scholarly journals The paradoxical genesis of too-big-to-fail

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-41
Author(s):  
Thomas Umlauft
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Small Unit ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Us ◽  
Small Banks ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

At least since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) has received widespread attention. The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, while the economic historical approach has been confined to tracing the doctrine to its first appearance. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the academic literature by offering an explanation for why, as opposed to how, the TBTF doctrine has developed. This paper identifies the US population’s distrust and at times hostility against the prospect of concentration of power in large financial institutions as the causal factor leading to the TBTF phenomenon. The resulting socially non-optimal regulation favoured a fragmented and fragile banking system based on small unit banks at the cost of more diversified branch banks. The Great Depression impressively highlighted the deep structural flaws of the US banking system. At the same time, however, it caused a shift in the public opinion, which had generally been opposed to deposit insurance, and thereby aligned the public interest with that of small banks, which would profit most from deposit insurance. The newly acquired public and political support enabled weak unit banks to lobby successfully against reforming the banking structure and instead for the adaption of federal deposit insurance. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) only addressed the symptoms of the weak banking industry but not its causes. Moreover, the strongly biased FDIC policies have generally favoured creditors at large banks, which ultimately led to the TBTF doctrine which, in turn, provided banks with a non-technical incentive to grow in size in order to gain TBTF protection. Initially aimed at preserving the US financial landscape based on small unit banks, the FDIC as the main conduit for TBTF rescues thus became the main driver for big bank corporate welfare. Deposit insurance gave rise to TBTF and, at the same time, put small banks deemed “too-small-to-safe” at a competitive disadvantage, further accelerating the trend towards increasingly large and complex banks.

scholarly journals The US banking system: does the size of the institution matter to its economic-financial situation?

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-19
Author(s):  
José Alejandro Fernández Fernández ◽  
Virginia Vázquez ◽  
Juan Antonio Vicente Virseda
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Factorial Analysis ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
The Us ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The Relationship

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of the entities in the US banking system and their economic-financial situation. The objective of this study is to group different economic and financial variables of the entities together into factors that characterize the US banking system and identify and identify how the factors vary according to the size of the entities. To do this, we start from the values taken by 32 economic-financial and regulatory ratios, obtained directly from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for a period between the first quarter of 1990 and the penultimate of 2016. With this data it is performed a factorial analysis that allows synthesizing the 32 variables in 7 factors and, at the same time, obtaining relationships between these variables and the size and between themselves. Finally, through a neural network, the previous factors are hierarchized according to the influence that the size of the entities exerts on them. Among the conclusions reached, it should be noted that the loan structure is the factor that best classifies the size. It also determines the existence of a negative ?profitability-solvency? relationship with larger entities, (Assets> $ 250 B.) and smaller ones (Assets <$ 100 M.), as well as demonstrating the existence of moral hazard and the need for regulation that limits said risk (because the largest entities are the least solvent and assume the most risks).

scholarly journals Empty talk? University voices on the Global Financial Crisis

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Bridgman
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
News Media ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Housing Prices ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Us ◽  
Complex Events ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Company Sector

The global financial crisis (GFC) which began in 2007 with a liquidity squeeze in the US banking system and which continues to play out today has affected us all, whether through the collapse of the finance company sector, rising unemployment, falling housing prices or the recession which followed the initial market crash. The speed and scope of the crisis surprised most experts – policy makers included. Specialists from a myriad of disciplines, from economics and finance to risk management, corporate governance and property, are trying to make sense of what happened, why it happened and what it means for us now and into the future. Members of the public rely on the news media to keep them informed of the crisis as it unfolds and they rely on experts to translate these complex events into a language which they can understand. The GFC is educating us all, and it is important that we all learn from it to avoid making the same mistakes again. 

Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Over Time

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

Competitive aggressiveness, community banking and performance

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-240
Author(s):  
Jeff Stambaugh ◽  
G. T. Lumpkin ◽  
Ronald K. Mitchell ◽  
Keith Brigham ◽  
Claudia Cogliser
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Us ◽  
Competitive Aggressiveness ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Competitive Actions

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to develop and empirically test a conceptualization of competitive aggressiveness (CA), a dimension of entrepreneurial orientation.Design/methodology/approachStructural equation modeling and hierarchical regression are employed on responses from 182 banks in the southwestern US Performance data on the banks are drawn from the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) Call reports.FindingsThe results indicate awareness, motivation and capability are antecedents of CA, which itself is positively related to increased market share and, in more dense markets, profitability.Practical implicationsAggressive firms exhibit certain routines that can lead to competitive actions, which assists performance in some contexts. Managers who wish to increase (or decrease) their firms' overall competitive posture can encourage (or discourage) employees from performing competitive routines such as monitoring their rivals or talking about their rivals' strategies.Originality/valueBy developing CA' conceptualization, the study advances the understanding of the antecedents of competitive behavior and makes it easier to study competition in smaller firms.

How Has the EU Protected Depositors in the Financial Crisis?

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 289-312
Author(s):  
Niall J Lenihan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Deposit Guarantee Schemes ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis chapter addresses the question of how the EU has protected depositors in the financial crisis. The chapter will discuss (1) the impact in Europe of the US system for the protection of depositors, (2) the important changes made to the EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive, first in 2009 in response to the 2007 deposit run on Northern Rock, and then again in 2014 in response to the financial crisis, (3) the decision of the EFTA Court regarding the scope of Iceland’s obligations under the EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive, following the collapse of the Icelandic banking system in 2008, and (4) the introduction of a powerful depositor preference rule throughout the EU, in response to the resolution of the Cypriot banking system in 2013. This chapter argues that the EU has responded to the impact of the financial crisis on bank depositors by enhancing the legal protections available to depositors.

13 Resolution in the UK and US: Variations to the Same Goals

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krimminger Michael
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Insurance Fund ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Point Of Entry ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
National Governments

This chapter explores the US and UK’s response to the 2007–9 Global Financial Crisis. In both cases, funding for the resolution and restructuring of failing financial companies came from public sources-generally national governments and central banks funded by the private creditors or other private sources. In the UK, the resolution actions relied solely on taxpayer financing. In the US, the government’s actions relied on Federal Reserve funding, Treasury funding through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) funding from the Deposit Insurance Fund. The chapter also assesses the role of bail-in under the Resolution Authorities and concludes with a brief summary of the UK and EU approach to single point of entry (SPOE) strategy.

scholarly journals Post-crisis financial intermediation

10.26458/1531 ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Ilie MIHAI ◽  
Cristian OPREA
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Intermediation ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Regional Economies ◽  
Loan Portfolio ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
Economic And Financial Crisis

The recent financial crisis that begun in 2007 in the US, which then swept around the world, has left deep scars on the already wrinkled face of the global economy.Some national and regional economies, which had money for expensive makeup, or created money[1], managed to blur or hide the scars left by the crisis, others are still facing difficulties in overcoming the effects of this.The rapacity of banks, their greed and risk ignorance, were the origin of the outbreak of the last major economic and financial crisis but unfortunately those who were responsible or, rather, irresponsible, paid little or nothing at all for the burden of their bad loan portfolio. This cost has been supported by the population, either directly by paying high interest and fees [Mihai I., 2007], or indirectly, through the use of public budgets to cover the losses of banks, most of which had private capital. In this context, we intend to examine the state of financial intermediation in Romania in the post-crisis period, and to primarily follow: (i) The structure and evolution of the banking system; (ii) Non-government credit situation; (iii) The level of savings; (iiii) Loan-deposit ratio; (v) The degree of financial intermediation and disintegration phenomenon etc., and to articulate some conclusions and suggestions on the matters that have been explored. 

The World Economy

2008 ◽  
Vol 204 ◽  
pp. 9-14 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Banking System ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
Mortgage Defaults

A financial crisis, rooted in US mortgage defaults, has been building for several years. Its effects have seriously damaged the prospects for the global economy, and have particularly serious consequences for the English speaking world. Unsound lending permitted by poor regulation and worsened by lax bankruptcy laws has led the US, and potentially the rest of the OECD, to the brink of a large-scale recession. The scale of the potential slowdown depends upon the scale of losses to the banking system and their impacts on the ability of the banking system to lend.

Confidence without Sacrifice

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-176
Author(s):  
David T. Burbach
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Social Expectations ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Military

The American public expresses more confidence and trust in the US military than in any civil or private-sector institution. Such esteem for the military is notable given that the public also believes recent US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were failures. Confidence may emerge from the military’s professionalism rather than delivery of battlefield results and may also reflect positive sentiments based on social expectations and “cheap” patriotism. The public’s willingness to fund, join, or grant autonomy to the military is more circumscribed than high trust would suggest; the public may be “confident” but is willing to overrule generals and admirals when values are in conflict. Confidence may increasingly reflect political support: both a growing affinity between the military and the Republican Party and a tendency (again, stronger for Republicans) to express more confidence when the president is of one’s own party. Disturbingly, trends in public opinion as well as recent behavior of politicians and retired military leaders all suggest growing politicization, with possible ramifications for weakening civilian control, ultimately causing a loss of the public’s trust.

Part II The US Resolution Regime, 5 Fundamentals of Resolution Authority

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gleeson Simon ◽  
Guynn Randall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Core ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Us ◽  
Insurance Programme ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

This chapter looks at the history and fundamental elements of resolution authority as it has been developed and used in the United States. The goal of resolution authority in the United States has been to deal with failed banks and other financial institutions in a manner that stems runs, avoids contagion and preserves critical operations, the same goal as deposit guarantee schemes. First introduced in the United States in 1933 as part of the deposit insurance programme for banks, resolution authority was originally little more than the method by which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation honoured its obligations to insured depositors before evolving to its current state. Resolution authority, as conceived in the United States, has two principal components—the core resolution powers and the claims process. The core resolution powers consist of the authority to quickly separate the assets and viable parts of a failed bank's business (the good bank) from its capital structure liabilities (the bad bank), so that its critical operations are preserved and runs and contagion are avoided. It is virtually always completed in the United States over a weekend commonly known as resolution weekend. The claims process involves determining the validity and amount of the claims of individual holders of capital structure liabilities in accordance with ordinary principles of due process and distributing the residual value of the good bank to such holders in satisfaction of their claims. The claims process typically takes at least six to nine months to be completed in order to comply with ordinary principles of due process for potential claimants.

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