scholarly journals Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 915-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng-Chia Chiu ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh ◽  
Feng Tian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Contagion Effect ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
Endogenous Matching ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of M&A, industry, and contagion via a common auditor or geographical proximity. These findings support the view that board monitoring plays a key role in the contagion and quality of firms' financial reports. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Determinants and Consequences of Quantitative Critical Accounting Estimate Disclosures

2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 189-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Glendening ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Kenneth W. Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Estimation Uncertainty ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices with multiple quantitative CAE clients. These findings hold for the presence, initiation, number, and magnitude of quantitative CAE, and for both pension and non-pension quantitative CAE. We also find that incidences of AAERs, misstatements, and small positive earnings surprises decrease after initiation of quantitative CAE. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the use of quantitative disclosure to inform users about accounting estimation uncertainty in financial reports. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals Does the Monitoring Mechanisms Considered as Dilemma against the Practices of Earnings Management

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Dea'a Al-Deen Omar Alsraheen ◽  
Isam Hamad Saleh
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Service Firms ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Regulatory Bodies

This paper mainly aims to explore the role of monitoring mechanisms in limiting the earnings management practices among service firms in Jordan. The data used in this study were from the financial annual reports of 59 ASE listed service firms in 2015. The results of multiple regression analysis demonstrate the fairly varied influence of board of directors’ variables. This paper presented three hypotheses covering board independency, CEO duality and audit committee. According to the results, internal monitoring mechanisms significantly impact the level of the practices of earnings management and the reduction of the agency conflict. Additionally, the regulatory bodies in Jordan should focus more on the role of internal monitoring mechanisms in Jordanian companies in terms of effectiveness in order to improve the quality of financial reports can be improved via the assurance of high quality of earnings. Finally, this study becomes a catalyst for more research on quality of financial reports and earnings quality in Jordan and other countries where there is still lack of studies in this domain.

Irregularities in Accounting Numbers and Earnings Management—A Novel Approach Based on SEC XBRL Filings

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Henselmann ◽  
Dominik Ditter ◽  
Elisabeth Scherr
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Analysis ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analysis Approach ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Fully Automatic ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The SEC XBRL mandate enables the gathering of accounting numbers to be fully automatic in a database-like manner that provides vast opportunities for financial analysis. Using this functionality, this study proposes a simple analytical prescreening measure that uses abnormal digit distributions at the firm-year level to identify firms suspected of having managed earnings. On average, we find that the constructed measure indicates a greater amount of irregularities in the reported accounting numbers of firms with higher incentives to engage in earnings management. The suggested XBRL-enhanced digit analysis approach may provide the SEC and investors a simple measure to flag financial reports carrying a higher probability of human interaction. JEL Classifications: C10; M41; M43. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are publicly available. The analytical prescreening VBA-Tool is available upon request. A description of the tool is available; see Appendix B.

The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liesbeth Bruynseels ◽  
Eddy Cardinaels
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Negative Effect

ABSTRACT To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have “friendship” ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through “advice networks” do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals An Examination of the Effects of Change in Committee Chair on Audit Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Izhar Haq ◽  
Teresa Lang ◽  
Hongkang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Predicted Values ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
A Company

This study uses GMI Ratings directorship data from 2008 to 2013 along with the associated financial data to examine the relationship between audit committee chair change with the absolute discretionary accruals in the financial statements of the reporting companies.  Our results suggest that audit committee chair change is positively associated with the absolute discretionary accruals.  Specifically, absolute discretionary accruals are significantly higher when there is a change in the audit committee chair.  These results are consistent with prior research that deviations from the predicted values of accruals is an indicator of “poor” audit quality.  An additional finding of this paper is that a person younger than 60 is more likely to be a new audit committee chair when there is a change and therefore will have less experience and contacts than the outgoing chair. An important implication of these results is that audit committee chair change can have a significant impact on the quality of the financial statements of a company as well as on the audit quality.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

scholarly journals The Influence of KAP Size, Institutional Ownership, and Audit Committee on The Quality of Financial Statements

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Adris Kuncoro ◽  
Dhini Suryandari
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Descriptive Statistical Analysis

This research aims to examine the relationship between KAP size, institutional ownership, and the audit committee on the quality of financial reports. 616 Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) companies in 2018 became the population in this study. Purposive sampling as a sampling technique resulted in 547companies. Using inferential logistic regression analysis and using descriptive statistical analysis hypothesis testing methods with IBM SPSS version 25 tools. This study found that the KAP size and the audit committee has a positive effect on the quality of financial reports. Institutional ownership does not affect the quality of financial reports. Simultaneously, KAP size, institutional ownership, and audit committee influence the quality of financial reports. This study concludes that partially, KAP size and audit committee has a positive effect on the quality of financial reports. Simultaneously, KAP size, institutional ownership, and audit committee affect the quality of financial reports. Further research suggests using other proxies, other periods, and other variables.

Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

scholarly journals The Impact of the Audit Committees' Properties on the Quality of the Information in the Banking Financial Reports: A Survey on Saudi Commercial Banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Mwafag Rabab’ah ◽  
Omar Al-Sir ◽  
Ali A. Alzoubi
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
The Impact

This study aims to identify the impact of the audit committees' properties on the quality of the information of the banking financial reports in the Saudi commercial banks by identifying the effect of identifying tasks and duties, independence, accounting and banking experience and efficiency of the audit committee on achieving the quality of the Saudi banking and financial reports. 110 questionnaires were distributed on the research sample and 105 questionnaires were received and analyzed through ANOVA. Results indicate that the availability of the audit committees' properties affect increasing the quality of the financial reports in the Saudi banking at the level of properties as a whole where the (P) probable value was (0.000 ), which is less than 0.05. It represents the functions and duties of the audit committee, the committee's independence in banks, the availability of the accounting and banking experience for the members of the audit committee and the efficiency of the audit committees at banks. The study recommends more emphasis on the diversity of the experiences of the members of the audit team and thus; the committee can performs its functions in a more efficient and effective way.

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