Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 832-839
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The fundamental principles that guide determinations about the appropriate relationship between state and national authority in matters affecting the foreign affairs of the United States began to evolve even before the ratification of the Constitution in 1789. The centralization of governmental power in this field is reflected in microcosm in the three great state papers of the United States. The nation began in 1776 as “United Colonies” that were “Free and Independent States” under the Declaration of Independence; developed into a “firm league of friendship” under the Articles of Confederation in 1781; and became a “more perfect union” created by the people, not by its constituent political units, under the Constitution in 1789.

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-69
Author(s):  
Chaim Shinar

‘The Soviet Union, like the United States, was a country established to serve and promote a political idea, not to be a state for nations. The United States was founded in order to be a modern democratic polity; the Soviet Union in order to promote Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union thus began as a ‘modern,’ post-imperialist state. The cement holding the state together was a compound of ideology, a hierarchical, disciplinary party, charismatic leadership, and external treats. [In the 80s] this cement was crumbling… [The Soviet] state had lost its raison d’être and the people turned to the traditional and conventional basis of the state – that is, the nation. But since this was a multinational state – and unlike the multiethnic United States, most peoples in the USSR have distinct languages and territories of their own – [they returned to them to establish independent states.]’1


2018 ◽  
pp. 120-151
Author(s):  
Peter Charles Hoffer ◽  
Williamjames Hull Hoffer

Even if the Declaration were a legal document announcing the independence of the United States, according to revolutionary constitutional theory no independent state could exist without fundamental law, in this case a constitution of some sort that was ratified by the people. The Revolutionaries agreed that constitutions must precede and empower governments, or the fundamental rule of consent of the governed could not be followed. Congress did not have such a foundation. The last paragraph of the Declaration thus served as a miniature prototype constitution until such time as a more substantial document could be prepared and ratified. The powers that the Declaration gave to the United States, to wage and conclude wars, regulate commerce, and all the other powers that independent states “may of right do” were the very definition of sovereignty. As it happened, they were the most valid factual claims the Declaration made, for Congress were already doing all of them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
◽  
◽  

Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


Author(s):  
Takis S. Pappas

Based on an original definition of modern populism as “democratic illiberalism” and many years of meticulous research, Takis Pappas marshals extraordinary empirical evidence from Argentina, Greece, Peru, Italy, Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, the United States, Spain, and Brazil to develop a comprehensive theory about populism. He addresses all key issues in the debate about populism and answers significant questions of great relevance for today’s liberal democracy, including: • What is modern populism and how can it be differentiated from comparable phenomena like nativism and autocracy? • Where in Latin America has populism become most successful? Where in Europe did it emerge first? Why did its rise to power in the United States come so late? • Is Trump a populist and, if so, could he be compared best with Venezuela’s Chávez, France’s Le Pens, or Turkey’s Erdoğan? • Why has populism thrived in post-authoritarian Greece but not in Spain? And why in Argentina and not in Brazil? • Can populism ever succeed without a charismatic leader? If not, what does leadership tell us about how to challenge populism? • Who are “the people” who vote for populist parties, how are these “made” into a group, and what is in their minds? • Is there a “populist blueprint” that all populists use when in power? And what are the long-term consequences of populist rule? • What does the expansion, and possibly solidification, of populism mean for the very nature and future of contemporary democracy? Populism and Liberal Democracy will change the ways the reader understands populism and imagines the prospects of liberal democracy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-179
Author(s):  
Howard A. Palley

Abstract The Declaration of Independence asserts that “All men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Nevertheless, the United States, at its foundation has been faced with the contradiction of initially supporting chattel slavery --- a form of slavery that treated black slaves from Africa purely as a commercial commodity. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom had some discomfort with slavery, were slaveholders who both utilized slaves as a commodity. Article 1 of our Constitution initially treated black slaves as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of apportioning representation in order to increase Southern representation in Congress. So initially the Constitution’s commitment to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity” did not include the enslaved black population. This essay contends that the residue of this initial dilemma still affects our politics --- in a significant manner.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 132-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Dodge

Even before its hundredth year anniversary on 16 May 2016, the Sykes-Picot agreement had become a widely cited historical analogy both in the region itself and in Europe and the United States. In the Middle East, it is frequently deployed as an infamous example of European imperial betrayal and Western attempts more generally to keep the region divided, in conflict, and easy to dominate. In Europe and the United States, however, its role as a historical analogy is more complex—a shorthand for understanding the Middle East as irrevocably divided into mutually hostile sects and clans, destined to be mired in conflict until another external intervention imposes a new, more authentic, set of political units on the region to replace the postcolonial states left in the wake of WWI. What is notable about both these uses of the Sykes-Picot agreement is that they fundamentally misread, and thus overstate, its historical significance. The agreement reached by the British diplomat Mark Sykes and his French counterpart, François Georges-Picot, in May 1916, quickly became irrelevant as the realities on the ground in the Middle East, U.S. intervention into the war, a resurgent Turkey and the comparative weakness of the French and British states transformed international relations at the end of the First World War. Against this historical background, explaining the contemporary power of the narrative surrounding the use of the Sykes-Picot agreement becomes more intellectually interesting than its minor role in the history of European imperial interventions in the Middle East.


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