An Average Azeri Village (1930): Remembering Rebellion in the Caucasus Mountains

Slavic Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Grant

In this article, Bruce Grant advocates an anthropological perspective for understanding resistance to early Soviet rule, given that not all anti-Soviet rebellions operated by the same cultural logic. Combining oral histories and archival evidence to reconstruct highly charged events in rural northwest Azerbaijan, where as many as 10,000 men and women joined to overthrow Soviet power in favor of an Islamic republic in 1930, Grant examines moral archetypes of banditry, religious frames of Caucasus life, magical mobility, and images of early nationalist struggle against communism. Exploring what it means to have been “average” in the Soviet Union of the 1930s, Grant invites readers to consider classic narrative framings of periods of great tumult.

1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric J. Schmaltz

In early 1989, the Soviet Germans established the Wiedergeburt (“Rebirth”) All-Union Society. An umbrella-organization originally designed to protect and advance ethnic-German interests in the USSR, the “Rebirth” Society adopted the most effective legal means by which it could confront the regime—namely, political dissent based on Lenin's notion of national self-determination. The “Rebirth” movement evolved in this context and represented the fifteenth-largest Soviet nationality numbering more than two million in the 1989 Soviet census. By 1993, official membership in the “Rebirth” Society included nearly 200,000 men and women. Ironically, at the very moment the Soviet Germans became more politically conscious, the Soviet Union and the ethnic-German community were disintegrating.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

Many self-identified realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars contend that ideology played a critical role in generating and shaping the United States' decision to confront the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. A close look at the history reveals that these ideological arguments fail to explain key aspects of U.S. policy. Contrary to ideological explanations, the United States initially sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, did not initially pressure communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, and later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. The U.S. decision to confront the Soviets stemmed instead from the distribution of power. U.S. policy shifted toward a confrontational approach as the balance of power in Eurasia tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition, U.S. leaders tended to think and act in a manner consistent with balance of power logic. The primacy of power over ideology in U.S. policymaking—given the strong liberal tradition in the United States and the large differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology—suggests that relative power concerns are the most important factors in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.


2001 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Varese

It is difficult to discuss a phenomenon when one does not know precisely what it is. This problem is particularly vexing in the case of the Mafia. It has been argued that ‘the need for a definition [of the Mafia] is crucial; not just for any definition with some degree of contingent empirical plausibility, but for a definition with some analytical clout’ (1). The word ‘Mafia’ itself has travelled far to distant lands, such as the former Soviet Union. For instance, according to Arkadii Vaksberg, Russian journalist and author of The Russian Mafia, the Mafia is ‘the entire soviet power-system, all its ideological, political, economical and administrative manifestations’ (2). In an article published in a magazine for British executives dealing with Russia, the label Mafiosi is used to lump together bureaucrats, smugglers from the Caucasus, the CPSU nomenklatura accused of embezzling state funds, the late British businessman Robert Maxwell and many others (3).


1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Elleman

Following the october revolution, the Soviet Union regained majority control over the strategically located Chinese Eastern Railway, which ran through Manchuria, by signing two previously unpublished secret agreements: the first with the Beijing government on May 31, 1924, and the second with Zhang Zuolin's government in Manchuria on September 20, 1924. These secret agreements were signed despite the Soviet government's repeated promise that it would never resort to secret diplomacy. The Soviet Union also renewed control over the Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railway despite a 1919 Soviet manifesto promising that this railway would be turned over to China without compensation. To consolidate Soviet power over this railway, the USSR then signed the January 20, 1925, convention with Japan that recognized Japan's authority over the South Manchurian Railway in return for Japan's acquiescence to full Soviet authority over the Chinese Eastern Railway.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-59
Author(s):  
Eleonóra Matkovits-Kretz

Abstract The German community in Hungary suffered many blows at the end of World War II and after it, on the basis of collective guilt. Immediately after the Red Army had marched in. gathering and deportation started into the camps of the Soviet Union, primarily into forced-labour camps in Donetsk, the Caucasus, and the Ural mountains. One third of them never returned. Those left behind had to face forced resettlement, the confiscation of their properties, and other ordeals. Their history was a taboo subject until the change of the political system in 1989. Not even until our days, by the 70th anniversary of the events, has their story reached a worthy place in national and international remembrance. International collaboration, the establishment of a research institute is needed to set to rights in history the story of the ordeal of the German community after World War II. for the present and future generations


1994 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Varese

It is difficult to discuss a phenomenon when one does not know precisely what it is. This problem is particularly vexing in the case of the Mafia. It has been argued that ‘the need for a definition [of the Mafia] is crucial; not just for any definition with some degree of contingent empirical plausibility, but for a definition with some analytical clout’. The word ‘Mafia’ itself has travelled far to distant lands, such as the former Soviet Union. For instance, according to Arkadii Vaksberg, Russian journalist and author of The Russian Mafia, the Mafia is ‘the entire soviet power-system, all its ideological, political, economical and administrative manifestations’. In an article published in a magazine for British executives dealing with Russia, the label Mafiosi is used to lump together bureaucrats, smugglers from the Caucasus, the cpsunomenklatura accused of embezzling state funds, the late British businessman Robert Maxwell and many others.


1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
David D. Laitin

Recently published histories of national groups living under Soviet rule provide a rich secondary literature on the various paths taken by these groups to be incorporated into the Russian empire and the Soviet state. Social scientists who want a differentiated understanding of political mobilization among the various nationalities should not ignore these important contributions. This review essay attempts to synthesize these histories in order to provide a coherent model of nationality politics. Proposing an “elite incorporation model” of political mobilization, the essay accounts for different sources of national protest. The model weight not only the pressures for national autonomy and republican sovereignty but also the pressures that provide support for the Union.


Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the following Chapter 9 are interconnected as they both discuss Armenian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter focuses on the transnational social field and the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs. Armenians have lived in the Caucasus and the Middle East prior to the 1915 Armenian genocide, a defining moment historically and especially for the diaspora. Self-determination claims of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been interconnected historically, considered part of ‘Eastern Armenia’. They both seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991. An independent Armenia was internationally recognized as a state, unlike the de facto state of Karabakh, unrecognized at present. A devastating 1988 earthquake and a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (1992–4) created opportune moments for the diaspora in Western countries to connect to Armenia and Karabakh. The diaspora in Europe was primarily formed by survivors and descendants of the Armenian genocide, with roots in ‘Western Armenia’ in Turkey and the larger Middle East, and organized by diaspora parties. Fragility of statehood in Armenia and Karabakh, and recurrent violence and authoritarianism in the Middle East continued to create push factors for Armenians to emigrate across the globe and for the diaspora to mobilize. The highest priority in the diaspora, especially in Europe, remained the recognition of the Armenian genocide, while Karabakh’s recognition and supporting Armenia took a back seat. The chapter presents data on migration in the Armenian field, in the Caucasus, the Middle East and globally, and specifies the individual profiles of Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 50-71
Author(s):  
Clayton Black

Abstract This article examines the Leningrad Opposition of 1925 not so much as a regionally based schism in the party opposed to Stalin’s increasing monopoly of power, but rather as a cohesive expression of the city’s frustration with NEP and the economic hardships it imposed on the most industrialized city in the Soviet Union in the first seven years of Soviet power. Contrary to Western historiography on the Opposition, Zinoviev did not so much lead as align with the city’s leaders.


Inner Asia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brophy

AbstractUp till now, the problem of Uyghur identity construction has been studied from an almost exclusively anthropological perspective. Little Western research has been done on the history of the Uyghur community in the Soviet Union during the period of national delimitation, and the process by which a re-invented ‘Uyghur’ identity was fostered among settled Turkicspeakers of East Turkestani origin. In this paper I have set out to trace some of the key events and debates which formed part of that process. In doing so I provide evidence that challenges certain aspects of the standard account of this period, in particular the role of the 1921 Tashkent conference. In 1921 the term ‘Uyghur’ was not used an ethnic designation, but as an umbrella term for various peoples with family roots in Eastern Turkestan. It was not until several years later that the term took its place beside other ethnonyms in the Soviet Union, provoking debate and opposition in the Soviet Uyghur press. This paper is largely based on the recently republished writings of leading Uyghur activists and journalists from the 1920s, and focuses on the role of the Uyghur Communist Abdulla Rozibaqiev. My paper attempts to demonstrate the importance of basing the study of Uyghur history on Uyghur language sources, rather than Russian or Chinese materials alone.


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