scholarly journals Why is neo new? History of philosophy and matrix triology

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-94
Author(s):  
Predrag Milidrag

The article analyzes Matrix film trilogy of Wachowski brothers from the aspect of the history of philosophy and presence of ideas of Plato, Descartes and Hegel in it. In the first part, it is analyzed the platonic framework of the first film and it is argued that there is no Cartesian hyperbolic doubt in it, but there is a cartesian theme in physical exercises in very Matrix as a way of freeing the mind. In the second part, using Hegel?s The Philosophy of History and The Phenomenology of Spirit, author gives an answer from the title of the article: sixth Neo is new because he started to determines himself. The final part of the article is concerned with clash of Neo and Agent Smith in third part of Matrix. Neo?s death is tragic in Hegelian sense of tragedy. Finally, the author interprets the dialog between Architect and Oracle using the Marx?s idea that whole previous history of mankind is only prehistory.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvatore Carannante

Resumen: Nella parte quinta dell’Etica, Spinoza descrive l’«amore intellettuale verso Dio» - che nasce nella mente che ha raggiunto la scientia intuitiva - come una «parte dell’amore infinito con il quale Dio ama se stesso». Scopo del saggio è gettare luce sui rilevanti, ma scarsamente considerati, riferimenti di Hegel alla teoria dell’amor dei intellectualis, tentando di ricostruirne il significato a due livelli differenti: anzitutto, esaminando le Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, dove la descrizione dell’amore intellettuale è inserito in una disamina storico-filosofica del pensiero spinoziano; in secondo luogo, analizzando alcuni passaggi della Fenomenologia dello spirito e della Scienza della logica, opere in cui Hegel richiama l’amor dei intellectualis per esprimere metaforicamente la convinzione che l’Assoluto va concepito in termini dialettici, come soggetto e spirito.  Palabras clave: Hegel - Spinoza - Amor dei intellectualisAbstract: In the fifth part of the Ethica Spinoza describes the «intellectual love toward God» – arising in the mind that has achieved the scientia intuitiva – as a «part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself». The aim of the essay is to cast light, at two different levels, on the interesting but rarely studied Hegel’s references to the theory of amor dei intellectualis: firstly, focusing on the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where the description of intellectual love is included in an historico-philosophical account of Spinoza’s thought; secondly, dealing with the Phenomenology of Spirit and in the Science of Logic, works in which Hegel mentions the amor dei intellectualis in order to express the idea that the Absolute has to be conceived in dialectical terms, as subject and spirit.Key words: Hegel - Spinoza - Amor dei intellectualis


Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.


Health ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Peter Adamson

This introduction to the volume gives an overview of the chapters, setting out a case for integrating the history of philosophy with the history of medicine and sketching some of the key philosophical issues that arise around the concept of health. These include the difficulty of defining “health,” the mind-body relationship, and questions about how philosophy informs medical science and practice. A central idea is that the concept of health operates at two levels, the mental and the physical (or the soul and the body), so that ethical virtue and physical well-being have often been seen as parallel or mutually dependent.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-79
Author(s):  
Thomas Uebel

Abstract The response given to C.G. Hempel’s well-known challenge by Arthur Danto in his Analytical Philosophy of History of 1965 – that deductive-nomological and narrative explanations are logically compatible yet employ incommensurable schemata – is here investigated from a historical perspective. It is shown that the developmental trajectory that emerges from an analysis of Danto’s previous writings – including not only a forgotten paper of 1958 but also his PhD dissertation of 1952 – contains distinctive step-changes with publications of 1953 and 1956 still prior to that of 1958–59 which enabled his subsequent discovery of narrative sentences. It is also argued that Danto’s developmental trajectory runs contrary to that presumed by some prominent commentators. Analytical History of Philosophy was not the midpoint of his ascent from mainstream philosopher of science to high priest of postmodern aesthetics, but represents a reasoned retreat from his early historical idealism.


Author(s):  
James Dodd

This chapter sketches the trajectory of Jan Patočka’s philosophical development against the background of the conflicts and crises that marked the history of the twentieth century, and which profoundly affected the Czech philosopher. The relevant period spans from the 1930s, when Patočka studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg, to the philosopher’s activities as a dissident in 1970s Czechoslovakia. Particular attention is paid to Patočka’s deep reading of the history of philosophy; the complexities of his appropriation of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger; and the philosophy of history developed late in his career. The chapter ends with a consideration of Patočka’s influence on contemporary phenomenological philosophy, suggesting that his most promising contribution lies in his challenging engagement with the problem of Europe, above all his call for a post-European philosophical perspective.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-379
Author(s):  
David Vessey

The key difference between the history of ideas and the history of philosophy is that philosophers always consider their historical studies as potentially contributing to contemporary philosophical practice. Such presentism risks anachronistic readings of texts, but a too narrow focus on the historical context of the text risks limiting its ability to contribute to contemporary philosophizing. The current discussion of the history of philosophy focus entirely on how to understand, and what we can learn from, a philosopher’s claims and arguments. Hans-Georg Gadamer offers a different focus, arguing instead that it is the questions that the text answers that generate insights for contemporary philosophical practice. His focus on questions cuts across the standard ways of thinking about the relation between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas and provides novel answers to some central issues in the philosophy of history, for example how to best articulate a principle of charity.


The Oxford Handbook of Hegel is a comprehensive guide to the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, the last major thinker in the philosophical movement known as German Idealism. Beginning with chapters on his first published writings, the authors draw out Hegel’s debts to his predecessors and highlight the themes and arguments that have proven the most influential over the past two centuries. There are six chapters each on the Phenomenology of Spirit and The Science of Logic, and in-depth analyses of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Five chapters cover Hegel’s philosophy of law, action, and the ethical and political philosophy presented in his Philosophy of Right. Several chapters cover the many recently edited lecture series from the 1820s, bringing new clarity to Hegel’s conception of aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy. The concluding part focuses on Hegel’s legacy, from his role in the formation of Marx’s philosophy to his importance for contemporary liberal political philosophy. The Handbook includes many essays from younger scholars who have brought new perspectives and rigor to the study of Hegel’s thought. The essays are marked by close engagement with Hegel’s difficult texts and by a concern with highlighting the ongoing systematic importance of Hegel’s philosophy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-24
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann

Abstract The essay – an elaborated version of my academic farewell speech [Abschiedsvorlesung] – discusses three theses: 1. Histories and history as well as history of philosophy and philosophy of history can only be staged as narratives. “True” stories enact the past and deliver schemes for anticipating the future; insofar history and future constitute the semantics of the present. 2. “Systematic” philosophy analyses the temporal narratives which store the historical experiences and eliminates their temporality in a process of transforming narratives into arguments. The most important step in this transformation consists in isolating the key notions of the narratives and in arranging these key notions in a “timeless” systematic order. 3. History of philosophy and philosophy of history restage, however, the temporal narrative, which systematic philosophy wants to eliminate from philosophy. This operation produces an unsolvable paradox where the claim of timeless truth and that of unescapable temporality are both valid. It throws up questions such as: how can it be possible for philosophical truths to lose their credit? Do timeless truths exist, and if so what do they mean? Do these paradoxes lead to schadenfreude on the part of the historian of philosophy, who knew it all along, or should one see these unsolvable complexities as a chance to enjoy the richness of possibilities which history unfolds? The essay chooses the second alternative.


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