Remarks by James Mitchell

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 188-190
Author(s):  
James Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Summit Meeting ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Soviet Trade ◽  
Soviet Foreign Trade

I have been asked to comment on the US-Soviet trade agreement and the negotiations leading up to it. Negotiations began in December 1971, when Secretary of Commerce Stans made the first ministerial level contacts with the Soviet Union on trade and commercial matters. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev returned the visit in May 1972, meeting with Stans’ successor, Peter Peterson. They got down to specifics on what each side wanted on trade matters. Then came the Summit Meeting and the adoption of “Basic Principles” of US-Soviet relations. In principle number seven, the two countries pledged that they would actively promote the growth of economic and commercial ties. The also agreed to establish a Joint Commercial Commission.

German-Soviet Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Break, 1927

Slavic Review ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Harvey L. Dyck
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Debate ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Soviet Trade ◽  
Foreign Ministry

In May 1927 Sir Austen Chamberlain precipitated the first great international crisis of the post-Locarno period by denouncing the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and severing Britain's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Although Germany was not directly involved, the dispute nevertheless was to have a profoundly disturbing effect on German-Soviet relations. By raising the possibility of a wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military confrontation between London and Moscow, it strained Germany's diplomatic system, which rested on the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Thus it posed some fundamental questions for the German Foreign Ministry: Were the policies associated with those agreements compatible with each other only in fair weather? Did Germany have the freedom to remain neutral if the dispute should deepen? In short, was it still realistic to believe that Germany could maintain equally intimate ties with London and Moscow? Because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously denned a balancing role as the sine qua non of Germany's international revival, the imbroglio soon led to a great debate in the Wilhelmstrasse. The issue on which it turned was, as a leading participant observed, “whether Germany's ties with Russia are worth enough to our present and future political interests so that it pays to assume the political expenses and risks involved in maintaining them.”

The Soviet Union and the Six Day War (May 14–June 5, 1967)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heller
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Soviet Bloc ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Summit Meeting ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
Global War

No change occurred before the war to moderate Soviet political behaviour. Soviet support for the Arabs was unequivocal, while Israel was subjected to an increasing number of warnings and threats. The straits of Tiran were regarded by the Kremlin as Egyptian territory, and Israel was accused of assisting the US in the Vietnam war. Israel feeling strangled by the Arabs, launched a surprise attack which led the Soviet bloc (except for Romania) to sever diplomatic relations. However, both America and the Soviet Union were not interested in a global war. Hence a summit meeting was held in Glassboro between Johnson and Kosygin, each patron supporting its clients. Brezhnev secretly confessed the Soviet leadership’s utter frustration with its Arab clients, particularly Egypt, which failed to use the modern Soviet weaponry the Kremlin profusely supplied. He also revealed the Soviet leadership’s contempt for Israel, which was entirely economically dependent on America.

Russian Protectionism: Problems of Institutional Heritage

2012 ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
L. Tsedilin
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Economic Integration ◽  
The State ◽  
New Economic Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
State Monopoly ◽  
The Times ◽  
Soviet Experience

The article analyzes the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet experience of the protectionist policies. Special attention is paid to the external economic policy during the times of NEP (New Economic Policy), socialist industrialization and the years of 1970-1980s. The results of the state monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions in the Soviet Union are summarized; the economic integration in the frames of Comecon is assessed.

Soviet Tanks, American Sedans: Traces of India’s Cold War-era Hedging Towards the United States, 1966–1971

2021 ◽  
pp. 097492842098309
Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Food Aid ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Evaluative Study ◽  
Complex Interdependence ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Food Shortages

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.

The Anti-Aryan Moment: Decolonization, Diplomacy, and Race in Late Pahlavi Iran

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Cold War

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”

In Afghanistan: Western and Soviet Methods of Counterinsurgency

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Lasha Tchantouridze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Military Mission ◽  
Lasting Change

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.

The Emergence of the New Cold War: The Syrian and Ukraine Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.

Hitler's Antarctic base: the myth and the reality

Polar Record ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Summerhayes ◽  
Peter Beeching
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Background Knowledge ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Lack Of Information ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Navy ◽  
Dronning Maud Land ◽  
Do So

In January-February 1939, a secret German expedition visited Dronning (or Queen) Maud Land, Antarctica, apparently with the intention inter alia of establishing a base there. Between 1943 and 1945 the British launched a secret wartime Antarctic operation, code-named Tabarin. Men from the Special Air Services Regiment (SAS), Britain's covert forces for operating behind the lines, appeared to be involved. In July and August 1945, after the German surrender, two U-boats arrived in Argentina. Had they been to Antarctica to land Nazi treasure or officials? In the southern summer of 1946–1947, the US Navy appeared to ‘invade’ Antarctica using a large force. The operation, code-named Highjump, was classified confidential. In 1958, three nuclear weapons were exploded in the region, as part of another classified US operation, code-named Argus. Given the initial lack of information about these various activities, it is not, perhaps, surprising that some people would connect them to produce a pattern in which governments would be accused of suppressing information about ‘what really happened’, and would use these pieces of information to construct a myth of a large German base existing in Antarctica and of allied efforts to destroy it. Using background knowledge of Antarctica and information concerning these activities that has been published since the early 1940s, it is demonstrated: that the two U-Boats could not have reached Antarctica; that there was no secret wartime German base in Dronning Maud Land; that SAS troops did not attack the alleged German base; that the SAS men in the region at the time had civilian jobs; that Operation Highjump was designed to train the US Navy for a possible war with the Soviet Union in the Arctic, and not to attack an alleged German base in Antarctica; and that Operation Argus took place over the ocean more than 2000 km north of Dronning Maud Land. Activities that were classified have subsequently been declassified and it is no longer difficult to separate fact from fancy, despite the fact that many find it attractive not to do so.

The Communist Contest for Status

2019 ◽  
pp. 82-133
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
Alexei Shevchenko
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Social Competition ◽  
The West ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
The Us ◽  
Catch Up

This chapter argues that both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) pursued social competition with the Western states while at the same time seeking recognition from the states they were trying to subvert. Stalin sought to increase the power and prestige of the Soviet state through coerced industrialization, and Khrushchev made an effort to “catch up and surpass” the West in economic production. The PRC sought to improve its status by allying with the Soviet Union, but the Chinese chafed under their status as “younger brothers” to their senior ally, and eventually Mao challenged the Soviets for leadership of the international communist movement. In the 1970s, China took advantage of the US need to balance Soviet military power by putting aside communist ideology to become a tacit ally of the United States, part of a “strategic triangle.”

scholarly journals A Genealogy of (post-)Soviet Dependency: Disabling Productivity

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassandra Hartblay
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
The United States ◽  
Core Element ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Global Condition ◽  
Postindustrial Era ◽  
Post Industrial

<p>Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon's 1994 article &ldquo;A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the US Welfare State&rdquo; explored the historical emergence of "dependency" as a moral category of post-industrial American state. In this article, I engage their framework to explore the genealogy of dependency in America's post-industrial sister, the post-Soviet Russian Federation. I also add disability as a core element of 'dependency' that was largely absent from Fraser and Gordon's original analysis. Considering cross-cultural translation, I ask how Russian deployments of three words that all relate to a concept of interdependence align with and depart from American notions of dependency, and trace historical configurations of the Soviet welfare state vis-a-vis disability. To do so, I draw on historical and cultural texts, linguistic comparisons, secondary sources, and ethnographic research. Given this analysis, I argue that rather than a Cold War interpretation of the Soviet Union and the US as oppositional superpowers in the 20th century, a liberatory disability studies framework suggests that in the postindustrial era the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as dual regimes of productivity. I suggest that reframing postsocialism as a global condition helps us to shift considerations of disability justice from a critique of capitalism to a critique of productivity.&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Keywords: dependency, disability, citizenship, russia, productivity</p>

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