Sosa’s Responses to Dreaming Skepticism

Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against (what we have called) either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what appears to be some radical surgery on the concept of knowledge; a radical surgery that, as I show, is probably unnecessary to avoid dreaming skepticism. Finally, I sketch some independent considerations why I think that the hyperbolic skeptic's dreaming argument is not acceptable.

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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2019.38 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (4) ◽

pp. 453-473

Author(s):

Matthias Steup

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Experience ◽

Cognitive Structure ◽

Alternative View ◽

Animal Knowledge ◽

Ernest Sosa ◽

Perceptual Knowledge ◽

Mutual Dependence ◽

Knowing That ◽

Temporal Priority ◽

Vicious Circularity

AbstractAccording to externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism, it's possible to gain knowledge through a perceptual experience without being in a position to know that the experience is reliable. As a result, both of these views face the problem of making knowledge of perceptual reliability too easy, for they permit deducing perceptual reliability from particular perceptual experience without already knowing that these experiences are trustworthy. Ernest Sosa advocates a two-stage solution to the problem. At the first stage, a rich body of perceptual animal knowledge is acquired. At the second stage, perceptual knowledge becomes reflective after deducing perceptual reliability from the initial body of perceptual animal knowledge. I defend the alternative approach of rejecting both externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism. According to the alternative view, perceptual knowledge and knowledge of perceptual reliability require each other. Such a cognitive structure seems viciously circular. I propose that the appearance of vicious circularity dissipates when the relationship in question is viewed, not as one of temporal priority, but instead as synchronic mutual dependence. At a given time, one cannot have perceptual knowledge without knowledge of perceptual reliability, and vice versa. Such mutual dependence, I argue, is benign.

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism ◽

10.1163/221057011x608872 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

pp. 124-137 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michael Williams

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Knowledge ◽

Reflective Knowledge ◽

Animal Knowledge ◽

Ernest Sosa ◽

Alternative Approach ◽

Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽

Cognitive Faculties ◽

Skeptical Problem ◽

Vicious Circularity ◽

Direct Answer

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.

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Virtudes epidémicas reflexivas. El conocimiento como una cuestión de confianza

Análisis Revista de investigación filosófica ◽

10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621569 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 243

Author(s):

Manuel Liz

Keyword(s):

Animal Knowledge ◽

Human Knowledge ◽

Epistemic Circularity ◽

Ernest Sosa ◽

De Re ◽

Epistemic Virtues ◽

Sources Of Knowledge ◽

Palabras Clave ◽

Epistemic Perspective

Resumen De acuerdo a Ernest Sosa, el conocimiento re exivo debería ser capaz de integrar al- gunas circularidades epistémicas como fuentes virtuosas de conocimiento. Argumen- taremos que tal conocimiento re exivo tiene que estar basado en ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar de manera adecuada la justi cación de nuestras creencias de primer orden. También argumentaremos que entender esas capacidades comunitarias y temporales como constituyendo virtudes epistémicas re exivas nos conduce fuera de cualquier concepción criterial del conocimiento. Para estas concepciones, conocer siempre requiere saber que se han satisfecho determinados criterios. Si el conoci- miento propiamente humano inevitablemente necesita alguna dosis de re exión, y si nuestro conocimiento re exivo necesariamente depende del ejercicio virtuoso de ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar la justi cación, entonces en último término el conocimiento no puede ser criterial. El conocimiento humano es más bien una cuestión de con anza Palabras clave: Conocimiento; criterios; perspectiva epistémica; circularidad epistémica; conocimiento animal; conocimiento re exivo; ascenso epistémico; virtu- des epistémicas re exivas; delegación de la justi cación; aplazamiento de la justicación. AbstractAccording to Ernest Sosa, re ective knowledge would have to be able to integrate some epistemic circularities as virtuous sources of knowledge. We will argue that such re ective knowledge has to be based on some capacities for delegating and relegating in adequate ways the justi cation of our rst-order beliefs. Also, we will argue that to understand those communitarian and temporal capacities as constituting re ective epistemic virtues leads us outside any criterial conception of knowledge. For these conceptions, knowing always requires to know that certain criteria are ful lled. If human knowledge worth of the name unavoidably needs some amount of re ection, and if our re ective knowledge necessarily depends on virtuous delegation and deferring, then at the end of the day knowledge cannot be criterial. Human knowledge is rather a matter of trust.Keywords: Knowledge; criteria; epistemic perspective; epistemic circularity; animal knowledge; re ective knowledge; epistemic ascent; re ective epistemic virtues; delegation of justi cation; deferring of justication.

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Los sueños, la agencia y el juicio

Análisis Revista de investigación filosófica ◽

10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621565 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 315

Author(s):

Matthew Soteriou

Keyword(s):

Second Order ◽

Reflective Knowledge ◽

Animal Knowledge ◽

Ernest Sosa ◽

Virtue Epistemologist

De acuerdo con Sosa, Descartes es un epistemólogo de virtudes, y podemos entender el proyecto epistemológico de Descartes sólo como un proyecto de segundo orden que concuerda con esta manera de entender su epistemología. Mi objetivo en este artículo es el de ahondar en esta comparación con la epistemología de Descartes, principalmente mediante la exploración de una manera en la que uno podría añadir ciertos detalles suplementarios a la postura general de Sosa, con la finalidad de que ésta concuerde de mejor manera con la postura de Descartes, o al menos con la que yo considero que es la postura de DescartesPalabras clave: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, conocimiento animal, conocimiento reflexivo, cognitio, scientia.AbstractAccording to Sosa, Descartes is a virtue epistemologist, and we can make sense of Descartes’ epistemological project only as a second-order project that fits with this view of his epistemology. My aim in this paper is to pursue this comparison with Descartes’ epistemology—principally through exploring a way in which one might add certain supplementary details to Sosa’s general approach, in order to bring it into closer alignment with Descartes’ view, or at least what I take to be Descartes’ view Keywords: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, animal knowledge, reflective knowledge, cognitio, scientia.

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Aptness and Safety: How Are They Related?

Crítica Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía ◽

10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.869 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 42 (125) ◽

pp. 27-46

Author(s):

Miguel Ángel Fernández

Keyword(s):

Virtue Epistemology ◽

Animal Knowledge ◽

Ernest Sosa

In A Virtue Epistemology, Ernest Sosa defines the notions of safety and aptness of beliefs and uses them to characterize two kinds of knowledge, animal and reflective. This paper tries to bring out what I take as an incoherence in Sosa’s views concerning how safety and aptness relate to knowledge and to each other. I discuss an apparent counterexample Sosa gives to his final view that aptness suffices for animal knowledge and argue that in fact the principle on which Sosa responds to the counterexample does not permit the response he offers. The principle in question is problematic for Sosa’s epistemology in a deeper way: it doesn’t seem to cohere with Sosa’s view that only aptness, not safety, is required for animal knowledge.

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