International Political Communication: Elite vs. Mass

1952 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier

In the second half of the seventeenth century, European philosophers began to regard the enlightenment of ignorant and prejudiced people as a means of reducing persecution and of promoting just and reasonable government. In international affairs, the first dramatic application of this doctrine occurred during the wars of the French Revolution when diplomacy, the traditional form of elite communication, was supplemented by missionary appeals to the common man on the enemy side. Since that time, the technology of communication has greatly improved; ever larger literate masses of the population participate in politics and war; the social homogeneity of the political elites in various nations has been lost, and in the West the ideas of liberty and equality have been drained of their revolutionary power.

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-458
Author(s):  
Eugene Heath

AbstractSeventeenth-century English common lawyer Sir John Davies sets forth, in his Irish Reports, a provocative and interesting argument on the nature of custom and its relation to the common law. This relatively unexplored argument shows how actions may emerge from conditions of liberty and slowly acquire qualities of social benefit and agreeability that are essential if the common law is to be identified with custom. Davies not only provides a coherent account of how custom might possess some reasonability, but he also seems to suggest that custom is unintended, thereby anticipating a theme found in eighteenth-century thinkers such as Mandeville, Hume, Ferguson, and Burke. In addition, Davies's account has important implications for political theory: the priority of the social over the political and a notion of political consent that arises via custom itself.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-117
Author(s):  
V.V. Bocharov

Traditionalism as a "return to traditional values" is widely represented today in the world political process, but it is particularly striking in the East. This phenomenon is analyzed from the standpoint of cultural-historical psychology. The revival of "archaic" manifestations is explained by the political elites’ (conscious or unconscious) appeal to deep layers of people's consciousness which provided the legitimacy of the "power of tradition" in the traditional society. The paper reveals the essence of this power embodied in social fear that had emerged together with first behavioral norms. It analyses taboo as a norm which initially labeled the hierarchy in the primary society, prescribing an asymmetry of behavior to the higher and lower strata (the ones in power and the ones in their power). There is a relation between the taboo and the psychophysiological mechanism of the prohibition (I. Pavlov, J. Castro) which transformed the "natural" fear into the "social" one. The paper describes the ambivalent nature of social fear as well as its intentional object: representatives of the higher strata (L. Vygotsky). The archetype of power behavior is illustrated by the political practices of the East where taboos in the shape of «absurd laws», religious and etiquette norms are widely existent in the legal field of this region’s states. This archetype also largely determines the behavior of politicians which often appears in archaic forms. Similar "psychological documents" (L. Vygotsky) are recorded in the behavior of actors in the political process of the West.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 117-129
Author(s):  
Marek Delong

The Polish Episcopate critically assessed the social and economic situation in Poland in the period of the transition from communism to democracy and a freemarket economy. Privatisation led to production being stopped and to an increase in unemployment. Profit and not human dignity became the measure of labour. The economic and social reality was dominated by the treatment of economics and financial success as of the highest values and the dissemination of the opinion that in politics and economics there are no values. The political elites showed an inability to develop long-term strategies for getting out of the crisis. The disappearance of the morality of many representatives of public life, which was manifested in universal corruption and the aspiration to improve social status as soon as possible, contributed to this state of affairs. As a result, there was a crisis of the idea of the common wealth and an increase in crime. The social crisis was particularly visible in moral attitudes, social behaviour, and in the economic sphere, public finance, on the labour market, and in the quickly progressing social stratification.


Urban History ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-588
Author(s):  
Frederik Buylaert ◽  
Jelten Baguet ◽  
Janna Everaert

AbstractThis article provides a comparative analysis of four large towns in the Southern Low Countries between c. 1350 and c. 1550. Combining the data on Ghent, Bruges and Antwerp – each of which is discussed in greater detail in the articles in this special section – with recent research on Bruges, the authors argue against the historiographical trend in which the political history of late medieval towns is supposedly dominated by a trend towards oligarchy. Rather than a closure of the ruling class, the four towns show a high turnover in the social composition of the political elite, and a consistent trend towards aristocracy, in which an increasingly large number of aldermen enjoyed noble status. The intensity of these trends differed from town to town, and was tied to different institutional configurations as well as different economic and political developments in each of the four towns.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Predrag Pavlicevic

This article indicated a model for a scientific description of styles of political leadership in Serbia from 1990 to the present, more precisely, pointed the basic elements of concept developed by the author in the study ?The style of political leaders in Serbia in the period 1990-2006? (2010). For the evaluation the author uses analytical tools that include the aforementioned concept, simultaneously indicating correlative theoretical approaches the aforementioned study did not examine, and may be of importance for the research of political elites in Serbia. This contributes the epistemological part of the method, which is registered in the definition of the style of political leadership as a term and the category apparatus that follows - understood from the aspect of the political style: the style in building political power, the style of political communication, the style of building one?s legitimacy, the ideological style, the styles of political language, symbolism and rituals, non-verbal communication and style in expressing patriotism. Starting from the fact that political styles are related to characteristics of political cultures and that it is necessary to make a concept of ideal typical models of styles focused on political subjects, this article marked the styles of political leadership typology related to the specific acting of political leaders in Serbia: authoritarian, republican, realistic, populist, conformist, revolutionary and style of a politician-rebel.


2005 ◽  
pp. 65-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Slobodan Naumovic

The text offers an examination of socio-political bases, modes of functioning, and of the consequences of political instrumentalisation of popular narratives on Serbian disunity. The first section of the paper deals with what is being expressed and what is being done socially when narratives on Serbian disunity are invoked in everyday discourses. The next section investigates what political actor sty, by publicly replicating them, or by basing their speeches on key words of those narratives. The narratives on Serbian disunity are then related to their historical and social contexts, and to various forms of identity politics with which they share common traits. The nineteenth century wars over political and cultural identity, intensified by the struggle between contesting claims to political authority, further channeled by the development of party politics in Serbia and radicalized by conflicts of interest and ideology together provided the initial reasons for the apparition of modern discourses on Serbian disunity and disaccord. Next, addressed are the uninnally solidifying or misinterpreting really existing social problems (in the case of some popular narratives on disunity), or because of intentionally exploiting popular perceptions of such problems (in the case of most political meta-narratives), the constructive potential related to existing social conflicts and splits can be completely wasted. What results is a deep feeling of frustration, and the diminishing of popular trust in the political elites and the political process in general. The contemporary hyperproduction of narratives on disunity and disaccord in Serbia seems to be directly related to the incapacity of the party system, and of the political system in general, to responsibly address, and eventually resolve historical and contemporary clashes of interest and identity-splits. If this vicious circle in which the consequences of social realities are turned into their causes is to be prevented, conflicts of interest must be discursively disassociated from ideological conflicts, as well as from identity-based conflicts, and all of them have to be disentangled from popular narratives on splits and disunity. Most important of all, the practice of political instrumentalisation of popular narratives on disunity and disaccord has to be gradually abandoned.


1952 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Smith

As in the Middle Ages in the West, so in Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868) men were fond of explaining the hierarchical society in which they lived by comparing it to an organism. Social classes, Confucian scholars said, were like parts of the body: each had a vital function to perform, but their functions were essentially different and unequal in value. In this scheme the peasants were second in importance only to the ruling military class. Just as the samurai officials were the brains that guided other organs, so the peasants were the feet that held the social body erect. They were the “basis of the country,” the valued producers whose labor sustained all else. But, as a class, they tended innately to backsliding and extravagance. Left alone they would consume more than their share of the social income, ape the manners and tastes of their betters, and even encroach upon the functions of other classes to the perilous neglect of their own. Only the lash of necessity and the sharp eye of the official could hold them to their disagreeable role. They had to be bound to the land; social distinctions had to be thrown up around them like so many physical barriers; and, to remove all temptation to indolence and luxury, they had to be left only enough of what they produced to let them continue producing.


Sexualities ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 136346072096129
Author(s):  
John Andrew G Evangelista

Homonationalism refers to how the West folded LGBTQ rights into the nation through neoliberal economies, intervention, and surveillance of racialized communities. This shift relied on the exceptionalist narrative that reveres Western sexual liberation—liberal, bureaucratic, visible, and consumerist—while silencing queer narratives from Southern, racialized, and migrant communities. The literature found that some LGBTQ (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgenders, and queers) organizations deployed this imperial narrative, yet accounts on the social conditions facilitating such deployments remain scant. To expand the current discussions, my paper situates the Philippine LGBTQ movement’s affinity with homonationalism within the political, material, and ideological exigencies that confronted activists.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-107
Author(s):  
Patrick V. Day

Abraham Wheelock’s first edition of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle appeared at the height of the First English Civil War in 1643, and it is often treated by modern critics as an appendix to the Old English Historia Ecclesiastica to which it is attached. This paper argues that the Chronicle participated in a larger royalist campaign to establish the West Saxons as the institutional forbears of the first two Stuart kings. The West Saxon genealogies authorize a seventeenth-century conception of patriarchal, divine kingship when they trace Alfred to the biblical Adam. Alternatively, the medieval Chronicle presents the advisory body of the Anglo-Saxons, the witan, as a potentially restrictive force upon the monarchy—an image incompatible with a royalist agenda. Wheelock mediates the contradictory presence of the powerful witan by diminishing its historical importance through excision, substitution, and inconsistent translation so that the Chronicle may more easily conform to early modern perceptions of absolutist kingship.


Inner Asia ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-373
Author(s):  
Elke Studer

AbstractThe article outlines the Mongolian influences on the biggest horse race festival in Nagchu prefecture in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).Since old times these horse races have been closely linked to the worship of the local mountain deity by the patrilineal nomadic clans of the South-Eastern Changthang, the North Tibetan plain. In the seventeenth century the West Mongol chieftain Güüshi Khan shaped the history of Tibet. To support his political claims, he enlarged the horse race festival's size and scale, and had his troops compete in the different horse race and archery competitions in Nagchu. Since then, the winners of the big race are celebrated side by side with the political achievements and claims of the central government in power.


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