Tocqueville's Constitutionalism

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1175-1195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Kraynak

For the ancient philosophers, constitutionalism meant classifying regimes and constructing regimes to form virtuous citizens. In the modern world it generally means checks and balances, institutional mechanisms limiting the power of government and protecting private rights. In Democracy in America Tocqueville attempts to combine both views in his interpretation of the U.S. constitutional system. He employs the regime analysis of ancient constitutionalism to understand the new phenomenon of popular sovereignty and its potential for despotic control over the minds and characters of citizens. At the same time, he shows how the constitutional devices found in the United States—such as federalism, judicial review, and the separation of powers—can be adapted to inculcate a kind of moral virtue by teaching citizens to exercise liberty with moral responsibility and to govern themselves. The result is a constitutional theory that weaves ancient and modern principles into an original and coherent whole.

Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This introductory chapter discusses how judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has usually emerged historically for a combination of four reasons. First, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is a response to a nation’s need for an umpire to resolve federalism or separation of powers boundary line disputes. The second main cause of the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is what can be called the rights from wrongs hypothesis; judicial review very often emerges as a response to an abominable deprivation of human rights. The third major cause is the out-and-out borrowing of the institution of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from either the United States’ model; the German Civil Law model; and, most recently, from the Canadian Second Look judicial review constitutional model. The fourth major cause is the existence of a system of checks and balances, which gives Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts political space to grow in. Revolutionary charismatic constitutionalism can also lead to the growth of judicial review as Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained in an important new book, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019).


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-188
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at French judicial review. From the French Revolution of 1789 up until the adoption in 1958 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the Republic of France refused to tolerate any kind of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. The traditional French view was that judicial power is oligarchic, opposed to progressive causes, and should be contained as much as possible. The 1958 French Constitution provides an elaborate system of checks and balances with its bicameral legislature consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate; with its division of the executive power between the president and the prime minister (who can be from opposite political parties); and with its increasing focus on decentralization. As such, just as federalism umpiring helped to give rise to judicial review in the United States, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and India, so too did separation of powers umpiring help to give rise to judicial review in France. Judicial review in France was hugely expanded in 1971, for rights from wrongs reasons; in 1974, for insurance and commitment reasons; and in 2008, for borrowing reasons.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8335
Author(s):  
Jasmina Nedevska

Climate change litigation has emerged as a powerful tool as societies steer towards sustainable development. Although the litigation mainly takes place in domestic courts, the implications can be seen as global as specific climate rulings influence courts across national borders. However, while the phenomenon of judicialization is well-known in the social sciences, relatively few have studied issues of legitimacy that arise as climate politics move into courts. A comparatively large part of climate cases have appeared in the United States. This article presents a research plan for a study of judges’ opinions and dissents in the United States, regarding the justiciability of strategic climate cases. The purpose is to empirically study how judges navigate a perceived normative conflict—between the litigation and an overarching ideal of separation of powers—in a system marked by checks and balances.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (01) ◽  
pp. 17-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Fisher

From World War II to the present, prominent scholars placed their hopes in the presidency to protect the nation from outside threats and deal effectively with domestic crises. Their theories weakened the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances by reviving an outsized trust in executive power (especially over external affairs) that William Blackstone and others promoted in eighteenth-century England. The American framers of the Constitution studied those models with great care and fully rejected those precedents when they declared their independence from England.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This concluding chapter identifies the four major causes of the growth and origin of judicial review in the G-20 common law countries and in Israel. First, the need for a federalism umpire, and occasionally a separation of powers umpire, played a major role in the development of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in India, and most recently in the United Kingdom. Second, there is a rights from wrongs phenomenon at work in the growth of judicial review in the United States, after the Civil War; in Canada, with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in India, after the Indira Gandhi State of Emergency led to a massive trampling on human rights; in Israel, after the Holocaust; in South Africa, after racist apartheid misrule; and in the United Kingdom, after that country accumulated an embarrassing record before the European Court of Human Rights prior to 1998. This proves that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation often occurs in response to a deprivation of human rights. Third, the seven common law countries all borrowed a lot from one another, and from civil law countries, in writing their constitutions. Fourth, and finally, the common law countries all create multiple democratic institutions or political parties, which renders any political attempt to strike back at the Supreme Court impossible to maintain.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This book is about the stunning birth and growth of judicial review in the civil law world, since 1945. In Volume I of this two-volume series, I showed that judicial review was born and grew in common law G-20 constitutional democracies and in Israel primarily: (1) when there is a need for a federalism or a separation of powers umpire, (2) when there is a rights from wrongs dynamic, (3) when there is borrowing, and (4) when the political structure of a country’s institutions leaves space within which the judiciary can operate. The countries discussed in Volume I were the following: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, (3) Australia, (4) India, (5) Israel, (6) South Africa, and (7) the United Kingdom....


1969 ◽  
pp. 880
Author(s):  
Graeme A. Barry

The author undertakes an historical analysis of the judicial achievements of Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1941 until his sudden death in 1954. Justice Jackson's approach to the nature of the judicial function, to judicial review and to the question of extrajudicial activities sheds light on contemporary debate in these areas. Despite being undoubtedly influenced by his place on the "Roosevelt Court," Jackson was a strong individualist, which the author believes accounts for his "maverick" status on the Court Justice Jackson's prominent judicial opinions relating to economic regulation, procedural due process, civil liberties and the separation of powers doctrine reveal how he addressed the inherent tension between judicial review and democracy in the American system of government. The effects of extrajudicial activities are explored with reference to his key role at the Nuremberg Trials, and the appointment of Madam Justice Louise Arbour to serve as Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 1006-1011
Author(s):  
Lukman Hakim ◽  

The main problem of this research triggers by the fact that Indonesia fundamental constitutional system changed into the 1945 Constitution. The changes affected the structure and structural mechanism of state institutions. The main purpose of this study is to analyze the philosophical question of the basic root formed in the 1945 Constitution as a new constitution of Indonesia. Regarding the organization and institution of the state can be started by questioning the essence of power that is institutionalized or organized into the state. The results showed that it is also important to know how the principle of popular sovereignty is reflected in the structure and mechanisms of state and government institutions that guarantee the establishment of the legal system and the functioning of the democratic system. At the theory level in terms of state institutions, with the various state commissions, how the principle of popular sovereignty is organized into institutional functions can be patterned into state institutions that are equal and mutually balanced in forms of checks and balances. From a normative perspective, the sources of state institutional authority can be used as a reference in the structuring of state institutions by considering shifts and the development of state administration, especially with the state commissions that occurred after changes to the 1945 Constitution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 206
Author(s):  
Tanto Lailam

Artikel ini membahas tentang penataan kelembagaan pengujian norma hukum di Indonesia, yang diawali dengan pembahasan problematika kelembagaan dan praktik pengujian norma hukum saat ini dan gagasan penataaan lembaga kedepan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa beberapa persoalan, meliputi (1) kelembagaan yang tidak ideal dan tidak sesuai dengan checks and balances system, hal ini terbukti banyaknya lembaga yang terlibat dalam pengujian norma, yakni MK, MA, dan Mendagri–Gubernur (Wakil Pemerintah Pusat); (2) persoalan objek pengujian yang tidak memiliki batasan yang jelas; (3) dalam praktik, persoalan tolok ukur pengujian terjadi kerumitan, terutama dalam penggunaan tolok ukur dalam menilai pertentangan norma hukum. Gagasan penataan kelembagaan ini di desain untuk kelembagaan satu atap pada MK, yang didasari argumentasi bahwa: MK sebagai pengawal Pancasila dan UUD 1945, dalam rangka penataan kelembagaan yang berbasis pada mekanisme checks and balances system, mewujudkan hierarkisitas peraturan perundang-undangan yang berkelanjutan, implementasi pengujian formil dalam praktik pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang, penataan regulasi menjadi lebih tersistem, pengujian produk hukum tertentu merupakan pintu masuk untuk melihat semua persoalan pertentangan normanya pada setiap hierarki. Pada sisi yang lain, objek dalam sistem pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan juga belum terintegrasi menurut konstitusi dan belum mengarah pada penataan sistem heirarki norma hukum dan upaya harmonisasi norma hukum. Sistem konstitusi dengan paradigma “the supreme law of the land” mengharuskan seluruh peraturan dibawahnya harus bersumber dan tidak boleh bertentangan, dengan berpijak pada prinsip “tidak boleh satu detik pun ada peraturan perundang-undangan yang berpotensi melanggar konstitusi tanpa bisa diluruskan atau diuji melalui pengujian yudisial”.This article is discussed the institutional arrangement of regulation reviews in Indonesia. It’s begins with a discussion of the institutional problems and practice of regulations review and the design of institutional arrangement in the future. The results of the study shows several issues including: (1) institutions which are not ideal and contradicted with checks and balances system, it’s proofed by amount of institutions has authority about the functions, namely: Judicial review (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court), and Executive Review (Minister of Home Affairs and Governor; (2) the object of review doesn’t clear boundaries; (3) in practice, the problems of standard reviews is complicated, especially in the use of judging standard in the conflict of legal norm. The idea of institutional arrangement is designed for one institutionalization at the Constitutional Court, which is based on the argument: The Constitutional Court as the guardian of the Pancasila (ideology of state) and the 1945 Constitution, in the framework of institutional arrangement based on checks and balances system, realizing the sustainable in the heirarchy of regulation, in practice of formal review to reviewing regulations under a law, arrangements of regulations more systematic and comprehsnsive, regulations review is the entrance to see all the issues of it’s conficting in each hierarchy. On the other hand, the object in the system of regulation reviews is also not integrated according by the constitution, and it’s not in accordance with the arrangement system in hierarchy of the regulation and efforts to harmonize the legal norms. The constitutional system with the “supreme law of the land” paradigm requires that all the regulations below should be sourced and not be contradictions, with the principle of “no regulations may be conflict againts the constitution without judicial review.


Author(s):  
Liah Greenfeld ◽  
Nicolas Prevelakis

Nationalism is the worldview of the modern world. It is based on three fundamental principles: it is secular; it sees the members of the community defined as a nation as fundamentally equal; and it presupposes popular sovereignty. Modern ethnicity, that is, ethnic identity, is the result of ethnic nationalism. One can classify nationalisms into three major types: the individualistic-civic type, as seen in England, the United States, and a few other countries, though it remains a minority in the world; the collectivistic-civic type—also a minority; and finally, the collectivistic-ethnic type, which is found in most of the nations in the world. This third and last type is what is usually referred to as “ethnic identity” in the modern world. These types of nationalism seldom exist in their ideal form. Typically, one will find a combination of elements from different types. Their relative importance may vary from one period to another, or within the same period and among different social strata. The case of Greek nationalism illustrates this point. It also represents a clear example of the causal role of nationalism in shaping ethnic identity. The seeds of ethnicity emerged in the first decades of the Greek state, though it was only in the middle of the nineteenth century that Greek nationalism took its definite ethnic form. This evolution can be seen in two areas: the emergence of Greek irredentism, and the construction of Greek historiography.


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