scholarly journals Principal-agent problems in publicly owned enterprises: The failure of the shareholder

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 70-83
Author(s):  
Njomëza Zejnullahu
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Publicly Owned ◽  
The Government

The presence of principal-agent problems in publicly owned enterprises is highlighted by many scholars. Unfortunately, such problems are present in publicly owned enterprises (POEs) in Kosovo too. Capture, rent-seeking, moral hazard, information asymmetry, and adverse selection are some of the agency problems that POEs in Kosovo are facing, negatively impacting their performance and citizens’ welfare. Recently, one of the POEs that used to be the most profitable is on the verge of bankruptcy with bank accounts blocked. This paper aims to explore the relevance of principal-agent problems in the governance of publicly owned enterprises and the failure of the shareholder to play its role and pursue the best interest of POEs. The paper also questions the applicability of the principal-agent model in POEs when the shareholder fails to play its role as a principal by concluding that the lack of “real” principal in publicly owned enterprises undermines the applicability of principal-agent theory and there is a need to make the Government more responsible by taking some measures such as the inclusion of private sector as a shareholder. The paper concludes that the Government must act as a responsible shareholder and exercise its role properly while also raises the opportunity of the inclusion of the private sector as minority shareholders in POEs, which may help in increasing the responsibility of the shareholder in the oversight of the management of POEs. Conclusions of the paper may be relevant for further studies regarding the corporate governance and structure of publicly owned enterprises from the perspective of the agency theory and hence exploring possibilities of reducing principal-agent problems in POEs.

scholarly journals Study on Third-Party supervision of Major Ecological Ecological Projects Auditing Based on Principal-agent Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 03009
Author(s):  
Liang Zhao ◽  
Chuiyong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Incentive Policy ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Government

Without considering the existence of third-party audit supervision and considering the existence of third-party audit supervision, the principal-agent model of major engineering audits between government and audit organizations was constructed. The analytical solutions under various hypothetical conditions were analyzed for the government. The optimal incentive policy for major engineering audits provides the basis. The analysis results prove that, the introduction of third-party units for audit supervision can effectively stimulate audit behavior, reduce information asymmetry, and create higher engineering quality and audit quality in the process of major engineering audit.

scholarly journals Optimizing Incentive Policy of Energy-Efficiency Retrofit in Public Buildings: A Principal-Agent Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3442
Author(s):  
Xin Liang ◽  
Geoffrey Qiping Shen ◽  
Li Guo
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Public Buildings ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Incentive Policy ◽  
Incentive Policies ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Energy Use Intensity ◽  
The Government

The building sector consumes most energy in the world, especially public buildings, which normally have high energy-use intensity. This phenomenon indicates that the energy-efficiency retrofit (EER) for public buildings is essential for energy saving. Incentive policies have been emphasized by governments in recent years, but their effectiveness has not been sufficient. A major reason is agency problems in EER and that the government and building owners have asymmetric information. Furthermore, most policies apply identical standard to existing buildings of different types, resulting in resistance from owners and tenants. To mitigate this issue, this study proposes a principal–agent model to optimize incentive policy in EER. The proposed model defines two pairs of principal–agent relations (i.e., the government-owner and owner-tenant) and models their behaviors under different scenarios as per principal–agent theory. The results indicate the optimal incentive policies for different scenarios. In addition, critical factors of policy making, such as cost, risk, uncertainty, and benefit distribution are discussed. This study has implications for policy that will benefit policy makers, particularly in promoting EER by mitigating the agency problem found for the different scenarios.

scholarly journals A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (70) ◽  
pp. 19-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Del Pilar Castillo Valencia ◽  
Giácomo Balbinotto
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Computational Tool ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
External Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Expected Benefits ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
Benefits And Costs

This article studies the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcement mechanisms that an Armed Illegal Organization (AIO)'s leadership, which is the principal, offers to its operatives, who act as agents. This principal-agent model focuses on both the expected benefits and costs for those who decide to stay or defect from the armed organization, in an uncertain context in which desertion is encouraged by an external agent who is providing incentives aimed at fostering operatives' individual desertion. Given a parameterization of the model, we find the optimal transfer system using the constrained minimization routine fmincon in MATLAB's optimizations toolbox. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate the behavior of agents who are facing the probability of being punished and how this could encourage agents to not make any effort.

Opportunistic behavior in the principal–agent model of policing

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-115
Author(s):  
Petter Gottschalk
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Police Officer ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Field Officer ◽  
Law Enforcement Agency ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Whereas the criminal justice system is designed to determine whether a police officer as an offender is guilty or innocent, the principal–agent model of policing can provide insights into police officer behavior in law enforcement. Agency theory suggests that the chief as a principal and the field officer as an agent may have different preferences, varying knowledge, and opposite risk willingness when it comes to policing. For example, goals may justify means. In this article, the case of a convicted police officer in Norway is discussed based on principal–agent theory.

Involvement of private actors in the provision of urban sanitation services; potential challenges and precautions

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sanitation Services ◽  
Urban Sanitation ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use relevant models and theories to conceptualize the prospects and challenges associated with private sector involvement in the provision of sanitation and environmental services in urban settlements of developing African economies. Design/methodology/approach – The study adopts the public choice theory and principal-agent model in its conceptualization and analysis. Retrospective literature analysis within the qualitative research approach has been employed for the study. It draws extensively on existing classical theoretical and current empirical literature on privatization of urban sanitation services in developing countries. Findings – The study observes that privatization is a necessary tool for enhancing quality and responsive sanitation service delivery but there must be some mechanisms to prevent any latent challenges. The study also observes that the same problems associated with the public sector could transcend into the private sector if key measures are not taken into consideration. Practical implications – The process of privatizing or contracting out must ensure competition, enough communication to all stakeholders as well as involving expertise in the bidding process. The process also requires strict monitoring and supervision; these call for an appropriate legal framework to regulate privatization. The paper reminds urban administrators and policy makers to be circumspect in the privatization process. If the process of privatization is carried out effectively, urban sanitation services will be provided effectively and efficiently. Originality/value – The paper adapts the public choice and principal-agent model to assess privatization processes in developing African countries. This study will be of importance to urban administrators, public officials and policy makers in general.

scholarly journals A Multi-task Principal Agent Model for Knowledge Contribution of Enterprise Staff

10.28945/3572 ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 261-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengyi LE
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Creation ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Knowledge Contribution ◽  
Set Up

According to the different behavior characteristics of knowledge contribution of enterprise employees, a multi-task principal-agent relationship of knowledge contribution between enterprise and employees is established based on principal-agent theory, analyzing staff’s knowledge contribution behavior of knowledge creation and knowledge participation. Based on this, a multi-task principal agent model for knowledge contribution of enterprise staff is developed to formulate the asymmetry of information in knowledge contribution Then, a set of incentive measures are derived from the theoretic model, aiming to prompt the knowledge contribution in enterprise. The result shows that staff’s knowledge creation behavior and positive participation behavior can influence and further promote each other Enterprise should set up respective target levels of both knowledge creation contribution and knowledge participation contribution and make them irreplaceable to each other. This work contributes primarily to the development of the literature on knowledge management and principal-agent theory. In addition, the applicability of the findings will be improved by further empirical analysis.

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Large-Scale Dredging Project Based on Fairness Preference

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 144-150
Author(s):  
Bin Zhou ◽  
Zi Gang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Calculation Methods ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Technical Parameters ◽  
Preference Theory ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Bid Price ◽  
Principal Agent Model

This paper establishes fair incentive model of large-scale dredging project using principal-agent theory and fairness preference theory and analyzes the influence of technical parameters of ships and bid price of the dredging project on principal, agent incentives and profits. Study shows that the principal-agent model must be corrected, so this paper puts forward correction methods and calculation methods.

scholarly journals SPECIFICATION OF CORPORATE CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "AGENCY THEORY"

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Irina Mishurova ◽  
Elena Panfilova ◽  
O. Nesterova
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Different Characteristics

The article describes the specification of corporate conflicts from the position of the classic line of agency problem within the framework of the "Principal- Agent" model, and in the new line of agency model "Principal - Principal" between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, including shareholder interactions with stakeholders under the Principal-Stakeholders model and board interactions with stakeholders through Agent-Stakeholders, and interactions between company management, mid-level managers and employees within the Agency-Agent model, which makes it possible to classify different characteristics of corporate conflicts. The article clarifies the content and functional specifics of corporate conflicts (gnoseological function, diagnostic, procedural, preventive, predictive), which allows you to systematize the essential characteristics of corporate conflicts and determine the adaptability of the application of various methods and methods of their management taking into account the main stages of the life cycle of corporate conflicts (stage of emergence, development and completion).

scholarly journals Venture Investment Incentive Mechanisms and Simulation with Venture Entrepreneurs Having Multistage Efforts Based on Fairness Preference Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaihong Wang ◽  
Chuan Ding ◽  
Jiacheng Chen ◽  
Aimin Li
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Dynamic Variable ◽  
Theoretical Derivation ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Preference Theory ◽  
Venture Investment ◽  
Principal Agent Model

When venture capital has been invested into venture companies, venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs form a principal-agent relationship. Take into account the fact that the venture entrepreneur’s effort is a long process, because the effort is not the same at different stage. Therefore, efforts variables are seen as the multistage dynamic variable, and venture investment principal-agent model with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts is constructed on the basis of the classic principal-agent theory in the paper. Further, in the later stage effort of venture entrepreneurs is affected by the size of prestage benefit with venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs; thus the fairness preference model is improved, and venture investment principal-agent model with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts is constructed on the basis of fairness preference theory. Both theoretical derivation and simulation have demonstrated that, under the condition of information asymmetry, if the fairness preference of venture entrepreneurs holds, then(1)venture capitalists provide venture entrepreneurs with level higher than that without fairness preference,(2)in every single stage venture entrepreneurs make efforts higher than those without fairness preference, and(3)in two periods both venture investors and venture entrepreneurs gain total real gains higher than those in two periods without fair preference.

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