Roman limes in military campaigns of the Barbarians

Author(s):  
Krzysztof Narloch
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (29) ◽  
pp. 148-165
Author(s):  
طالب منعم حبيب الشمري ◽  
عبد الرزاق حسين حاجم

  The obelisk is a large stone block with a height ranging from 50 cm to 3 m. It varies in width from one obelisk to another. It is sculptured from one side or two or four sides with prominent picture inscriptions, often accompanied by cuneiform texts for immortalising kings and their military campaigns. This obelisk is constructed in a rectangular or square, and some of them a dome convex or semi-circular or pyramid. The lower section of the obelisks is wide, similar to the base of the base, and another section is sculpted on a slightly sloping end, so that it can easily be attached to the ground or placed on a special base. The rulers and kings of Mesopotamia established and displayed the obelisk in public places in order to be seen by the public.  It also was placed in the yards of temples or public squares and squares and the streets of cities. It used to celebrate their religious, military and historical achievements in order to immortalise their actions. These obelisks are held to commemorate the deeds of kings and their achievements in peace and war as confirmed by the cuneiform texts and the artistic scenes implemented on them.


Author(s):  
Dominic Tierney

According to just war theory, military campaigns should only be fought as a last resort, with the goal of correcting a grave evil, and where there is a high probability of success. But what happens when a military campaign unravels and becomes unwinnable? How can a leader reconcile just war theory with the need to extricate the country from a quagmire? In recent decades, US presidents have repeatedly faced such moral dilemmas, as campaigns in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq all became unwinnable. When victory is no longer achievable, leaders should dial down the goals of the war, resist the pressure to embrace barbarism, negotiate with the adversary, and seek the best possible peace from the range of plausible alternatives.


Author(s):  
Pratyay Nath

What can war tell us about empire? Climate of Conquest is built around this question. Pratyay Nath eschews the conventional way of writing about warfare primarily in terms of battles and technologies. Instead, he unravels the deep connections that Mughal war-making shared with the broader dynamics of society, culture, and politics. In the process, he offers a new analysis of the Mughal empire from the vantage point of war. Climate of Conquest closely studies the dynamics of the military campaigns that helped the Mughals conquer North India and project their power beyond it. In the first part, Nath argues that these campaigns unfolded in constant negotiation with the diverse natural environment of South Asia. The empire sought to discipline the environment and harness its resources to satisfy its own military needs. At the same time, environmental factors like climate, terrain, and ecology profoundly influenced Mughal military tactics, strategy, and deployment of technology. In the second part, Nath makes three main points. Firstly, he argues that Mughal military success owed a lot to the efficient management of military logistics and the labour of an enormous non-elite, non-combatant workforce. Secondly, he explores the making of imperial frontiers and highlights the roles of forts, routes, and local alliances in the process. Finally, he maps the cultural climate of war at the Mughal court and discusses how the empire legitimized war and conquest. In the process, what emerges is a fresh interpretation of Mughal empire-building as a highly adaptive, flexible, and accommodative process.


1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Neil Gregor

Since the end of the war itself, research on the German economy during the Second World War has focused – explicitly or implicitly – on the search for an explanation of the disparities in armaments and output between the first and second halves of the war. In the first half of the war, up until the winter of 1941–2, the development of armaments production was characterised by more or less stable levels of output against the background of the series of swift and successful military campaigns in Poland and in the West. This stands in stark contrast to the second half, which witnessed a radical increase in aggregate armaments output which lasted well into the summer of 1944, and which saw tank production reach 589 per cent of the level at which it had stood in January 1942, weapons production reach 382 per cent of its January 1942 level, and aircraft production 367 per cent of its January 1942 level over the same period, to name some of the most obvious successes. These increases were all the more astonishing for the fact that they were achieved against the background of a massive war of attrition on the Eastern Front which placed demands on German resources and drew male labour from German factories into the Wehrmacht on a scale out of all proportion to that experienced in the first half of the war.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452091861
Author(s):  
Pratyay Nath

The category of ‘military labour’ has traditionally been used to designate ‘combat labour’ – the labour of soldiers. Focusing on the case of early modern South Asia, the present essay argues that this equivalence is misplaced and that it is a product of a distorted view of war defined primarily in terms of combat. The essay discusses the roles played by the logistical workforce of Mughal armies in conducting military campaigns and facilitating imperial expansion. It calls for broadening the category of ‘military labour’ to include all types of labour rendered consciously towards the fulfilment of military objectives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Kreiner

Abstract In 21 CE, a series of localized movements broke out in Gallia Comata due to heavy debts among provincials according to Tacitus. Modern scholars have long argued that the indebtedness occurred because of rising interest rates, resulting from dwindling currency in circulation after decades of free-spending following Augustus’ victory at Actium, and that Gallic communities were subjected to an additional tribute to support the wars of Germanicus (14–16 CE), which continued unabated after the wars and pushed Gauls beyond their means. These claims are misguided, however, in that there is no certain evidence of a special tax to support Germanicus’ wars and that the argument for a dwindling circulation of currency in Gaul falters under closer inspection. Rather, the pressing statal and military needs imposed on communities in Gallia Comata after 9 CE on top of routine exactions could significantly increase burden levels levied on provincial populations, thus contributing to rising debts. Through examining how Roman logistics and conscription operated in this period, it is possible to trace how populations were impacted by such demands and which communities were most heavily affected by them, too. Individually, the impact of each factor is unlikely to have been burdensome enough to have caused large-scale resistance, it is only the cumulative effect that these explanations had on top of routine Roman extraction schemes that could create the conditions for this revolt. This paper argues that in extraordinary circumstances, such as the period after the Varian Disaster for Gallia Comata, the costs of supporting military campaigns places real short-term strains on local economies, which creates the conditions for revolt. The benefit of this approach is that it may explain other episodes of anti-fiscal resistance that broke out during or within a decade of wars in neighboring regions.


1981 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Leonard

In the April 1979 issue of CSSH I proposed a theory: The financial services of leading indigenous banking firms were indispensable to the Mughal state, and the diversion by these firms of resources, both credit and trade, from the Mughals to other political powers in the Indian subcontinent contributed to the downfall of the Mughal empire (p. 152). John F. Richards's article in the present issue takes exception to that theory, challenging the evidentiary basis for my assertions. While stating that further research was admittedly necessary to test and fully substantiate the theory, I certainly offered evidence that these banking firms supplied working capital to the empire and its officials for military campaigns, trade, construction, karkhanah (workshop) production, and personal loans. I also discussed the bankers' regulation of the valuation, exchange, and circulation of currency, and particularly the hundi system of bills of exchange. The political potential of these financial services – of their performance or nonperformance, and on what terms – is obvious. Indeed, I cited instances of political interactions between bankers and officials.


Author(s):  
Amin Tarzi

Since its inception as a separate political entity in 1747, Afghanistan has been embroiled in almost perpetual warfare, but it has never been ruled directly by the military. From initial expansionist military campaigns to involvement in defensive, civil, and internal consolidation campaigns, the Afghan military until the mid-19th century remained mainly a combination of tribal forces and smaller organized units. The central government, however, could only gain tenuous monopoly over the use of violence throughout the country by the end of the 19th century. The military as well as Afghan society remained largely illiterate and generally isolated from the prevailing global political and ideological trends until the middle of the 20th century. Politicization of Afghanistan’s military began in very small numbers after World War II with Soviet-inspired communism gaining the largest foothold. Officers associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan were instrumental in two successful coup d’états in the country. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ending the country’s sovereignty and ushering a period of conflict that continues to the second decade of the 21st century in varying degrees. In 2001, the United States led an international invasion of the country, catalyzing efforts at reorganization of the smaller professional Afghan national defense forces that have remained largely apolitical and also the country’s most effective and trusted governmental institution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
V. Y. Butanayev ◽  

This article attempts to systematize various source materials for comprehensive coverage of the issues of the functioning of the statehood of the ancient Kyrgyz and restoration of the canvas of historical events of the period covered. The author gives a description of the kagan dynasty and its representatives, examines the levels of the social hierarchy of the nomadic society, the system of interaction of vertical and horizontal structural formations, the canons of customary law in the Kyrgyz kaganate. The study provides links to ancient Türkic written monuments, Chinese chronicles, Tibetan documents, Mongol legends and Arab geographical works, which reflect various hypotheses about the origin of the Kyrgyz ruling dynasty «Azho» («Azhe»), and also analyzes the interpretation of the words «az «,» Az budun «by various scientists in the context of the ethnogenesis of the Kyrgyz people. It covers diplomatic activities, military campaigns and the death of the first Kyrgyz kagan Barsbeg, his family ties and political relations with the rulers of the Turkic kaganate. The highest officials of the Kyrgyz state – begi were subdivided into the following six groups: tsaysians (high administrative rank), tutuki (governors), buyruks (messengers), zhangshi (clerks), chory or churas (military title), tarhans (collectors of taxes and taxes) , each of which performed the corresponding functions in the management of society and solved the current tasks facing the kaganate. An important role in the life of the nomadic society of the ancient Kyrgyz was played by the patriarchal family – «arch kun» and the tribal community – «aal kun». In the Kyrgyz state, one of the manifestations of socio-ethnic exploitation was the institution of Kyshtym, whose origins date back to the HunnoScythian era. Kyrgyz society had the beginnings of judicial legislation, expressed in the functioning of a system of strictly established orders of customary (traditional) law – «töre»


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