An Analysis of “Little r” Restatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 667-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E. L. Tan ◽  
Susan M. Young
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Multivariate Tests ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Free Cash Flows ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS “Little r” restatements occur when a firm's immaterial errors accumulate to a material error in a given year. Unlike “Big R” restatements that must be reported through an SEC 8-K material event filing, little r restatements do not require an 8-K form or a withdrawal of the auditor opinion. This paper documents this previously unexamined form of restatement and analyzes the characteristics of the firms that have used this method of correcting accounting errors over the period 2009 through 2012. Contrary to concerns voiced by regulators and research agencies we find, in multivariate tests, that little r firms are generally more profitable, less complex, and show some evidence of stronger corporate governance and higher audit quality than Big R firms. Compared to non-revising or restating firms, little r firms have lower free cash flows, higher board expertise, higher CFO tenure, are less likely to use a specialist auditor, and less likely to have material weaknesses in their internal controls. We also find that the majority of little r firms do not include any discussion of why these little r's occurred. We discuss policy implications related to disclosure of little r revisions. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G38. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated.

Business Strategy, Internal Control over Financial Reporting, and Audit Reporting Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Bentley-Goode ◽  
Nathan J. Newton ◽  
Anne M. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Business Strategy ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This study examines whether a company's business strategy is an underlying determinant of the strength of its internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) and auditors' internal control reporting quality. Organizational theory suggests that companies following an innovative “prospector” strategy are likely to have weaker internal controls than companies following an efficient “defender” strategy. Consistent with theory, we find that firms with greater prospector-like characteristics are more likely to report and less likely to remediate material weaknesses, incremental to known determinants of material weaknesses. We also find that auditors' internal control reporting quality is lower among clients with greater prospector-like characteristics when measured using the timeliness of reported material weaknesses. Our findings indicate that business strategy is a useful summary indicator for evaluating companies' internal control strength and suggest that internal control reporting is an important area for audit quality improvement among prospector-like clients. JEL Classifications: D21; 21; M41. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources as indicated in the text.

The Association between Audit Manager and Auditor-In-Charge Experience, Effort, and Risk Responsiveness

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Core ◽  
Specific Experience ◽  
Primary Core ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Core Role

SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

scholarly journals Relationship Between Free Cash Flows and Corporate Governance Levels in the Light of Agency Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. e3206
Author(s):  
Glaysson Aguilar de Araújo ◽  
Lara Alves Corrêa ◽  
Valéria Gama Fully Bressan ◽  
João Estevão Barbosa Neto ◽  
Bruna Camargos Avelino
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Free Cash Flows

This research analyzes the relationship between free cash flows (FCFs) and the different levels of Corporate Governance present in the Brazilian stock market. To this end, the sample was composed of 212 Brazilian publicly traded companies listed on Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão [B]³, in the period from 2010 to 2018. The methodology consisted of estimating a regression for panel data, using the random effects model, estimating by generalized least square (GLS) and assuming adjustments for autocorrelation and robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity. The results found, for the sample studied, suggest that Corporate Governance levels are positively related to the FCFs. In synergy, when compared to the Traditional level of [B]³, companies listed on the Novo Mercado and Level 2 levels tend to present higher FCF values. In addition, the larger the size of the companies and the higher their return on equity, the higher their FCFs tend to be, just as companies in stages of maturity tend to present lower FCF values. The relevance of this research is based on analyzing, in a stock market subject to imperfections, factors that may affect decisions about the level of cash maintenance of companies, more specifically by evaluating how Corporate Governance mechanisms relate to the theory of FCFs, in a context of potential conflict of interest.

Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After controlling for ISS recommendations, we find that voting outcomes remain significantly related to abnormal equity compensation expense. Consistent with shareholders considering the equity compensation expense, we document that firms shorten equity compensation vesting periods when they are no longer required to disclose the equity compensation expense. Our findings suggest that shareholders rely on multiple, distinct measures of equity compensation when participating in corporate governance. JEL Classifications: M12; M52; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Revisiting the (Mis)Pricing of Accruals

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Bradley Lail ◽  
Robert C. Lipe ◽  
Han S. Yi
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Investor Behavior ◽  
Reliability Measures ◽  
Accrual Anomaly ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Jel Classifications

Our paper examines inconsistent conclusions regarding the accrual anomaly and demonstrates the importance of aligning regression specifications with hypotheses. Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) conclude that accruals are mispriced and the mispricing seems to increase as accrual reliability decreases. Barone and Magilke (2009) and Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (2016) conclude that cash flows rather than accruals are mispriced. We show that the divergent conclusions come from misalignment between the null hypothesis and regression specification in Richardson et al. (2005) . In addition, analysis of the contemporaneous relations between stock returns and components of earnings supports an initial underreaction to cash flows by investors. We fail to detect links between the reliability measures in Richardson et al. (2005) and investor behavior once we align the statistical tests with the null hypothesis. Our reexamination of prior findings benefits accounting academics, standard setters, and others interested in how investors use earnings components. JEL Classifications: M41. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

scholarly journals Integration of Internal Control and Financial Statement Audits: Are Two Audits Better than One?

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Free Cash Flows: Evidence from Malaysia

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 531-537
Author(s):  
Razieh Adinehzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Free Cash Flows ◽  
The Relationship

This study provides view of free cash flow and corporate governance (CG) by addressing the relationship between audit committee characteristics with free cash flow. Specifically, this study explores whether audit committee characteristics are substitutes to control agency problem regarding to free cash flow within Malaysian firms. The data set comprise of 200 firm observations Malaysian companies for four consecutive years, which comprise of 2005 to 2008. The results show that size of audit committee, frequency of audit committee meeting, proportion of audit committee independence is positively associated with level of free cash flow (FCF). The results of study highlight the importance of corporate governance mechanism, in the form of audit committee characteristics, in the management of cash flow.

Tangible Long-Lived Asset Impairments and Future Operating Cash Flows under U.S. GAAP and IFRS

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Gordon ◽  
Hsiao-Tang Hsu
Keyword(s):  
Predictive Value ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Operating Cash Flows ◽  
Reporting Incentives ◽  
Asset Impairments ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the predictive value of tangible long-lived asset impairments for changes in future operating cash flows under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. We find that impairments reported under IFRS are negatively associated with changes in future operating cash flows, whereas those under U.S. GAAP, on average, are not. We investigate whether differences in the predictive value are attributable to differences in recognition or measurement, providing evidence suggesting that impairment recognition under U.S. GAAP is delayed. Evidence also suggests that the value-in-use measurement attribute, allowed under IFRS, does not induce under-impairing as IFRS and U.S. GAAP impairments are similarly related to future impairments. The main result of a negative association under IFRS, but not U.S. GAAP, holds after considering future impairments to control for measurement differences, macro-economic factors, and firm reporting incentives. Further, impairment losses under IFRS are more predictive in high-enforcement countries. JEL Classifications: D78; F02; M16; M41; G38. Data Availability: Data used are available from sources identified in the paper.

Do Big 4 Auditors Provide Higher Audit Quality after Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Auditor?

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Peng Guo
Keyword(s):  
Propensity Score ◽  
Propensity Score Matching ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Accounting Restatements ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Matching Procedure ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY: Recent research suggests that Big 4 auditors do not provide higher audit quality than other auditors, after controlling for the endogenous choice of auditor. We re-examine this issue using the incidence of accounting restatements as a measure of audit quality. Using a propensity-score matching procedure similar to that used by recent research to control for clients' endogenous choice of auditor, we find that clients of Big 4 audit firms are less likely to subsequently issue an accounting restatement than are clients of other auditors. In additional tests, we find weak evidence that clients of Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue accounting restatements than are clients of Mid-tier auditors (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman). Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors do perform higher quality audits. JEL Classifications: M41, M42 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

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