scholarly journals The value of communication and cooperation when servers are strategic

2020 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 349-367
Author(s):  
Mark Fackrell ◽  
Cong Li ◽  
Peter Taylor ◽  
Jiesen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Transmission Probability ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Successful Transmission ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
The Social ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Successful Transmission Probability

In 2015, Guglielmi and Badia discussed optimal strategies in a particular type of service system with two strategic servers. In their setup, each server can be either active or inactive and an active server can be requested to transmit a sequence of packets. The servers have varying probabilities of successfully transmitting when they are active, and both servers receive a unit reward if the sequence of packets is transmitted successfully. Guglielmi and Badia provided an analysis of optimal strategies in four scenarios: where each server does not know the other’s successful transmission probability; one of the two servers is always inactive; each server knows the other’s successful transmission probability and they are willing to cooperate. Unfortunately, the analysis by Guglielmi and Badia contained some errors. In this paper we correct these errors. We discuss three cases where both servers (I) communicate and cooperate; (II) neither communicate nor cooperate; (III) communicate but do not cooperate. In particular, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy in Case II through a Bayesian game formulation, and demonstrate that there is a region in the parameter space where there are multiple Nash equilibria in Case III. We also quantify the value of communication or cooperation by comparing the social welfare in the three cases, and propose possible regulations to make the Nash equilibrium strategy the socially optimal strategy for both Cases II and III. doi:10.1017/S1446181120000048

scholarly journals THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION WHEN SERVERS ARE STRATEGIC

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 349-367
Author(s):  
M. FACKRELL ◽  
C. LI ◽  
P. G. TAYLOR ◽  
J. WANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Transmission Probability ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Successful Transmission ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
The Social ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Successful Transmission Probability

In 2015, Guglielmi and Badia discussed optimal strategies in a particular type of service system with two strategic servers. In their setup, each server can be either active or inactive and an active server can be requested to transmit a sequence of packets. The servers have varying probabilities of successfully transmitting when they are active, and both servers receive a unit reward if the sequence of packets is transmitted successfully. Guglielmi and Badia provided an analysis of optimal strategies in four scenarios: where each server does not know the other’s successful transmission probability; one of the two servers is always inactive; each server knows the other’s successful transmission probability and they are willing to cooperate.Unfortunately, the analysis by Guglielmi and Badia contained some errors. In this paper we correct these errors. We discuss three cases where both servers (I) communicate and cooperate; (II) neither communicate nor cooperate; (III) communicate but do not cooperate. In particular, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy in Case II through a Bayesian game formulation, and demonstrate that there is a region in the parameter space where there are multiple Nash equilibria in Case III. We also quantify the value of communication or cooperation by comparing the social welfare in the three cases, and propose possible regulations to make the Nash equilibrium strategy the socially optimal strategy for both Cases II and III.

scholarly journals Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access Strategy Based on Impatient Behavior of Secondary Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

Electronics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeng ◽  
Liu ◽  
Wang ◽  
Lan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Learning Ability ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Spectrum Access ◽  
Secondary Users ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Limited Spectrum

In the cognitive radio network (CRN), secondary users (SUs) compete for limited spectrum resources, so the spectrum access process of SUs can be regarded as a non-cooperative game. With enough artificial intelligence (AI), SUs can adopt certain spectrum access strategies through their learning ability, so as to improve their own benefit. Taking into account the impatience of the SUs with the waiting time to access the spectrum and the fact that the primary users (PUs) have preemptive priority to use the licensed spectrum in the CRN, this paper proposed the repairable queueing model with balking and reneging to investigate the spectrum access. Based on the utility function from an economic perspective, the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal spectrum access strategy of SUs was studied through the analysis of the system model. Then a reasonable spectrum pricing scheme was proposed to maximize the social benefits. Simulation results show that the proposed access mechanism can realize the consistency of Nash equilibrium strategy and social optimal strategy to maximize the benefits of the whole cognitive system.

scholarly journals Defending Against Man-In-The-Middle Attack in Repeated Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuxin Li ◽  
Xiaohong Li ◽  
Jianye Hao ◽  
Bo An ◽  
Zhiyong Feng ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Man In The Middle ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Simultaneous Move ◽  
Mitm Attack

The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack has become widespread in networks nowadays. The MITM attack would cause serious information leakage and result in tremendous loss to users. Previous work applies game theory to analyze the MITM attack-defense problem and computes the optimal defense strategy to minimize the total loss. It assumes that all defenders are cooperative and the attacker know defenders' strategies beforehand. However, each individual defender is rational and may not have the incentive to cooperate. Furthermore, the attacker can hardly know defenders' strategies ahead of schedule in practice. To this end, we assume that all defenders are self-interested and model the MITM attack-defense scenario as a simultaneous-move game. Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept which is proved to be always unique. Given the impracticability of computing Nash equilibrium directly, we propose practical adaptive algorithms for the defenders and the attacker to learn towards the unique Nash equilibrium through repeated interactions. Simulation results show that the algorithms are able to converge to Nash equilibrium strategy efficiently.

scholarly journals Spatial correlated games

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (11) ◽  
pp. 171361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramón Alonso-Sanz
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Variable Degree ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Dimensional Lattice ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Link Type

This article studies correlated two-person games constructed from games with independent players as proposed in Iqbal et al. (2016 R. Soc. open sci. 3 , 150477. ( doi:10.1098/rsos.150477 )). The games are played in a collective manner, both in a two-dimensional lattice where the players interact with their neighbours, and with players interacting at random. Four game types are scrutinized in iterated games where the players are allowed to change their strategies, adopting that of their best paid mate neighbour. Particular attention is paid in the study to the effect of a variable degree of correlation on Nash equilibrium strategy pairs.

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