Strong Societies and Weak States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOEL S. MIGDAL
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lawrence P. Markowitz ◽  
Mariya Y. Omelicheva

This chapter examines low levels of terrorist violence in Muslim-majority societies. Studies of terrorism have tended to view the relationship between religion and violence through the narrow lens of security, thereby overpredicting the extent of terrorist violence across societies. After reviewing the various explanations for terrorist violence, and applying them to Central Asia, this chapter explores the conditions under which a state’s involvement in illicit economies—specifically its collusion in the drug trade—can dampen levels of terrorist violence. Combining quantitative analysis (including GIS-enabled tools) with a series of in-depth expert interviews conducted in Central Asia, it emphasizes the complex political economy of security that defines infrastructurally weak states, where political and security apparatuses are often immersed in informal and illicit economies. This approach helps uncover the complex links between religion and organized violence, where state apparatuses are often drawn into collaborative relationships with nonstate actors.


2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractNegotiators for powerful, self-reliant states tend to be less responsive to weak states relative to domestic constituents, while negotiators for states entangled in ties of asymmetric interdependence with more powerful states tend to be more responsive to the demands of powerful states than to the demands of domestic constituents. Asymmetrical power does not necessarily lead to asymmetrical results, however, because negotiators in weaker states may, nevertheless, have more attractive non-agreement alternatives and a longer shadow of the future. Negotiators with attractive non-agreement alternatives will be more willing to put agreement at risk by withholding concessions in the negotiation process. Centralized and vertical institutions are often a bargaining liability precisely because weak states tend to be less responsive to domestic constituents, whereas divided government can be a major asset. These propositions are demonstrated through an analysis and reconstruction of the North American Free Trade negotiation process.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 340-364
Author(s):  
Md. Abdul Mannan

This article examines the connection between politics of Islamo-nationalism in Bangladesh and Bangladesh’s policy of balancing against India. In response to India’s regional supremacy in South Asia, especially India’s dominance over Bangladesh, policy makers in Bangladesh have constantly faced two options: either ‘bandwagoning’ with India, or ‘balancing’ against the regional hegemon. Interestingly, since the 1990s until 2013, Bangladesh’s response has always swung from one side to another – from bandwagoning to balancing – in connection with the rotation of Bangladesh regime between two major political parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (AL). Bangladesh – with the BNP’s hold on power – preferred a policy of balancing against India’s dominance. During the regime of the AL, such policy dramatically shifted towards bandwagoning with India. The BNP’s preference for a balancing policy constitutes a puzzle. Weak states – which are not capable of changing unequal outcomes in the face of a preponderant power – generally pursue a policy of bandwagoning. Thus, the puzzle is as to why Bangladesh – despite being a weak actor vis-a-vis India’s overwhelming regional supremacy – pursued a policy of balancing against India during the BNP’s hold on power. This article asserts that the BNP’s politics of Islamo-nationalism is a key variable that can answer the above puzzle. The ‘self–other’ notion of Islamo-nationalism defines the national ‘selfness’ of Bangladesh in terms of the Islamic identity for its overwhelming Muslim masses, and constructs India, henceforth in this article, ‘Hindu India’, as the ‘enemy–other’ to ‘Muslim Bangladesh’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (49) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
N. H. Kalyuzhna ◽  
◽  
T. K. Kovtun ◽  

The article aims at clarifying the essence of hybrid threats through systematizing their key characteristics and determining preconditions for conflict escalation. Common definitions of hybrid threats are considered and the lack of a unified approach to their interpretation is emphasized given their diversity and comprehensive nature. The high destructive potential of hybrid threats due to their hidden nature and focus on the most vulnerable aspects of the hybrid aggression object are substantiated. The specifics of carrying out hybrid threats in the economic sphere is analyzed, and the example of foreign trade relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation shows that the economic sphere serves as a space for hiding and deformalizing a hybrid conflict. The essence of the synergetic effect made by the synchronous realization of hybrid threats in different confrontation areas is considered. It is demonstrated that the key feature of hybrid conflicts is their staying outside the legally justified intervention of other states and international organizations. Emphasis is placed on the rapid spread of hybrid threats in the economic sphere and on the special risks that conflicts hybridization creates for economically weak states. Another important feature of hybrid threats is identified, namely, the high probability of their escalation due to unforeseen events, the global pandemic COVID-19 in particular. It is substantiated that the expected risk of the post-pandemic period is the transition of most national economies to protectionist policies, which will inevitably increase the risk of hybrid threats escalation for economically weak states due to the desire of more powerful states to protect their national economic interests. Having analyzed the specifics of hybrid threats and understanding hybridity as a result of combining different forms, the authors identify the key characteristics of hybrid threats and further combine them into the following groups according to their essence: general aspects; specifics of methods and tools; areas of implementation; prerequisites for efficiency.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE CUBITT

AbstractContemporary peacebuilding operations are often mandated to rebuild ‘collapsed’ or weak states and provide unique opportunities for internationals to exert far reaching influence in their reconstruction. The responsibility to help secure peaceful transformations and longer term stability is profound. This article explores the issue of efficacy and propriety in reconstruction programming and draws from field work in Sierra Leone – a rare example of ‘success’ for international partners in peacebuilding missions. The assertion is made that, despite the euphoria over the mission in Sierra Leone, the peacebuilding operations were more about the mechanics of statebuilding than the local politics of building peace, and that there was a distinct disconnect between the policy rhetoric and the policy practice. The argument is put that the pressing local concern of giving citizens a stake in government was not best served in the reconstruction project because the wider and more influential objectives of the peacebuilding mission were about meeting international goals not local aspirations. This reality has come at the cost of exploiting a unique opportunity for creative thinking about the kind of state structures which can better address the main challenges for sustainable peace facing post-war states like Sierra Leone.


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