccine, a long-standing and well-entrenched antivaccination movement, distrust of public health officials, and political polarization have left many people ambivalent or opposed to vaccination. According to a poll by the Kaiser Family Foundation taken in late November and early December 2020, 27% of respondents surveyed stated that they would “probably” or “definitely” not be willing to be vaccinated.1 Reflecting the sharp partisan divide that has characterized views about the pandemic, Democrats (86%) were far more likely than Republicans (56%) to be vaccinated. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print February 4, 2021: e1–e4. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.306166 )


2020 ◽  
pp. 216747952095077
Author(s):  
Evan L. Frederick ◽  
Ann Pegoraro ◽  
Samuel Schmidt

When asked if she would go to the White House if invited, Megan Rapinoe stated, “I’m not going to the fucking White House.” The next morning, President Donald Trump posted a series of tweets in which he criticized Rapinoe’s statements. In his tweets, Trump introduced issues around race in the United States and brought forth his own notion of nationalism. The purpose of this study was to conduct an analysis of users’ tweets to determine how individuals employed Twitter to craft a narrative and discuss the ongoing Rapinoe and Trump feud within and outside the bounds of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and nationalism. An inductive analysis of 16,137 users’ tweets revealed three primary themes: a) Refuse, Refute, & Redirect Racist Rhetoric b) Stand Up vs. Know your Rights, and c) #ShutUpAndBeALeader. Based on the findings of this study, it appears that the dialogue regarding racism in the United States is quickly evolving. Instead of reciting the same refrain (i.e., racism no longer exists and systematic racism is constructed by Black people) seen in previous works, individuals in the current dataset refuted those talking points and clearly labeled the President as a racist. Additionally, though discussions of nationalism were evident in this dataset, the Stand Up vs. Know Your Rights theme was on the periphery in comparison to discussions of race. Perhaps, this indicates that some have grown tired of Trump utilizing nationalism as a means to stoke racism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Abstract:While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.


Significance The Vietnam analogy implies that President Joe Biden’s decision to leave Afghanistan will have deeply negative consequences for the United States. However, Afghanistan is not Vietnam and the Biden withdrawal needs to be considered within the wider context of his administration’s review of US commitments abroad. Impacts The White House will be pressured to clarify the future of other US military commitments, particularly in Iraq. Biden will seek to reassure allies, particularly those in NATO, that his commitment to multilateralism will not diminish. Biden may seek an opportunity for a military show of force, possibly in the Middle East, to refute accusations of weakness.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Hollinger

If we are going to explain the slow pace of de-Christianization for the United States relative to other industrialized societies in the North Atlantic West, we might well begin with the church-state relationship. The absence of an established church in the United States has enabled religious affiliation to function, like other voluntary organizations in “civil society,” as mediators between the individual and the nation. I conimented on this rather old idea in a book C. John Sommerville is kind enough to cite in another connection, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture, but since he does not take up this point, I will develop it a bit further here, before reacting to Sommerville's other concerns as expressed in his refreshingly fair-minded rejoinder to my essay in the March 2001 issue of Church History.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-795
Author(s):  
Claude Cadart

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.


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