Chinese Dream, Cool Japan, and the Korean Wave: “Gangnam Style” and the Soft Power of East Asian Countries among Young Adults in the US Heartland

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130
Author(s):  
Young-ok Yum ◽  
Doobo Shim
2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Gyo Koo ◽  
Vinod Aggarwal

AbstractThe traditional institutional equilibrium in East Asia—the embrace of the WTO at the multilateral level and a focus on market-driven, informal integration at the sub-multilateral level—is under heavy strain. Increasingly, East Asian countries are pursuing greater institutionalisation at the sub-multilateral level, weaving a web of preferential arrangements in response to similar strategies pursued by the US and the EU. This article examines the likely path of trading arrangements in Northeast Asia, its implications for East Asia and the future of APEC and ASEM. We propose an institutional bargaining game approach, focusing on goods, countries' individual bargaining situations and the fit with existing arrangements, and allowing an exploration of the evolution of trading arrangements in East Asia. An East Asian trading bloc has both benign and pernicious elements, depending on the ideas and beliefs held by regional actors. The contribution of a prospective East Asian bloc to APEC and ASEM primarily depends on the balance of interests between the US and the EU concerning East Asia. In view of the tremendous political and economic uncertainty in the global economy, the path to freer trade in Northeast Asia, East Asia and the world system is likely to be a bumpy one.


Significance The preferential US trade programme faces renewal or lapse by December 31. South-east Asia’s economies are structured to take advantage of the GSP and many of the products exported to the United States under GSP (such as light manufactures and seafood) are important for South-east Asia’s supply chains. Impacts Vietnam may make another application for inclusion in the US GSP programme. The more authoritarian South-east Asian countries could find it easier to gain US GSP preferences under Trump. The Trump administration could use the GSP as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations or renegotiations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
See Seng Tan

Abstract This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-137
Author(s):  
Laima Juknevičiūtė

Vytautas Magnus UniversitySouth Korea’s experience wielding soft power is usually associated with the Korean Wave, which swept the Asian region off its feet predominantly during the first decade of this century. In this article I will however argue that the phenomenon of the Korean Wave has never been intended as a calculated attempt on the part of the South Korean government to enhance the overall South Korean image worldwide and thus increase South Korean international might and prestige. To prove the validity of this hypothesis, I will provide a concise historical overview of the inception, development and spread of South Korean popular culture, while at the same time tracing its underlying soft power implications. I will likewise attempt to discuss the popular reception of the Korean Wave in three East Asian countries, i.e. Mainland China, Taiwan and Japan, and one European country, i.e. Lithuania. The scope of the endeavour has been largely restricted to the cinematic aspect of the Korean Wave, for I consider the creation of motion pictures and drama serials to be by far the most precious, influential and revealing form of art.


Author(s):  
Neelam Verma

Main aim of this article was a systematic review on causes and management of Myopia progression in children. Myopia is a general disorder, affecting just about one-third of the US popula­tion and over 90% of the population in some East Asian countries. Elevated amounts of myopia are connected with a bigger risk of sight-threatening troubles, such as retinal detachment, choroidal degeneration, cataracts and glaucoma. Slowing the progression of myopia could potentially advantage millions of children in the India. Few approaches used for myopia organize have proven to be useful. Treatment options such as undercorrection of myopia, gas permeable contact lenses, and bifocal or multifocal spectacles have all been proven to be inef­fective for myopia control, although one recent randomized clinical trial using executive top bifocal spectacles on children with progressive myopia has shown to decrease the progression to nearly half of the control subjects. The most effective methods are the use of orthokeratology contact lenses, soft bifocal contact lenses, and pharmaceutical agents such as atropine, timolol or pirenzepine. Keyword: Myopia progression, pharmaceutical agents, lenses, treatment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (05) ◽  
pp. 1550066
Author(s):  
EU CHYE TAN ◽  
CHOR FOON TANG

This paper aims to ascertain whether direct macroeconomic linkages exist between some East Asian (EA) countries on the one hand and the United States (US) and Europe on the other, based upon quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) series spanning from the early 1990s. Long-run and short-run lead-lag relations are explored within a trivariate modeling framework. Contrary to popular belief, the empirical evidence suggests generally either very nominal or no direct links at all between these EA countries and the US in terms of GDP. Direct links with Europe are completely ruled out. All these would allude to a very limited susceptibility of these EA economies to shocks in the US and Europe, barring a global economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. The growing belief that if China sneezes, the world catches the flu is also not borne out by the empirical results.


2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (6) ◽  
pp. 875-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan te Nijenhuis ◽  
Yu Yong Choi ◽  
Michael van den Hoek ◽  
Ekaterina Valueva ◽  
Kun Ho Lee

AbstractSpearman’s hypothesis tested at the subtest level of an IQ battery states that differences between races on the subtests of an IQ battery are a function of thegloadings of these subtests, such that there are small differences between races on subtests with lowgloadings and large differences between races on subtests with highgloadings. Jensen (1998) stated that Spearman’s hypothesis is a law-like phenomenon. It has also been confirmed many times at the level of items of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. This study hypothesizes that with concern to Spearman’s hypothesis, subtests and items function in fundamentally the same way, and tested whether Spearman’s hypothesis is confirmed at the item level for White–East Asian comparisons. A group of Korean young adults (N=205) was compared with other groups of young adults from Canada, the US, Russia, Peru and South Africa (totalN=4770) who took the Advanced Progressive Matrices. Spearman’s hypothesis was strongly confirmed with a sample-size-weightedrwith a value of 0.63. Computing thegloadings of the items of the Raven with either the Raven-gor the Wechsler-gled to the same conclusions. Tests of Spearman’s hypothesis yielded less-strong outcomes when the 36-item Advanced Progressive Matrices were used than when the 60-item Standard Progressive Matrices were used. There is a substantial correlation between sample size and the outcome of Spearman’s hypothesis. So, all four hypotheses were confirmed, showing that a part of the subtest-level nomological net replicates at the item level, strengthening the position that, with concern to Spearman’s hypothesis, subtests and items function fundamentally the same. It is concluded that Spearman’s hypothesis is still a law-like phenomenon. Detailed suggestions for follow-up research are made.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kevin Arlidge

<p>The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are using a hedging strategy to ensure their security. The Philippines is pursuing a dual policy of hedging and balancing with the US. Singapore is following a policy of hedging but is verging on bandwagoning with the US. All countries are leveraging off ASEAN and its associated fora as their first line of defence. While ASEAN and its fora are adequate for dialogue they are not effective in solving disputes among ASEAN countries or between ASEAN countries and China. The uncertain military rise of China and territorial and maritime disputes with China are causing South East Asian countries to feel insecure. While China professes a policy of “Peaceful Development” its actions in 2009 and 2010 indicated a more aggressive approach to its claims over the entire South China Sea that it now states is an area of “core Interest” to China along with Taiwan. South East Asian countries are expanding or have plans to expand their defence force capability. The US is considered an important actor in guaranteeing South East Asian security and keeping China’s territorial ambitions in check in the immediate future. The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore are developing strong economic links with China but are keeping their military links at arms length while forging closer defence links with the US.</p>


Significance Washington is highly receptive to these calls. Regardless of who wins the US presidential election next week, a digital trade agreement with South-east Asia will be a strong candidate for the next administration’s trade agenda. Impacts Washington will seek ASEAN endorsement of US principles on digital governance but avoid a trade pact with ASEAN itself. A digital trade pact would allow Washington to influence South-east Asian tax rules for US ‘big tech’. Global technological decoupling would increase if South-east Asian countries embrace US technology standards.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kevin Arlidge

<p>The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are using a hedging strategy to ensure their security. The Philippines is pursuing a dual policy of hedging and balancing with the US. Singapore is following a policy of hedging but is verging on bandwagoning with the US. All countries are leveraging off ASEAN and its associated fora as their first line of defence. While ASEAN and its fora are adequate for dialogue they are not effective in solving disputes among ASEAN countries or between ASEAN countries and China. The uncertain military rise of China and territorial and maritime disputes with China are causing South East Asian countries to feel insecure. While China professes a policy of “Peaceful Development” its actions in 2009 and 2010 indicated a more aggressive approach to its claims over the entire South China Sea that it now states is an area of “core Interest” to China along with Taiwan. South East Asian countries are expanding or have plans to expand their defence force capability. The US is considered an important actor in guaranteeing South East Asian security and keeping China’s territorial ambitions in check in the immediate future. The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore are developing strong economic links with China but are keeping their military links at arms length while forging closer defence links with the US.</p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document