Large Scale Surveillance to Protect National Security: under EU Control?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Eskens
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth B. Kolmstetter ◽  
Stephanie Platz-Vieno ◽  
John Mills ◽  
Jeffrey Neal

Author(s):  
Sir Richard Dearlove

This article discusses the changing perceptions on national security and civic anxiety. During the Cold War and its aftermath, security was rather a simple and straightforward issue. The countries knew their enemies, where they are and the threats they presented. On the event that, the enemies's secrets were unknown, probing techniques were employed to determine the weaknesses of the enemy. This formulaic situation which seeped through in to the twenty-first century left little room for innovation. In fact, in some countries, security maintained at the Cold War levels despite criticisms that new and emerging national security threats should be addressed at a new level. Of the powerful nations, America maintained the role of a world policeman and adapted its national security priorities according to its perception of a new series of strategic threats; however these new security strategies were without a sense of urgency. However, the perception of global threats and national security radically changed in the event of the 9/11 attack. The sleeping national security priorities of America came to a full force which affected the national security priorities of other nations as well. In the twenty-first globalized world, no conflict remains a regional clash. The reverberations of the Russian military action in Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza, and the results of the attacks in Mumbai resonates loudly and rapidly through the wider international security system. While today, nations continue to seek new methods for addressing new security threats, the paradox of the national security policy is that nation-states have lost their exclusive grip of their own security at a time when the private citizens are assailed by increased fears for their own security and demand a more enhanced safety from the state. Nation-states have been much safer from large-scale violence, however there exists a strong sense of anxiety about the lack of security in the face of multiplicity of threats. Nations have been largely dependent on international coordinated action to achieve their important national security objectives. National policies and security theory lack precision. In addition, the internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign security. These blurring lines suggest that the understanding of national security is still at the height of transformations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 809-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. Krebs

AbstractContemporaries and historians often blame the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War on a dominant narrative of national security: the “Cold War consensus.” Its usual periodization, according to which it came together in the late 1940s and persisted until the late 1960s when it unraveled amidst the trauma of the Vietnam War, fits well with a common theory of change in ideas and discourse. That theory expects stasis until a substantial unexpected failure (in this domain, military defeat) discredits dominant ideas and unsettles dominant coalitions. However, systematic data reveal the standard history of this important case to be wrong. Based on a large-scale content analysis of newspaper editorials on foreign affairs, this article shows that the Cold War narrative was narrower than conventional accounts suggest, that it did not coalesce until well into the 1950s, and that it began to erode even before the Vietnam War's Americanization in 1965. To make sense of this puzzle, I develop an alternative theory of the rise and fall of the narratives that underpin and structure debate over national security. Rooted in the dynamics of public narrative and the domestic politics of the battlefield, the theory argues that military failure impedes change in the narrative in whose terms government officials had legitimated the mission, whereas victory creates the opportunity for departures from the dominant narrative. Process-tracing reveals causal dynamics consistent with the theory: failure in the Korean War, which might have undermined Cold War globalism, instead facilitated the Cold War narrative's rise to dominance (or consensus); and the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible that dominant narrative's breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. This hard and important case suggests the need to rethink the relationship between success, failure, and change in dominant narratives of national security—and perhaps in other policy domains as well.


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (24) ◽  
pp. 8286
Author(s):  
Dariusz Majchrzak ◽  
Krzysztof Michalski ◽  
Jacek Reginia-Zacharski

Large-scale failures of electric power systems (blackouts) have been the subject of intensive research in most countries for several years. This research aims primarily at seeking solutions to improve the reliability of the operation of power systems and the development of effective strategies to protect critical infrastructure from the effects of energy shortages and power cuts. In contrast, systematic research on crisis management and civil protection under conditions of prolonged blackout has been undertaken in Europe only recently, and these extremely important aspects of energy security have been delayed by the COVID-19 crisis. The ability of the Polish crisis management system to cope with the consequences of long-term, large-scale shortages and interruptions in the supply of electricity, as well as the consequences of possible failures in this field, has not been systematically examined to date. This issue is of growing strategic importance, not only from the point of view of security and defence policy, but also economic cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland’s infrastructural security must be considered in a broad regional and supra-regional context. A long-term lack of electricity in a large area of Poland would undermine the stability of the entire national security system, destabilising the region and supranational security systems. Apart from objective reasons, intentional attacks on the links of such a chain cannot be ruled out. Poland is the leader of this region, a frontline country in the NATO-Russia conflict, as well as a liaison state that provides the Baltic states—being EU and NATO members—with a land connection to Western Europe. In view of the growing risk of blackout, the importance of the problem and the existence of a cognitive gap in this field, we evaluated the Polish crisis management system in terms of its ability to respond to the effects of a sudden, long-term, large-scale blackout. Methodologically, we adopted a systems approach to security management. In order to estimate the consequences of a blackout, we used analogue forecasting tools and scenario analysis. By analysing previous crisis situations caused by blackouts and local conditions of vulnerability to such events, we formulated basic preparedness requirements that a modern crisis management system should meet in the face of the growing risk of blackouts. A review of strategic documents and crisis planning processes in public administration allowed us to identify deficits and weaknesses in the Polish crisis management system. On this basis we formulated recommendations whose implementation shall improve the ability of the national security system to face such challenges in the future.


Author(s):  
Y. Selyanin

The US Government has initiated a large-scale activity on artificial intelligence (AI) development and implementation. Numerous departments and agencies including the Pentagon, intelligence community and citizen agencies take part in these efforts. Some of them are responsible for technology, materials and standards development. Others are customers of AI. State AI efforts receive significant budget funding. Moreover, Department of Defense costs on AI are comparable with the whole non-defense funding. American world-leading IT companies support state departments and agencies in organizing AI technologies development and implementation. The USA's highest military and political leadership supports such efforts. Congress provides significant requested funding. However leading specialists criticize the state's approach to creating and implementing AI. Firstly, they consider authorized assignments as not sufficient. Secondly, even this funding is used ineffectively. Therefore Congress created National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) in 2018 for identifying problems in the AI area and developing solutions. This article looks at the stakeholders and participants of the state AI efforts, the budget funding authorization, the major existing problems and the NSCAI conclusions regarding the necessary AI funding in FYs 2021-2032.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 790-817
Author(s):  
Charlotte Wagnsson ◽  
Eva-Karin Olsson ◽  
Isabella Nilsen

Gender differences have been observed regarding many political and social issues, yet we lack comprehensive evidence on differences in perceptions on a wide range of security issues increasingly important to voters: military threats, criminality, and terrorism. Previous research suggests that when women are highly politically mobilized, as they are in Sweden, gender differences in political opinion are large. On the other hand, Swedish politicians have worked hard to reduce gender stereotypical thinking. This prompts the question: Are there gender differences in attitudes on security issues in Sweden, and if so, in what ways do the attitudes differ? This study is based on comprehensive data from focus groups and a large-scale survey. The results show that women were more prone to respond with an “ethic of care,” across security issues. Women were more inclined to understand security problems as structural, explained by macho culture, segregation, and injustice. Women tend to support preventive measures that provide individuals with opportunities to choose “the right path,” such as education and economic investment in deprived areas. When asked about national security, women believe more in diplomacy and dialogue. In general, women are less inclined to support various repressive solutions.


Author(s):  
Justin Charles Roberts

Following the United States takeover of Iraq in 2003, the Department of Justice released an assessment of Iraq’s fractured judiciary. Corruption, public distrust of the courts, and other roadblocks provided a bleak outlook on the rebuilding of the Iraqi judiciary. Nevertheless, recent large-scale judicial reforms have been moderately successful, including the separation of executive and judicial power, guarantee of due process, and efforts to protect the system from corruption, bribery, and political pressure. Now, during a period of relative stability, the Iraqi government must focus the improvement of the judiciary on four major areas: judicial independence, the debate between transparency and national security, the ability to prosecute high-ranking officials, issues with Kurdish autonomy, and international assistance and training. While each of these issues is deeply complex, this research asserts that there are six crucial improvements that will best enhance the Iraqi judiciary going forward. These improvements include increased courthouse rehabilitation to provide security for judges, a policy of erring on the side of transparency instead of worry over national security, a focus on promoting judges by merit instead of removing them through review, the rolling back of the ministerial protection law, a movement toward the election of judges instead of appointment, and an initiative to educate the Iraqi people and judiciary on the rich history of Iraqi law, as Iraq was the birthplace of codified law. If these improvements begin to be implemented now, they will ensure solid and sustainable growth of the Iraqi society and economy in the long-term.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 587-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Yew Weng

ABSTRACT There are always lessons to be learnt from every oil spill response. Similarly, critics are always quick to point out how a response was too slow, the inadequacy of equipment / manpower resources and, inevitably, how the response lacks proper coordination. Yet many of these common criticisms can be resolved if artificial ‘roadblocks and red tape’ are removed so that Responders can go about doing their jobs, providing prompt responses in mitigating damages caused by oil spills. This paper will discuss the challenges of mounting an international oil spill response in the Asia Pacific with specific references to political roadblocks and red tape put up by ‘recipient’ countries. Tier 3 Oil Spill Response organizations, namely Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Limited (OSRL/EARL), regularly practices activations and resource deployments through exercises with different scenarios. These exercises can take the form of tabletop exercises or full scale deployment of equipment, recall of Members’ regional and worldwide teams. The larger scale exercises involve trans-boundary movement of people and equipment, including boats and aircrafts. OSRL/EARL has conducted large scale exercises successfully. Unfortunately, there are also times when red tape prevented the company from responding in the swift and efficient manner that it endeavors. Various reasons given are ‘national security’ and the need for very ‘high level approvals’ as the recipient country will be deemed to be calling outside assistance for a national incident. The paper will discuss some of OSRL/EARL'S experiences like:Response organizations refusing to participate in exercises due to ‘national security’ reasonsNational agencies refusing import of equipment due to taxation lawsProtracted approval processes, and sometimes outright refusal, for materials like dispersantRefusing entry of international aircraftsClearance and complicated permit requirements for Responders entering a country to assist in the response The challenge to remove these road blocks is an uphill task. OSRL/EARL has an on-going Advocacy program to engage and cooperate on these issues with Government Agencies and relevant bodies. The Author believes that the removal of ‘road blocks’ will expedite responses to oil spills.


Author(s):  
Yuriy Slyusarenko

The purpose of the article is to identify and characterize the potential risks and threats to the implementation of state policy in the oil and gas sector, given ensuring the national security of Ukraine. The study analyzes the nature of the development of legal relations in the oil and gas sector in the context of identifying potential threats to national security. The reasons for changes in state policy in the oil and gas sector, depending on foreign policy challenges, have been identified. Promising reforming such an approach given the development of globalization processes and implementing the Russian Federation's quasi-civilization project is highlighted. It is determined that the state policy of Ukraine in the oil and gas sector depends on the position of powerful subjects of international politics, the realization of whose geopolitical interests can significantly adjust the actions of domestic authorities. An analysis of the leading countries of the EU and the Russian Federation suggests that in certain circumstances, economic interests may prevail over the declared political slogans. The termination of European countries' contracts with Russia's Gazprom using the take-or-pay formula may affect these countries' management in the amount of fuel supplied to Ukraine in reverse. The future abandonment of the take-or-pay procedure, which has created difficulties in paying for gas under long-term contracts, may reduce European partners' interest in reverse gas supplies to Ukraine. Therefore, reverse gas supply to Ukraine can be considered a tactical measure. In the long run, it is essential to focus on the use of alternative energy sources and the development of our gas deposits, including shale gas production. The state's national security interests also require a significant reduction in bylaws to determine legal relations in the oil and gas sector. Such a reduction may be dictated by the growing dependence of government decisions on the political situation, the interests of large financial and industrial groups and individual politicians. And the priority of such claims over the parts of statebuilding can cause large-scale negative consequences for Ukraine.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie Reaser ◽  
Gary M. Tabor ◽  
Rohit A. Chitale ◽  
Peter Hudson ◽  
Raina Plowright

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought biosecurity to the forefront of national security policy. Land use change is a fundamental driver of zoonotic disease outbreaks, yet substantial study is yet required to unravel the mechanisms by which land use-induced spillover operates. Ecological degradation may be the 21st Century’s most overlooked security threat. Within the biosecurity context, we introduce ecological countermeasures as highly targeted, landscape-based interventions aimed at arresting one or more of the components of land use-induced spillover, the chain of biological events that facilitate large-scale outbreaks of diseases transmitted between wildlife and people. We provide case studies of ecological countermeasures of particular interest to the US Department of Defense, broadly discuss countermeasures in the defense and health sectors, and provide an overview of recent US policy decisions related to health security in order to underscore the need for greater attention to ecological resilience as our best defense against future pandemics.


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