scholarly journals The principle of deductive closure of knowledge and contextualism

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Marko Peric
Keyword(s):  
Direct Consequence ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Rule Out

The hypotheses of radical skeptics are so conceived to put the attributor of knowledge in such position that she can?t ascribe knowledge to anyone, because the subject can?t get proper evidence to exclude skeptical alternatives. There are several versions of the skeptical arguments by which she tries to point out the impossibility of knowledge ascriptions as direct consequence of the impossibility to rule out skeptical alternatives. All of those arguments are based on a very intuitive epistemological principle: if we know p, and if we know that p implies q, then we know q as well. This principle is called the principle of deductive closure of knowledge (or simply closure). In this paper, the author analyzes the most important contextualist solutions to the skeptic paradox, those that accept the closure principle, and those that reject it as well.

The Epistemic Norms of Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

scholarly journals Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Anna Kompa
Keyword(s):  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Epistemic Standard ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemic Standards

AbstractThat knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

To what question is the Badiouan notion of the subject an answer? On the dialectical elaboration of the concept in his early work

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-120
Author(s):  
Jan-Jasper Persijn
Keyword(s):  
Direct Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Academic World ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Political Field ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Work Up

Alain Badiou’s elaboration of a subject faithful to an event is commonly known today in the academic world and beyond. However, his first systematic account of the subject ( Théorie du Sujet) was already published in 1982 and did not mention the ‘event’ at all. Therefore, this article aims at tracing back both the structural and the historical conditions that directed Badiou’s elaboration of the subject in the early work up until the publication of L’Être et l’Événément in 1988. On the one hand, it investigates to what extent the (early) Badiouan subject can be considered an exceptional product of the formalist project of the Cahiers pour l’Analyse as instigated by psychoanalytical discourse (Lacan) and a certain Marxist discourse (Althusser) insofar as both were centered upon a theory of the subject. On the other hand, this article examines the radical political implications of this subject insofar as Badiou has directed his philosophical aims towards the political field as a direct consequence of the events of May ’68.

scholarly journals The Subject of Critique: Ricoeur in Dialogue with Feminist Philosophers

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39
Author(s):  
Annemie Halsema
Keyword(s):  
Feminist Theory ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
The Self ◽  
Major Point ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Rule Out

This paper aims to show the relevance of Ricœur’s notion of the self for postmodern feminist theory, but also to critically assess it. By bringing Ricœur’s “self” into dialogue with Braidotti’s, Irigaray’s and Butler’s conceptions of the subject, it shows that it is close to the feminist self in that it is articulated into language, is embodied and not fully conscious of itself. In the course of the argument, the major point of divergence also comes to light, namely, that the former considers discourse to be a laboratory for thought experiments, while the latter consider discourse to be normative, restrictive and exclusive. In the second part, the possibility of critique and change are further developed. Ricœur does not rule out critique, rather interpretation includes distanciation and critique. Finally, his notion of productive imagination explains how new identifications become possible. 

scholarly journals ZAKAZ WYROKOWANIA PONAD ŻĄDANIE STRONY (‘NE EAT IUDEX ULTRA PETITA PARTIUM’) – RZYMSKIE TRADYCJE I WSPÓŁCZESNE REGULACJE POLSKIEGO PROCESOWEGO PRAWA CYWILNEGO

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Joanna Misztal-Konecka
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Current Formulation ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Polish Code ◽  
Rule Out

‘NE EAT IUDEX ULTRA PETITA PARTIUM’: THE PROHIBITION ON JUDGEMENTS OVER AND ABOVE THE CLAIM A PARTY HAS LODGED. ROMAN TRADITIONS AND CONTEMPORARY REGULATIONS IN POLISH CIVIL LAW PROCEEDINGS Summary One of the testimonials to the vast influence of Roman law on contemporary civil law, including proceedings, are the Latin legal maxims which have been used for centuries not only by theorists of the law but also by its practitioners. Following the social and political transformation, one of the maxims very often resorted to in Poland is ne eat iudex ultra petita partium. Its importance is confirmed by the fact that it is among the 86 inscriptions decorating the columns in the building of the Polish Supreme Court. This legal maxim is an excerpt from the Roman jurist Iavolenus (D. 10,3,18), who used this expression to rule out the possibility of one of the beneficiaries in an inheritance case obtaining an easement on the testator’s estate for use on his own property which was not part of the estate devised. Clearly the original formulation applied to a different issue than the sense in which it is used nowadays: as a reference to the limitation on a judge’s powers to the subject of the proceedings he is hearing. In the light of the current formulation of Art. 321 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure a court cannot or rule over and above the claim, or issue a verdict not relating to the claim. This prohibition means that the court cannot issue a verdict other than (aliud) or over and above (super) what the plaintiff or claimant petitioned for. Neither can it rule on any other grounds than those petitioned for by the plaintiff or claimant. The prohibition on judgements over and above the petition applies both to the object of the petition or claim (petitum) as well as to the grounds thereof (causa petendi).

scholarly journals Tax control and inspection supervision in the Republic of Serbia: Characteristics of the legal framework and the need for coordination

Ekonomika ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Milan Rapajić ◽  
Milivoje Lapčević ◽  
Violeta Miladinović
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
General Law ◽  
Official Control ◽  
Tax Laws ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Comprehensive Reform ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Rule Out

Today, the success of entire tax system is viewed through the effectiveness of tax control. Tax control activities are performed by tax inspectors with special authorities, duties and responsibilities, and its purpose is to control whether taxpayers activities comply with tax laws and regulations. With the adoption of the Law on inspection supervision, the Republic of Serbia has implemented a crucial, comprehensive reform of inspection bodies and the process of inspection supervision which has been of great significance for public administration, economy and citizens. The provisions of this law are applied to tax procedures based on the principle of subsidiarity, while the activities of tax inspection are mostly based on the provisions of the Law on tax procedure and tax administration. In tax procedures, the issues which are not regulated by the general Law on inspection supervision, are the subject of another specific law-however, the direct application of the specific law cannot rule out or restrict the application of the law which governs the issues of inspection supervision and official control which are not regulated by the specific law. In this paper, the author discusses the similarities and differences between two laws and solutions for their harmonization underlining their advantages and weaknesses aimed at ensuring the maximum compliance with tax laws and reduction of tax evasion and shadow economy.

Deductive closure principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Becker
Keyword(s):  
General Principle ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Rhetorical Device ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Philosophical Questions

The deductive closure principle is based on the thought that one straightforward way to extend one’s knowledge is to competently deduce some proposition from one or more propositions that one already knows. G.E. Moore (1939) appears to presume this in his proof of an external world. Updating Moore’s proof to incorporate the more recent rhetorical device of a brain-in-a-vat (BIV), from his putative knowledge that he has hands and his knowledge that his having hands entails that he is not merely a BIV being fed experiences, through electrodes, of having hands, Moore deduces and therefore claims to know that he is not a BIV. A natural sceptical reply also exploits the idea that one can extend one’s knowledge through deduction. The sceptic will say, for example, that Moore does not know that he is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV), for if he were his experience would be no different to what it actually is. Moore does know, however, that if he has hands then he is not (just) a BIV. Therefore, Moore does not even know that he has hands, for if he did, he could deduce and come to know that he is not a BIV, but that is not something he can know because, again, his vat experiences would be indistinguishable from normal ones. The idea that knowledge can always be extended through competent deduction from known premises – which implies that knowledge is deductively closed under known entailment – raises at least three philosophical questions. First, what general principle best captures this phenomenon? Due primarily to risk arising from the fallibility of belief-forming processes including deduction, there is reason to question even the most plausible formulations of closure. Second, are there any counterexamples to the principle or constraints on its application? Some philosophers claim that a properly formulated closure principle admits of exceptions, even if deduction is assumed to be infallible. Third, how might a theory of knowledge that upholds a robust (exceptionless) closure principle achieve anti-sceptical results?.

Deductive closure principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Brueckner
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Logical Implication ◽  
Logic Of Knowledge ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Sceptical Hypothesis

It seems that one can expand one’s body of knowledge by making deductive inferences from propositions one knows. The ‘deductive closure principle’ captures this idea: if S knows that P, and S correctly deduces Q from P, then S knows that Q. A closely related principle is that knowledge is closed under known logical implication: if S knows that P and S knows that P logically implies Q, then S knows that Q. These principles, if they hold, are guaranteed by general features of the concept of knowledge. They would form part of a logic of knowledge. An influential argument for scepticism about knowledge of the external world employs the deductive closure principle. The sceptic begins by sketching a logically possible hypothesis, or counter-possibility (for example, that one is a brain in a vat, with computer-induced sense experience) which is logically incompatible with various things one claims to know (such as that one has hands). The proposition that one has hands logically implies the falsity of the sceptical hypothesis. Supposing that one is aware of this implication, the deductive closure principle yields the consequence that if one knows that one has hands, then one knows that one is not a brain in a vat. The sceptic argues that one does not know this: if one were in a vat, then one would have just the sensory evidence one actually has. It follows that one does not know that one has hands. Some philosophers have sought to block this argument by denying the deductive closure principle.

Mesenchymal cell atypicality in inflammatory polyps

1977 ◽  
Vol 91 (9) ◽  
pp. 751-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce H. Klenoff ◽  
Max L. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Medical Therapy ◽  
Nasal Polyps ◽  
Mesenchymal Cell ◽  
Surgical Excision ◽  
Histological Changes ◽  
Nasal Symptoms ◽  
Neoplastic Lesions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Mesenchymal Stroma Cells ◽  
Rule Out

Excised nasal polyps should be examined histologically for classification as to aetiological process. Recently a ‘pseudosarcomatous’ change was reported in nasal polyps. We reviewed one hundred excised polyps for mesenchymal atypicality and found a wide degree of mesenchymal atypicality in the majority of nasal polyps.Nasal and choanal inflammatory polyps are the most frequent nasal masses which the otolaryngologist has to treat. Surgical excision is frequently required to alleviate the nasal symptoms of polyps unresponsive to medical therapy. Excised nasal polyps should be examined histologically for classification as to possible aetiological mechanisms and to rule out neoplastic lesions (Shea, 1947).Smith, Echevarria, and McLelland (Smith, 1974) recently described ‘pseudosarcomatous changes’ in nasal polyps. This stimulated us to investigate our inflammatoru nasal polyps for these histological changes. Casual observations demonstrated an impressive number of inflammatory polyps with varying amounts of atypical mesenchymal stroma cells. To quantitate these alterations, we reviewed the histological slides from one hundred patients with excised inflammatory polyps and the results are the subject of this report.

scholarly journals Slovak adverbs belonging to the group “often”: the problem of quasi-synonymy

2021 ◽  
pp. 148-169
Author(s):  
Daria Iu. Vashchenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Direct Consequence ◽  
Association Measure ◽  
Semantic Group ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Thematic Area ◽  
High Repeatability ◽  
Slovak Language ◽  
National Corpus

The article examines the semantics of the Slovak lexemes často and neraz, the two most frequent adverbs included in the semantic group of temporal words with a common meaning of high repeatability of action, based on the material of the National Corpus of the Slovak language. The characteristics of adverbs, their relative compatibility, which is isolated using the logDice association measure, as well as the mutual occurrence of adverbs within the same context are analyzed. The analysis showed that adverbs are not complete synonyms. For často, the main sphere of compatibility is formed by collocations with verbs and participles, which have the semantics of detection, appearance; combinations with representative verbs. Neraz, in turn, tends to particles that emphasize the significance of the situation; also to particles with the meaning ‘literally, really’, from verbal collocations, adverbs are mainly characterized by combinations with mental predicates denoting the process of persuasion. A separate thematic area for the adverb is formed by words that somehow denote life difficulties. Thus, the semantics of často, unlike neraz, presupposes regularity of repetition; neraz denotes not only irregular, but primarily non-standard situations, the adverb is largely focused on the subject of perception. In the case of the joint use of both adverbs, where their neutralization does not occur, the situation designated neraz often occurs after the situation designated často, and is its direct consequence. In addition, často can mark more frequent situations than neraz.

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