scholarly journals Epistemologia religiosa e formas de discursividades sobrepostas: uma análise desde a política da secularização de Charles Taylor [Religious epistemology and shapes of overlaping discourses: an analysis from the politics of secularization of Charles Taylor]

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (44) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Joel Decothé Junior

Neste artigo temos como objetivo tratar do significado político da secularização. Iniciamos abordando a tensão existente entre a epistemologia religiosa e a epistemologia do humanismo exclusivo. Damos continuidade problematizando a questão referente à era dos reordenamentos e da transmutação para uma nova ordem moral secularizada, na qual o agente humano se autointerpreta. Assim, destacamos a relevância da presença da epistemologia religiosa na construção de uma nova mentalidade no imaginário social moderno. Surge a implicação do exercício do self se avaliar fortemente a partir da epistemologia imanente do humanismo exclusivo. Outra abordagem empreendida deste problema é a da elaboração de uma ética da autenticidade, que interferiu na construção da identidade moral expressivista, cada vez mais desarraigada dos pressupostos da epistemologia religiosa. Então, abordamos a postura do agente humano viver o conflito de busca por autorrealização e sentido normativo-ontológico para o seu self ao articular a sua forma de vida e identidade moral numa era secular. [In this article we aim to address the political significance of secularization. We begin by addressing the tension between religious epistemology and the epistemology of exclusive humanism. We proceed to the question of the age of reordering and transmutation into a new secularized moral order, where the human agent is self-interpreting. Thus, we highlight the relevance of the presence of religious epistemology in the construction of a new mentality in the modern social imaginary. The implication of the exercise of the self arises strongly from the immanent epistemology of exclusive humanism. Another approach taken to this problem is the elaboration of an Ethics of authenticity, which interfered in the construction of expressivist moral identity, increasingly uprooted from the presuppositions of religious epistemology. So we approach the posture of the human agent to live the search conflict for self-realization and normative-ontological sense for his self by articulating his way of life and moral identity in a secular age.]

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 43-75
Author(s):  
Mariola Kuszyk-Bytniewska

In the article, I address the issues of the transformation of subjectivity, to which it is subject in the face of changes in the political and cultural status of knowledge in post-modernity. I am trying to identify and define the post-modern deficits of political culture as a consequence of these changes. Looking at the links between subjectivity and politics, I reach out to Charles Taylor, who characterizes the crisis of the ethos of authenticity, Anthony Giddens, who analyses the process of disembedding of a subject, and Michel Foucault describing modern technologies of the self-creation in the context of a concept of politics understood as praxis by Hannah Arendt.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Issam Khirallah

The paper outlines the interpretation of Sufism formulated by Mohamed Abed Al-Jabri, a contemporary Moroccan philosopher and critic of the Arabic tradition. According to him, Sufism, unknown to Arabic culture until the advent of Islam, originated through a historical conspiracy whereby the Persians attempted to weaken their new Arabic colonisers. Sufism is viewed by him as an evasion and a detachment from life and its problems. It leads its adepts, through the mystical journey, to renounce material life. It plunges its adepts into a way of life where the annihilation of the self in God represents the central value. This annihilation of the self in deity is possible only through the blind obedience of the Seeker (Mureed) to his Master (Sheikh). Therefore, Sufism can only thrive by using tyrannical means. It demands that its adepts, through following a predestined path chosen by God, lose their own volition and freedom in favour of their Master. Breaking the law at the end of the Seeker’s mystical journey reflects, paradoxically, a spiritual accomplishment. Additionally, Sufi orders maintain a congenial relationship with political tyranny. Consequently, I argue, Sufism leads to a loss of human responsibility for oneself and other beings. I also claim that in a post-tyrannical Arabic society, where responsibility for oneself and one’s community should be the centralvalue, Sufi ethics are unable to play a role in the promotion of modern values. For this reason, it should be prevented from shaping the political and social choices of a modern society and constrained to the mystical realm.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Genevieve Howard

<p>My thesis connects Eliza Haywood with the Hillarians, a London-based coterie of young writers and artists headed by Aaron Hill in the first half of the 1720s, and explores the possibility that in Fantomina, Or Love in a Maze (1725), Haywood used tropes of performance from her theatrical career to work out the implications of the Hillarian ideals of progressive conduct on female agency. Haywood’s early novels, including Fantomina, can be connected to the group, and can be shown to encompass its behavioural ideals – a self-consciously progressive model of male-female conduct.  My first chapter examines aspects of what Charles Taylor terms the “social imaginary” of the early eighteenth century. John Locke’s theory of personal identity (Part I) redefined the self in terms of consciousness, which meant the self could change. Conduct literature (Part II) defined the behaviour of women as “innate” through the regulation of sexual desire. In Part III, I show women philosophers, writers, and playwrights began to see women’s conduct, like the self, as constructed, and began applying this to relations between the sexes. If conduct was constructed it could change, and women began to work out these ideas and the implications of this change on stage. I show Haywood could have taken this theatrical convention of working philosophical ideas out on stage and adapted it to her fictions, particularly to Fantomina, via the process of novelisation. It is possible that as theatrical tropes crossed over into fiction in novelisation, the use of performance to work out philosophical ideas crossed over too.  My second chapter explores Haywood’s participation in manuscript literary culture. Part I positions her in the literary culture of her time, and connects her with the Hillarians, opening a new critical context in which to read her work. Part II connects the composition of her early texts with her coterie, arguing it is possible all her 1719-1725 texts, including Fantomina, were conceived and first read within the group. It explores the impact of this on the context and meaning of Fantomina, and how Haywood could have used genre, particularly the tropes of amatory fiction, to explore the ideas of the Hillarians.  Chapters Three and Four draw these strands of manuscript and performance together. Haywood’s association with the Hillarians, as I argue in Chapter Three, likely influenced her authorial agency in Fantomina. In Part I, I argue Haywood possibly had control over the image of the original portrait of her 1725 Secret Histories frontispiece. I then examine her narrative agency (Part II). Shifts in narrative discourse in Fantomina show Haywood used narration techniques adapted from the theatre, and these narrative shifts gave her a public voice: in these shifts, she appears to comment on how relations between the sexes are constructed – a pivotal focus of the Hillarians. Chapter Four explores Haywood’s development of the heroine’s agency in relation to sexual desire. This focus reveals the differing conduct of the heroine and Beauplaisir within the same relationship, as well as the power structure of the relationship – again pivotal focuses of her coterie. Haywood appears to be working out the implications of Hillarian ideals in relation to female agency, particularly sexual consent.  I conclude Haywood used masquerade and performance to develop a system of self-knowledge that relied on its expression through emotion, rather than the mind, and that this system can be extended beyond knowledge of the self to knowledge of others – and possibly further.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Genevieve Howard

<p>My thesis connects Eliza Haywood with the Hillarians, a London-based coterie of young writers and artists headed by Aaron Hill in the first half of the 1720s, and explores the possibility that in Fantomina, Or Love in a Maze (1725), Haywood used tropes of performance from her theatrical career to work out the implications of the Hillarian ideals of progressive conduct on female agency. Haywood’s early novels, including Fantomina, can be connected to the group, and can be shown to encompass its behavioural ideals – a self-consciously progressive model of male-female conduct.  My first chapter examines aspects of what Charles Taylor terms the “social imaginary” of the early eighteenth century. John Locke’s theory of personal identity (Part I) redefined the self in terms of consciousness, which meant the self could change. Conduct literature (Part II) defined the behaviour of women as “innate” through the regulation of sexual desire. In Part III, I show women philosophers, writers, and playwrights began to see women’s conduct, like the self, as constructed, and began applying this to relations between the sexes. If conduct was constructed it could change, and women began to work out these ideas and the implications of this change on stage. I show Haywood could have taken this theatrical convention of working philosophical ideas out on stage and adapted it to her fictions, particularly to Fantomina, via the process of novelisation. It is possible that as theatrical tropes crossed over into fiction in novelisation, the use of performance to work out philosophical ideas crossed over too.  My second chapter explores Haywood’s participation in manuscript literary culture. Part I positions her in the literary culture of her time, and connects her with the Hillarians, opening a new critical context in which to read her work. Part II connects the composition of her early texts with her coterie, arguing it is possible all her 1719-1725 texts, including Fantomina, were conceived and first read within the group. It explores the impact of this on the context and meaning of Fantomina, and how Haywood could have used genre, particularly the tropes of amatory fiction, to explore the ideas of the Hillarians.  Chapters Three and Four draw these strands of manuscript and performance together. Haywood’s association with the Hillarians, as I argue in Chapter Three, likely influenced her authorial agency in Fantomina. In Part I, I argue Haywood possibly had control over the image of the original portrait of her 1725 Secret Histories frontispiece. I then examine her narrative agency (Part II). Shifts in narrative discourse in Fantomina show Haywood used narration techniques adapted from the theatre, and these narrative shifts gave her a public voice: in these shifts, she appears to comment on how relations between the sexes are constructed – a pivotal focus of the Hillarians. Chapter Four explores Haywood’s development of the heroine’s agency in relation to sexual desire. This focus reveals the differing conduct of the heroine and Beauplaisir within the same relationship, as well as the power structure of the relationship – again pivotal focuses of her coterie. Haywood appears to be working out the implications of Hillarian ideals in relation to female agency, particularly sexual consent.  I conclude Haywood used masquerade and performance to develop a system of self-knowledge that relied on its expression through emotion, rather than the mind, and that this system can be extended beyond knowledge of the self to knowledge of others – and possibly further.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Issam Khirallah

The paper outlines the interpretation of Sufism formulated by Mohamed Abed Al-Jabri, a contemporary Moroccan philosopher and critic of the Arabic tradition. According to him, Sufism, unknown to Arabic culture until the advent of Islam, originated through a historical conspiracy whereby the Persians attempted to weaken their new Arabic colonisers. Sufism is viewed by him as an evasion and a detachment from life and its problems. It leads its adepts, through the mystical journey, to renounce material life. It plunges its adepts into a way of life where the annihilation of the self in God represents the central value. This annihilation of the self in deity is possible only through the blind obedience of the Seeker (Mureed) to his Master (Sheikh). Therefore, Sufism can only thrive by using tyrannical means. It demands that its adepts, through following a predestined path chosen by God, lose their own volition and freedom in favour of their Master. Breaking the law at the end of the Seeker’s mystical journey reflects, paradoxically, a spiritual accomplishment. Additionally, Sufi orders maintain a congenial relationship with political tyranny. Consequently, I argue, Sufism leads to a loss of human responsibility for oneself and other beings. I also claim that in a post-tyrannical Arabic society, where responsibility for oneself and one’s community should be the centralvalue, Sufi ethics are unable to play a role in the promotion of modern values. For this reason, it should be prevented from shaping the political and social choices of a modern society and constrained to the mystical realm.


Author(s):  
Christian Gilliam

Christian Gilliam argues that a philosophy of ‘pure’ immanence is integral to the development of an alternative understanding of ‘the political’; one that re-orients our understanding of the self toward the concept of an unconscious or ‘micropolitical’ life of desire. He argues that here, in this ‘life’, is where the power relations integral to the continuation of post-industrial capitalism are most present and most at stake. Through proving its philosophical context, lineage and political import, Gilliam ultimately justifies the conceptual necessity of immanence in understanding politics and resistance, thereby challenging the claim that ontologies of ‘pure’ immanence are either apolitical or politically incoherent.


Author(s):  
Mek Wok Mahmud ◽  
Sayed Sikandar Shah Haneef

Reversion to Islam while opening golden opportunities for a revert in terms of divine guidance and spiritual salvation is coming with somewhat insurmountable challenges in terms of Islamization of the self, family and contributions to the overall development of Malaysia as a multi-religious country. This is especially so when Islam as an official religion has made the issue of Islamization of the Malaysian society and its systems amongst the pivotal national agendas in the country.  As to what is the role of Chinese Muslims (reverts) in the process, studies, among others, have purported to present the statistics about their share in socio-economic development. Similarly, empirical studies point to the odds faced by this community at personal, family and community levels in their path for transition to the full Islamic way of life. To the presenters of this paper, however, the macro dimension of what it means to become a Muslim which is essential for adjustment to the Islamic requirements has not been sufficiently highlighted in discourses in the area. Accordingly, this paper presents the position statements on Islamic expectations from Chinese reverts with the purpose of motivating them to achieve greater things in the area of Islamization of their community and the nation to the effect. Keywords: Chinese converts, Islamization, expectations and challenges. Abstrak kembalinya seseorang kepada agama Islam selain dari membuka peluang keemasan dalam mendapat  petunjuk Ilahi dan pengisian rohani turut disertai dengan cabaran yang amat sukar untuk diatasi termasuklah cabaran Islamisasi diri, keluarga serta sumbangan kepada pembangunan keseluruhan Malaysia sebagai negara berbilang agama. Hal ini menjadi satu keutamaan terutamanya apabila Islam memegang status sebagai agama rasmi persekutuan yang menjadikan isu Islamisasi masyarakat Malaysia sebagai satu agenda nasional. Bagi menjayakan agenda ini, peranan umat Islam dari kalangan masyarakat Cina (cina muslim) juga perlu diambil kira. Statistik menunjukkan cina muslim turut mempunyai bahagian dalam menyumbang terhadap pembangunan sosio-ekonomi negara. Dalam pada masa yang sama, kajian empirikal membuktikan adanya bentuk bentuk cabaran yang dihadapi oleh komuniti ini di peringkat peribadi, keluarga dan komuniti dalam perjalanan mereka untuk kembali kepada cara hidup Islam yang sepenuhnya. Bagi kami pengkaji kertas ini, dimensi makro dalam menjadikan dan mengertikan  seseorang itu Muslim terutamanya dalam menyesuaikan diri dengan ajaran  Islam masih belum cukup diberi  penjelasan dan penerangan yang sewajarnya. Oleh itu, makalah ini cuba menerangkan idea dan cadangan yang berguna kepada cina muslim dengan tujuan memotivasikan  mereka bagi  mencapai kejayaan  yang lebih besar dari aspek Islamisasi di kalangan komuniti mereka seterusnya memberi sumbangan kepada negara. Kata kunci:  Cina Muslim, Islamisasi, harapan dan cabaran.


Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-217
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe

Abstract This paper examines the central criticisms that come, broadly, from the modern, ‘analytic’ tradition, of Pierre Hadot’s idea of ancient philosophy as a way of life.: Firstly, ancient philosophy just did not or could not have involved anything like the ‘spiritual practices’ or ‘technologies of the self’, aiming at curing subjects’ unnecessary desires or bettering their lives, contra Hadot and Foucault et al. Secondly, any such metaphilosophical account of putative ‘philosophy’ must unacceptably downplay the role of ‘serious philosophical reasoning’ or ‘rigorous argument’ in philosophy. Thirdly, claims that ancient philosophy aimed at securing wisdom by a variety of means including but not restricted to rational inquiry are accordingly false also as historical claims about the ancient philosophers. Fourthly, to the extent that we must (despite (3)) admit that some ancient thinkers did engage in or recommend extra-cognitive forms of transformative practice, these thinkers were not true or ‘mainline’ philosophers. I contend that the historical claims (3) and (4) are highly contestable, risking erroneously projecting a later modern conception of philosophy back onto the past. Of the theoretical or metaphilosophical claims (1) and (2), I argue that the second claim, as framed here, points to real, hard questions that surround the conception(s) of philosophy as a way of life.


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