scholarly journals Problematyka podatku od niezrealizowanych zysków kapitałowych w przypadku zmiany siedziby lub miejsca zamieszkania w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
Wiktoria Grotkowska
Keyword(s):  
Driving Force ◽  
Individual Member ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Economic Prosperity ◽  
Lisbon Strategy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Previous Decade ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Wraz z początkiem bieżącego roku weszła w życie nowelizacja ustawy o podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych, ustawy o podatku dochodowym od osób prawnych, ustawy — Ordynacja podatkowa oraz niektórych innych ustaw, wprowadzająca nieznany wcześniej polskiemu prawu podatek od niezrealizowanych zysków, ta zwany podatek wyjścia ang. exit tax. Problematyka tego podatku od momentu jego wprowadzenia do prawa unijnego w ubiegłym dziesięcioleciu pozostaje szeroko dyskutowana. Państwa członkowskie UE chętnie korzystają z tego sposobu dofinansowywania swoich budżetów, nierzadko implementując do swoich systemów exit tax w sposób, którego zgodność z traktatami może budzić wątpliwości. Szczególnie wyraźnie odznacza się na tym polu problem godzenia podatku wyjścia w wolności wspólnotowe, takie jak wolność przemieszczania się czy podejmowania działalności gospodarczej. Swobody te, będące fundamentami wspólnotowego dobrobytu i motorem napędowym unijnej gospodarki, są jednocześnie niezbędnym ogniwem w osiąganiu celów traktatu z Lizbony. W świetle powyższego należy podkreślić istotność odpowiedniej implementacji exit tax do systemów państw członkowskich. Wymaga ona od ustawodawców wysokiego poziomu precyzyjności czy wręcz „wstrzemięźliwości” przy tworzeniu odpowiednich aktów prawnych. Polski ustawodawca zdaje się o tym zapominać, co potwierdza analiza nowelizacji ustawy o podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych i prawnych. Ustawa wydaje się nie być dostatecznie dopracowana, nasuwają się pytania o tak podstawowe kwestie, jak ustalenie dnia zmiany rezydencji podatkowej czy zgodność z prawem traktatowym „nadgorliwego” rozciągnięcia tegoż podatku na osoby fizyczne nieprowadzące działalności gospodarczej.Niniejszy artykuł skupi się na wieloaspektowej analizie najbardziej problematycznych zagadnień związanych ze stosowaniem w praktyce uregulowań dotyczących nowego podatku oraz ogólnej ocenie uregulowań krajowych i unijnych w zakresie takiego opodatkowania. Uregulowania poszczególnych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej bywały bowiem częstym przedmiotem orzekania Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, a ich zgodność z prawem pierwotnym Unii wielokrotnie kwestionowana i podważana. Wobec powyższego przy wprowadzaniu do porządków krajowych niniejszych przepisów wymagana jest od ustawodawcy szczególna ostrożność i zważenie na możliwość ewentualnego naruszenia swobód europejskich. Na koniec podane zostaną ewentualne postulaty de lege lata i de lege ferenda dla polskiego ustawodawcy oraz ogólna ocena zgodności polskich uregulowań z Traktatem o Unii Europejskiej oraz Traktatem o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej. The issue of exit tax in the light of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgementsWith the beginning of 2019 the amendment to Polish tax acts’ has entered into force and it has introduced new tax that had never before been known in Polish law — exit tax. The issue of exit tax has been problematic for European countries’ legislators ever since it was introduced back in the previous decade. It was enthusiastically received by them as it provides an extra source for the country’s budget. However, the adoption of the tax to national law systems is highly complicated — the basis for such duty may stand in oppostion to most important European rules, such as the principle of free movement or the right of establishment. These freedoms, which underpin the internal market, are the driving force behind the economic prosperity in the EU and the prerequisite for achieving the aims of the Lisbon Strategy. Thus, it is crucial to implement regulations regarding the exit tax with scrutiny and high preciseness.This article focuses on a multifaceted analysis of the most problematic issues regarding the application of the new tax and the overall assessment of Polish and European acts on tax. The Court of Justice of the European Union has often negatively reviewed the regulations of individual Member States. Regarding the abovementioned, some substantial actions have to be undertaken by the lawmakers in order to ensure the compatibility of national acts with basic EU aims.

scholarly journals Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Data Privacy ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Data ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.

Taricco principles beyond Taricco

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Fabio Giuffrida
Keyword(s):  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Form Part ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Alleged Incompatibility ◽  
The Eu

This contribution examines whether the principles laid down in M.A.S., M.B. (‘ Taricco II’) may play a role in some forthcoming decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In Scialdone, the Court will be asked to strike a balance between the effectiveness of national legislation on VAT offences and the principle of lex mitior. The key difference between Taricco and Scialdone lies in the fact that the lex mitior principle, unlike the regulation of the statute of limitation, falls within the scope of the principle of legality at the European level. Kolev concerns instead an alleged incompatibility between Article 325 TFEU and the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike Taricco, therefore, the CJEU will have to deal with national rules that form part of procedural criminal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court may reach a Taricco II-like conclusion (i.e. disapplication in theory, exception to the disapplication in practice), especially if the reasoning of the CJEU will rely on the importance of foreseeability and legal certainty in criminal matters. These same principles could lead the CJEU, in Menci, not to endorse the partial revirement of the European Court of Human Rights in the A. and B v. Norway ruling and, as a consequence, not to lower the EU standard of protection of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.

Communicating with the European Composite Administration

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Reichel
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

One of the reasons for introducing a “Union” citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was to provide a direct channel between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. In contrast to many other international organizations, the role of the individual has been central to the European project since its inception. In its famous 1962 judgment given inVan Gend en Loos,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underscored the importance of the “vigilance of individuals concerned” seeking to protect their European rights in the new legal order through judicial control.2 The right to directly vote on the representatives of the European Parliament had already been introduced in the 1970s. The citizens of the Member States were thus equipped with two classic forms of political participation even prior to the introduction of Union citizenship: law making and the legal adjudication of individual cases. Nonetheless, whether these channels are sufficient to guarantee the citizens effective democratic means to influence legislation and exercise control of EU institutions in the rather complex multilevel legal system of the EU has been continuously debated.

Civis Europeus Sum – Union Citizenship and the Influence of the Court of Justice of the European Union

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-80
Author(s):  
Verica Trstenjak
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Tax Relief ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
Free Movement Of Persons ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Since its formation in 1950s as the economic community, the EU has created the monetary union and is increasingly evolving also into a political union – part of which is also a union or Europe of citizens. This article explores the development and the existing EU legislation and case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on Union citizenship. The article emphasises the importance of the case law of the CJEU for the development of this concept, focusing especially on the case law pertaining to access to social security benefits in another Member State, the rights of students, tax relief, and personal rights such as the right to write a name in a certain way and the right to family life. Case law of the CJEU has, inter alia, confirmed that even economically inactive Union citizens lawfully residing in another Member State have a right to access to social benefits under the same conditions as the Member State’s own nationals. The concept of the Union citizenship is of key importance in the development of EU law, as it expands the scope of the applicability of the provisions on free movement of persons and other fundamental freedoms. New challenges and questions linked to Union citizenship are arising over time, which should also be regulated at the EU level in the future. Therefore, further development of this concept can still be expected in the EU.

A quest for consistency in the law of commercial agency. Loss of the right to remuneration in Polish and European law

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (0) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Piotr Sitnik
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Third ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Council Directive ◽  
European Standards ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Right

In a recent judgment in ERGO Poist’ovňa, a.s. v Alžbeta Barlíková, the Court of Justice of the European Union attempted to clarify the ambit of Article 11 of Council Directive of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, that is the circumstances where a commercial agent’s right to remuneration may be extinguished should a negotiated transaction not be executed between the principal and the client. Notably, the Court held that in the event of even partial non-execution of a negotiated contract between the principal and the third party client, provided it happened due to no fault on the part of the principal, the agent’s right to commission is proportionately extinguished. The paper discusses the judgment in the light of previous CJEU case law and the Polish transposition of the said European standards with a view to finding any potential divergences between the two. The paper notes two problems. First, Polish law, as opposed to Slovak law, does not recognize an automatic termination of an insurance contract in the event of default on the part of the customer. Conversely, whether such an effect eventuates is left to contractual discretion of the parties. Second, Polish courts have been recently willing to substitute unjust enrichment for contractual liability even where, it appears, complainants have valid claims under Article 7614 of the Civil Code.

Gloss to the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 15 November 2018 (C 648/17) concerning covering the damage caused by the passenger with the motor liability insurance in respect of the use of motor vehicles

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Marcin Orlicki
Keyword(s):  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Motor Vehicles ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Compulsory Insurance ◽  
Car Park ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Eu

The gloss refers to the Judgment of the CJEU, which stated that the concept of 'use of vehicles’ covers the situation when the passenger of a vehicle parked in a car park, while opening the door of that vehicle, scraped against and damaged the vehicle parked next to it. This means that the motor liability insurance covers such damages, irrespective of the legal regulations contained in the laws of the EU Member States, which impose an insurance obligation and define its scope. The Judgment of the CJEU is contrary to the Polish law in force, which assumes that the motor liability insurance covers the responsibility of the owner of the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle, but not third parties (including the passenger). Although, according to the author, the extension of liability does not have an axiological justification, it is necessary to modify the interpretation of the Polish regulations defining the scope of insurance coverage and to introduce the amendment to the Act on Compulsory Insurance, the Insurance Guarantee Fund and the Polish Motor Insurers’ Bureau in the future.

The Right To Be Forgotten

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.

Trade Union Liability for ‘EU-Unlawful’ Collective Action

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Malmberg
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Alternative Understanding ◽  
The Eu

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has made it clear that collective action taken by trade unions under certain circumstances might violate the freedom of services and the right of establishment under the Treaty (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU). However, the Court has not addressed the issue of which remedies are to be available against a trade union arranging such an ‘EU-unlawful’ collective action. This question was dealt with by the Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) in its final judgment in December 2009. The article discusses this judgment and presents an alternative understanding of the EU law requirements concerning remedies for EU-unlawful collective actions.

scholarly journals The ‘Europe with the Regions’ before the Court of Justice

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Panara
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Right ◽  
Regional Languages ◽  
The Eu

This article analyses the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the regions. It argues that there is a discrepancy between the progressive framing of a ‘Europe with the regions’ in the political sphere and the limited impact of the Court in this field. This discrepancy does not emerge everywhere, nor does it emerge with the same intensity in all sectors. Indeed, in a number of areas, the CJEU has acknowledged the role and responsibilities of the regions. Examples include the right/duty of the regions to implement EU obligations, the protection of regional languages, as well as the ‘sufficient autonomy’ test developed by the CJEU in relation to state aid. There is no ‘ideological opposition’ of the CJEU to an increasing ‘regionalisation’ of the EU. There are, however, structural hindrances that prevent the Court from promoting further advancements of the status of the regions in the European edifice, particularly as regards their participation in EU processes. Since the EU remains a ‘union of states’, the ‘Europe with the regions’ has developed so far, and is likely to continue to develop, via advancements reflected in policy-making practices, soft-law arrangements and Treaty amendments rather than via the ‘judge-made federalism’ of the Court.

scholarly journals Pojęcie współmałżonka w prawie unijnym – uwagi na tle orzeczenia w sprawie Coman (C‑673/16)

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.

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