scholarly journals Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties? - A note on the European audit regulation

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Marc Eulerich
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
External Rotation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Audit Regulation ◽  
Economic Need ◽  
Audit Reform

The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.

scholarly journals Impact of auditor and audit firm rotation on accounting and audit quality: A critical analysis of the EC regulation draft

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Markus Stiglbauer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
A Current

In a current regulation draft of 2011, the European Commission (EC) plans the mandatory audit firm rotation principally after six years and with regard to a cooling off period of four years to increase auditor independence. This could complement the internal mandatory rotation (auditor rotation) by the 8th EC directive. The present paper gives a state of the art analysis of the empirical research results with regard to auditor and audit firm rotation. In contrast to the perception of the EC, the majority of the empirical results doesn’t find evidence for increased financial accounting and audit quality by audit firm rotation. Furthermore, the positive effects of the internal rotation period of seven years and the cooling off period of two years by the 8th EC directive are not empirically proved yet.

scholarly journals Audit Firm Rotation, Auditor Specialization, and Audit Quality in the Municipal Audit Context

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Suzanne Lowensohn ◽  
Jacqueline L. Reck
Keyword(s):  
Mediation Analysis ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Quality Measures ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Auditor Specialization ◽  
Government Audit

ABSTRACT The topic of audit firm rotation has been debated internationally for several decades. To inform the debate, we study the effects of audit firm rotation policies on audit quality in a government audit market. Using audit firm rotation data and audit quality measures from the Florida government audit market, a setting where procurement policies vary, we find that rotation policies are indirectly associated with higher audit quality. In particular, mediation analysis suggests that the consequences of policies that encourage Florida municipalities to consider rotation impact audit quality by encouraging the use of auditors that specialize in governmental audits, rather than auditor independence, which is frequently argued to support mandatory rotation.

scholarly journals Relative Influences of Review and Engagement Auditor Rotation on Audit Quality: Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-206
Author(s):  
Sang Ho Kim ◽  
Jianqun Xi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Model ◽  
Logit Model ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
First Year ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation ◽  
The Relationship

Manuscript type: Research paper Research aims: This study focuses on the effects of audit partner rotation on audit quality (AQ) in China. In particular, we examine the effects of review auditors (RAs) and engagement auditors (EAs) on AQ when they voluntarily and mandatorily rotate. Design/Methodology/Approach: The data in this study are retrieved from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We develop an OLS regression model and logit model respectively to test the hypotheses developed. Finally, we have 13,856 firm-year observations collected for the first regression model, and 16,893 firm-year observations gathered for the second logit model from 2003 to 2015. Research findings: Findings show that RAs are more likely to behave opportunistically to retain clients by weighing up the benefits and costs of compromising audit quality in the first year after a rotation. The results imply that RAs may have an incentive to acquiesce the clients’ accounting irregularities in their first year of audit engagement when they are mandatorily rotated. However, we do not find this trend in terms of EAs’ rotation, suggesting that EAs are less affected by the auditor-client relationship compared to RAs. In addition, we find that RAs are less likely to issue modified audit opinions (MOPI) as the magnitude of negative discretionary accruals (DA) increases when they are voluntarily rotated. Theoretical contribution/Originality: Previous studies have investigated the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. The results are mixed and inconclusive. Our study contributes to the extant literature by considering RAs’ opportunistic behaviour after mandatory rotation, which has not been explored in previous studies. In China, only a few studies have examined the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. Our study is one of the first study focusing on the RA’s influence on AQ. Practitioner/Policy implication: The findings of our study can help Chinese authorities, listed firms and academics gain more understanding on whether mandatory audit partner rotation improves audit quality in practice. Since RAs have greater incentive to retain the existing client, we propose that RAs should bear more responsibility for the audit work, instead of the equally shared responsibility with EAs. Research limitation/Implications: Our study is subject to some limitations. First, our study adopts the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. However, there can be a measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals. Second, we focus on the auditor rotation and exclude the case of audit firm rotation. Since the AQ can be affected by various factors, audit firm rotation can also affect AQ. Third, although we test the relative effects of RAs and EAs in audit work, we do not examine the effect of RAs’ characteristics such as their professional experience, educational background, and years of service. AQ can be affected by RAs’ characteristics.

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

Auditor Rotation: The PCAOB Considers a New Direction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C15-C20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela B. Roush ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Susan A. McCracken ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Active Participation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently undertook an exploration of the need for mandatory audit firm rotation with its issuance of the Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation (PCAOB 2011a). The accumulation of evidence from PCAOB inspections of audit engagements over the last eight years has led the Board to consider additional steps to protect auditors' independence. We provide a brief synopsis of these matters based primarily on remarks by the PCAOB's chairman, James R. Doty (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c). In addition, we include relevant observations from prior academic studies and end with a call for the active participation of stakeholders in this important debate.

scholarly journals Audit Fees and Financial Performance of Deposit Taking Saccos in North RIFT, Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
Dorris Serem ◽  
Dr. Rashid Fwamba ◽  
Dr. Alala Benedict
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Firm Experience ◽  
The Impact

The collapse of Deposit-Taking SACCOS and financial institutions in Kenya has caught the attention of the public and supervisory agencies to query the quality of audit. SACCO Societies Regulatory Authority on its inspection report indicated that SACCOs have been implicated in maladministration, scams and fraudulent dealings that led to their eventual collapse. SASRA also revoked licenses and rejected audited financial statements of some Deposit Taking SACCOs between 2013 to 2017.These financial scandals have been traced to poor audit quality. The study aimed to test the impact of audit quality on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The study sought to establish the influence of audit fees on financial performance; determine the influence of audit firm tenure on financial performance; establish the influence of auditor independence on financial performance and to determine the influence of audit firm experience on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. This study was based on Agency theory, Role theory and the Concept of audit expectation gap, and Stakeholders’ theory. This research adopted descriptive cross-sectional research design. The target population for the study was 266 staff of all the 16 registered Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The sample size was 48 respondents comprising of chief executive officers, finance officers and internal auditors of the Deposit-Taking SACCOs selected using purposive sampling method. Primary and secondary data was used. Questionnaires collected primary data while audited annual financial statements of SACCOs provided secondary data. Inferential and descriptive statistics was used in analyzing data through SPSS version 25. It emerged that audit fees, audit firm tenure and audit firm experience have a significant positive influence on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. Auditor independence had an insignificant positive influence on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The study concluded that audit quality has a positive noteworthy impact on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in Kenya. The study recommends that regulatory authorities should formulate strict rules on audit fee charges and oversee the implementation of the same. Also, SASRA should ensure DT-SACCOs implement auditor rotation in compliance with auditing regulations and standards. DT-SACCOs to consider auditor’s professional competence and experience before initiating any audit engagement. Finally, DT-SACCOs and auditors should reinforce the professional code of ethics in regard to auditor independence in terms of familiarity between auditor and the client that may lead audit work into jeopardy.

scholarly journals The relation of auditor tenure to audit quality: Empirical evidence from the German audit market

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Krauß ◽  
Henning Zülch
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

This study investigates whether and how the length of an auditor-client relationship affects audit quality. Using a sample of 1,071 firm observations of large listed companies for the sample period of 2005 to 2011, the study is one of the first to empirically analyze this auditing issue for the German audit market. The empirical results demonstrate that neither short term nor long term audit firm tenure seems to be a significant factor with regard to audit quality in Germany. In the wake of the ongoing discussion in the European Union regarding the optimal audit tenure length for the quality of the conducted statutory audits, our findings do not support the idea of a mandatory audit firm rotation rule.

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwoon Kim ◽  
Hyoik Lee ◽  
Jong Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Financial Statement Audit ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
First Time

Recently, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 20072009 began considering a variety of ways to enhance auditor independence and financial reporting quality, ultimately aiming at investor protection. Since the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement has once again received significant attention from regulators and policy makers around the world, including the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this paper, we investigate whether MAFR enhances audit quality in Korea. We find that under MAFR, newly rotated auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms during their initial (first-year) financial statement audit compared with under the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). Moreover, firms audited by mandatorily rotated new auditors have less discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality than those audited by voluntarily switched new auditors during the initial audit engagement. These results of earnings quality are more pronounced for firms that received a first-time going-concern audit opinion during the initial financial statement audit under MAFR. Taken together, the findings suggest that MAFR produces better audit quality than the VAFC. Further, our study provides implications for regulators and policy makers of countries considering the adoption of MAFR.

Threats to Auditor Independence: The Impact of Relationship and Economic Bonds

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Ye ◽  
Elizabeth Carson ◽  
Roger Simnett
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Long Duration ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: This study examines the association of a comprehensive set of auditor-client relationship bonds (audit firm tenure, audit engagement partner tenure, long duration director-auditor relationships, and alumni affiliation) with the level of economic bonds provided to an audit client (nonaudit services [NAS]). We further examine the effect of these economic and relationship bonds on auditor independence in the context of nonaudit services fees and the propensity to issue going-concern opinions. It is these economic and relationship bonds that have attracted the interest of regulators in their consideration of audit quality. This study was undertaken in Australia in 2002, which provided a context in which all these relationships could be examined before new regulations were introduced. Results show that audit firm tenure and alumni affiliation are associated with clients purchasing auditor-provided NAS, with stronger associations for clients with low agency costs. We further find that long audit engagement partner tenure and a joint effect of auditor-provided NAS and alumni affiliation have a negative effect on the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion.

scholarly journals On the Political Decision of Audit Market Regulation: Empirical Evidence of Audit Firm Tenure and Maximum Durations within the European Union

Economies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Markus Widmann ◽  
Florian Follert ◽  
Matthias Wolz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Magic Number ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Eu

After almost every economic crisis and corporate scandal, political actors announce the need for stricter regulatory measures for financial markets and companies, in an attempt to appease their voters and defend their political agenda. Regarding the latest international financial crisis, the EU responded, among other things, with comprehensive regulation of the European audit market. In the context of auditor rotation, after 17 June 2016, the duration of audit engagements should not exceed a maximum of 10 years. In this paper, we therefore investigate whether there is empirical evidence behind the 10-year threshold—or is it simply arbitrary? Our aim is to evaluate the audit market reform by the European Union (EU) (Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 and Directive, 2014/56/EU) related to the objective of improving the quality of audits. Therefore, our article addresses the most crucial element of this reform, the implementation of a mandatory audit firm rotation for public interest entities (Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Article 17). Based on a unique dataset of 11,834 firm observations from all listed companies within the EU between 2008 and 2017, we provide for the first time a discussion basis for the assessment of audit market interventions by the EU. Hence, we compare the new maximum durations with average audit tenure in the particular member states. Even where we present only descriptive results, our results at least indicate that the “magic number” 10 (years) could be more the result of a political process—i.e., a consent between the European institutions—rather than evidence based. Therefore, our findings shall serve as a first starting point in the discussion of a vast and interdisciplinary research field.

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