Distribution of Powers between an International Government and the Governments of National States

1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 862-872
Author(s):  
Arnold Brecht

Universal feeling seems to converge upon the postulate that after this war an International Government shall be formed to control war and peace of the world, and that the United States shall take full share in it. This dual demand is considered a fundamental platform on which all men of good-will can meet. There is a far-spread tendency, however, to postpone inquiries into its exact meaning and implications. This vagueness may have merits for winning popular support. It has none in preparing for final action. It may even defeat the movement's purpose, because little may come from the longing for International Government, unless details are well prepared in advance. Or, built with a marble façade on shaky foundations, International Government may lead to disaster rather than avert it.None of the United Nations—at least none of the “Big Four”—has thus far given up its sovereignty. For this very reason, no insurmountable difficulty may lie in the way of continuing their alliance to some good purpose after the war, and gradually extending it to other nations. That is still a far cry, however, from the establishment of an International Government which, distinct from the governments of its constituent members, should have the power to take consequential steps independently. If we stake our hopes on this latter type, we must answer the question of how shall the powers be divided between the International Government and the governments of the national states? In passing through the immense flood of discussions on International Government, it is amazing to see how scant are the contributions to this question.

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 797-804
Author(s):  
Myron E. Wegman

Data for this article, as in previous reports,1 are drawn principally from the Monthly Vital Statistics Report,2-5 published by the National Center for Health Statistics. The international data come from the Demographic Yearbook6 and the quarterly Population and Vital Statistics Report,7 both published by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, and the World Health Statistics Report,8 published by the World Health Organization. All the United States data for 1976 are estimates by place of occurrence based upon a 10% sample of material received in state offices between two dates, one month apart, regardless of when the event occurred. Experience has shown that for the country as a whole the estimate is very close to the subsequent final figures.


Author(s):  
Franz Neumann

This chapter considers a variety of methods of treating Germany. The main objective of the United Nations in the treatment of Germany is to prevent it from ever again becoming a threat to the security of the world. The problem of securing this objective could be approached through destruction of Germany's industrial potential, destruction of Germany as a political entity, and removal from German society of the causes of aggression. The chapter shows that the first two solutions should be deferred until it is clear that the third alternative proves unworkable. In order to eliminate the causes of aggressiveness in German society, temporary and long-term disabilities should be imposed upon Germany. The chapter also examines the causes of German aggression, the United States' policy toward Germany, short-term measures during the period of military government, conditional measures during the probationary period, and permanent impositions upon Germany.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wertheim

Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior internationalist efforts to end power politics, even as they based the design of the UN on a thoroughgoing critique of the League, precisely for assuming that power politics could be transcended.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-295
Author(s):  
Keith Allan Clark II

In 1955, Jiang Tingfu, representing the Republic of China (roc), vetoed Mongolia’s entry into the United Nations. In the 26 years the roc represented China in the United Nations, it only cast this one veto. The roc’s veto was a contentious move because Taipei had recognized Mongolia as a sovereign state in 1946. A majority of the world body, including the United States, favored Mongolia’s admission as part of a deal to end the international organization’s deadlocked-admissions problem. The roc’s veto placed it not only in opposition to the United Nations but also its primary benefactor. This article describes the public and private discourse surrounding this event to analyze how roc representatives portrayed the veto and what they thought Mongolian admission to the United Nations represented. It also examines international reactions to Taipei’s claims and veto. It argues that in 1955 Mongolia became a synecdoche for all of China that Taipei claimed to represent, and therefore roc representatives could not acknowledge it as a sovereign state.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon A. Christenson

In the merits phase of decision in the case brought by Nicaragua against the United States, the World Court briefly mentions references by states or publicists to the concept of jus cogens. These expressions are used to buttress the Court’s conclusion that the principle prohibiting the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is also a rule of customary international law.


Author(s):  
Henry Shue

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Rio de Janeiro at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992 establishes no dates and no dollars. No dates are specified by which emissions are to be reduced by the wealthy states, and no dollars are specified with which the wealthy states will assist the poor states to avoid an environmentally dirty development like our own. The convention is toothless because throughout the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee during 1991 to 1992, the United States played the role of dentist: whenever virtually all the other states in the world (with the notable exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) agreed to convention language with teeth, the United States insisted that the teeth be pulled out. The Clinton administration now faces a strategic question: should the next step aim at a comprehensive treaty covering all greenhouse gases (GHGs) or at a narrower protocol covering only one, or a few, gases, for example, only fossil-fuel carbon dioxide (CO2)? Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener (1992) have argued for moving directly to a comprehensive treaty, while Thomas Drennen (1993) has argued for a more focused beginning. I will suggest that Drennen is essentially correct that we should not try to go straight to a comprehensive treaty, at least not of the kind advocated by Stewart and Wiener. First I would like to develop a framework into which to set issues of equity or justice of the kind introduced by Drennen. It would be easier if we faced only one question about justice, but several questions are not only unavoidable individually but are entangled with one another. In addition, each question can be given not simply alternative answers but answers of different kinds. In spite of this multiplicity of possible answers to the multiplicity of inevitable and interconnected questions, I think we can lay out the issues fairly clearly and establish that commonsense principles converge to a remarkable extent upon what ought to be done, at least for the next decade or so.


1970 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 548-565
Author(s):  
Lincoln P. Bloomfield

When the United Nations Charter was drafted in 1945 the provisions for keeping the peace had to be drawn up in the abstract. There was no tangible enemy, crises were in the future, and commitments were made in a vacuum. It was only when it became clear what the world was really like that “peacekeeping” was invented. It turned out that in most conflict situations there was no definable aggressor or victim, that the danger was uncontrolled escalation of local conflicts into the nuclear realm, and that the real enemy was a fantastically complex set of instabilities, inequities, and passions to which 1945 international ground rules were inadequately related.


Author(s):  
Mahfuzakhon Khuja kizi Shamsieva

The article covers the history of women’s struggle for gender equality in the world and the work done in Uzbekistan to ensure women’s rights and freedoms after independence. In particular, the Declaration of the Rights of Women, adopted in the United States 150 years ago, defines “the history of women as the history of the constant domination of women by men”were analyzed by the helping scientific literatures and media materials as well. КEY WORDS: United Nations, gender equality, CEDAW Committee, Convention, Republic of Uzbekistan, Law, women, strategy.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (11) ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
Charles B. Keely

Ten years ago the United Nations sponsored the first conference of governments on global population. Held in Bucharest, the conference was spearheaded by the United States and planned as a rally in support of the notion that population was growing too rapidly around the world and that the right prescription was family planning. But Bucharest did not turn out as planned. Such developing giants as India and China questioned the cure, and the rallying cry became, rather, that development is the best contraceptive. The conferees produced a grandly-named World Population Plan of Action which, though it acknowledged the role of family planning and contraception, had more than one plan in its platform.


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