German-Soviet Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Break, 1927

Slavic Review ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Harvey L. Dyck

In May 1927 Sir Austen Chamberlain precipitated the first great international crisis of the post-Locarno period by denouncing the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and severing Britain's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Although Germany was not directly involved, the dispute nevertheless was to have a profoundly disturbing effect on German-Soviet relations. By raising the possibility of a wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military confrontation between London and Moscow, it strained Germany's diplomatic system, which rested on the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Thus it posed some fundamental questions for the German Foreign Ministry: Were the policies associated with those agreements compatible with each other only in fair weather? Did Germany have the freedom to remain neutral if the dispute should deepen? In short, was it still realistic to believe that Germany could maintain equally intimate ties with London and Moscow? Because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously denned a balancing role as the sine qua non of Germany's international revival, the imbroglio soon led to a great debate in the Wilhelmstrasse. The issue on which it turned was, as a leading participant observed, “whether Germany's ties with Russia are worth enough to our present and future political interests so that it pays to assume the political expenses and risks involved in maintaining them.”

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-209
Author(s):  
James G. Hershberg

Using materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow (combined with previously obtained Brazilian and U.S. sources), this research note presents fresh evidence about Soviet-Brazilian relations and the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, supplementing a detailed, two-part article published in the Journal of Cold War Studies in 2004 exploring Brazil's secret mediation between John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro at the height of the crisis. The new evidence illuminates a previously hidden “double game” that Brazil's president, João Goulart, played during the crisis as he alternated between meetings with the U.S. ambassador and Nikita Khrushchev's recently arrived envoy (Brazil and the Soviet Union had just restored diplomatic relations after a fifteen-year break). The new evidence from Moscow suggests that Goulart, who vowed solidarity with Washington and even toasted Kennedy's “victory” when talking to the U.S. ambassador, took a completely different approach when speaking to Soviet officials, expressing strong sympathy and even support for Khrushchev.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Tatiana Sokolova ◽  
Mohammad Rasouli

The Soviet Union and before that, Russia as one of the most powerful neighbors of Iran in history, despite its abundance of oil resources always looked at Iran's oil resources for specific purposes. In examining the impact of oil on the relations between the two countries of Iran and Russia, it turns out that they were trying to reach the Iranian oil resources in some cases, one in 1299/1921and the other in 1920/1941. At the time of Iran's occupation of the Second World War, the Russians, though at every turn did not succeed in their goals, during the occupation of Iran in September 1941 by the Allies they used all the necessary tools. For example, they used the Tudeh Party, the first and most organized Leftist party in Iran, to achieve its oil targets. At this stage, the Russian Foreign Ministry Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergey Kavtaradze came to Iran and formally requested for a license to exploit North Oil. The Tudeh Party, while previously opposed to any transfer of privilege to foreigners, when the Soviet Union- their spiritual and co-professional supporters came out, by providing the Balance Scheme they granted the southern oil share to the British and the North Sea's privilege to the Soviet Union. Because the American companies were set to exploit the oil scorecard in northern Iran, immediately the Soviet Union entered the scene and the Tudeh party also met with them. This oil demand was rejected by the Iranian parliament and the Iranian government opposed any new privilege because of the prevalence of war conditions in the world. In this context, the efforts of the Tudeh Party to satisfy the Iranian government and parliament in order to agree with the Soviet demand for oil in their own way can be considered.


Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

Five years ago West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder launched a tentative “Opening to the East” which marked a break with Konrad Adenauer's relatively rigid approach to, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The “Grand Conbtion” of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats continued the experiment from 1966-1969. The Hallstein Doctrine—no diplomatic relations with any country which had such relations with East Germany (the Soviet Union being the sole exception)—was abandoned. West Germany established diplomatic relations with the maverick Rumanian regime, and re-established relations with Tito's Yugoslavia. Several trade and cultural exchange agreements were entered into with East European Communist nations.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 188-190
Author(s):  
James Mitchell

I have been asked to comment on the US-Soviet trade agreement and the negotiations leading up to it. Negotiations began in December 1971, when Secretary of Commerce Stans made the first ministerial level contacts with the Soviet Union on trade and commercial matters. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev returned the visit in May 1972, meeting with Stans’ successor, Peter Peterson. They got down to specifics on what each side wanted on trade matters. Then came the Summit Meeting and the adoption of “Basic Principles” of US-Soviet relations. In principle number seven, the two countries pledged that they would actively promote the growth of economic and commercial ties. The also agreed to establish a Joint Commercial Commission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-156
Author(s):  
Argyrios Tasoulas

The article examines the role of the Cyprus issue in the bilateral relations between Greece and the USSR in 1956-1960. It is based on primal archival research realised at the Constantine Karamanlis Archive (AKK) and at the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE) in Athens. The analysis of the recently declassified documents relate to the events which took place in 1954, when the Soviet Union supported the Greek claims for self-determination of the Cypriot people in the United Nations on the basis of the anti-colonial principles. This contributed to the impressive increase in trade between Greece and the USSR, especially after the unofficial visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov to Athens in 1956. Against the backdrop of the deterioration of the international situation in 1957, Kremlin heavily criticized NATOs decision to deploy the US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe and applied diplomatic pressures to NATO member-states including Greece. The shift from tensions to a peaceful offensive strategy, characteristic of the Soviet diplomacy towards Greece, proved to be a double-edged sword for Moscow in the long term. The author concludes that both countries exploited the Cyprus issue for their benefit. Thus, Moscow managed to take advantage of the Greek discontent with the NATO allies as a means of increasing its own prestige in the region, while the Greek governments capitalized on the Soviet tactics in order to increase its political leverage in confronting NATO on Cyprus.


Balcanica ◽  
2008 ◽  
pp. 189-197
Author(s):  
Spyridon Sfetas

The 1960s were a decade of important developments in the Balkans. Skopje?s stirring up of the issue of the supposed "Macedonian" minority led to a series of diplomatic clashes between Greece and Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1960-1962 crisis. A major role in developments in the Balkans was played by the Soviet Union, which, directly or indirectly, greatly influenced the shaping of Yugoslav foreign policy. The crisis began in August 1960 when for the first time since 1950, the Yugoslavia Foreign Ministry publicly raised the question of protecting the rights of the "Macedonian minority". While the Athens-Belgrade crisis was not serious enough to lead them to break off diplomatic relations, it did have a catalytic effect on the shaping of Bulgarian policy with regard to the Macedonian question. After the restoration of democracy in Greece (1974), and despite her need for support from Yugoslavia on the Cyprus issue, the Karamanlis government did not repeat the "mistakes" of 1959. Belgrade, having secured in 1975 a renewal of the agreement on the free zone in the Port of Thessaloniki, did not insist on signing a border agreement. The Macedonian question had become of no more than academic interest in the discussions of politicians on both sides of the border, and the crisis of 1960-62 merely a forgotten flareup.


1969 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-615
Author(s):  
Roger P. Hamburg

Diplomatic relations between Chile and the Soviet Union were reestablished in 1964, increasing to five the number of Latin American countries with which the U.S.S.R. carried on diplomatic intercourse at that time. Two of these, Uruguay and Mexico, have a long record of “nonintervention” in diplomatic negotiations, e.g., recognition and diplomatic relations are almost pro forma, with little, if any, implied judgment of the nature and character of the opposite number's government. Brazil, a rather special case, reestablished diplomatic relations in 1961, at the beginning of the Quadros-Goulart flirtation with the Soviet Union. The Cuban case hardly deserves further consideration, having been discussed exhaustively in literally a score of publications. But the Chilean situation illustrates the juncture of evolving Soviet assessments of the Latin American political scene and the accompanying Soviet trade, aid, and diplomatic and cultural programs. The advent to power of the Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei Montalva calls attention to significant maneuvering and probing in Soviet foreign policy.


Author(s):  
K. Demberel ◽  

The article deals with the issue of Mongolia's foreign policy during the Cold War. This period is divided into two parts. The first period, 1945-1960s, is a period of conflict between two systems: socialism and capitalism. In this first period of the Cold War Mongolia managed to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as the “system allowed”. The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, is the period of the conflict of the socialist system, the period of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. During this period Mongolia's foreign policy changed dramatically and focused on the Soviet Union. This was due to the Soviet investment «boom» that began in 1960s and the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia in 1967. The Soviet military intervention into Mongolia was one of the main reasons for cooling the Soviet-Chinese relations. And military withdrawal contributed to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations until the mid-1980s and one of the conditions for improving relations with their neighbors. The internal systemic conflict had a serious impact on Mongolia's foreign policy over those years.


2017 ◽  
Vol 223 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-422
Author(s):  
M. Shaheen Siham Abdel Razzaq

The events that took place in Iran during the second world war are considered an important item for Iraqi diplomacy and follow-up by the Foreign Ministry in Iraq. On the other hand, this Iraqi diplomacy was considered to be quite flexible when a reshuffle occurred. It was looking for its causes and  linking them, and then adopting accurate scenarios to protect its interests. Iraq was not far from what was happening in Iran .When Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took power in Iran, The oil conflict has also existed. In addition to Iran's strategic position, making US intervention clear. Which prompted Iran to build an intimate relationship with the United States and strengthen its relations in all respects, especially when Ahmed assigned the strength of the Sultanate to form the ministry on the ninth of August 1924 and consider America a third force used by Ahmed Qawam as a bargaining chip to confront the British and Soviet Union in the region. After the issue of oil emerged on the political scene and at that time, the Iranian government took a deep breath in the embrace of the United States. In fact, Reza Shah Pahlawi inherited a backward country, especially in the economic field. He tried to reform the country's economic recession and make Iran to acquire a new stage, and the result of foreign demand for Iranian oil led to widespread reactions at the internal level and became pro-Western groups to reject the Soviet demand and solidarity with the independent. While the Iranian Communist Party (Toda Party) supported the request and held demonstrations for the immediate admission of the Soviet Union


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-83
Author(s):  
Robert Starr

On October 18, 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union completed the negotiation of a comprehensive series of arrangements covering trade between the two countries. A Trade Agreement, consisting of nine articles and three annexes, and complemented by several exchanges of letters, establishes a new legal framework for the development of US-USSR trade.


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