Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilian H. Chan ◽  
Kevin C. W. Chen ◽  
Tai Yuan Chen ◽  
Yangxin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Earnings Targets ◽  
Voluntary Adoption

ABSTRACT To deter financial misstatements, many companies have recently adopted compensation recovery policies—commonly known as “clawbacks”—that authorize the board to recoup compensation paid to executives based on misstated financial reports. Clawbacks have been shown to reduce financial misstatements and increase investors' confidence on earnings information. We show that the benefits come with an unintended consequence of certain firms substituting for accruals management with real transactions management (e.g., reduce research and development [R&D] expenditures), especially firms with strong incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. As such, the total amount of earnings management does not decrease subsequent to clawback adoption. We further show that although real transactions management temporarily boosts those clawback adopters' short-term profitability and stock performance, this trend reverses after three years. In summary, clawbacks may have unexpected effects for a subset of firms whose managers are under greater pressure to meet earnings goals. Data Availability: All data used in the study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility?

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 761-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Myung Seok Park ◽  
Benson Wier
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Accruals Quality ◽  
Corporate Social

ABSTRACT This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, (2) to manipulate real operating activities, and (3) to be the subject of SEC investigations, as evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases against top executives. Our results are robust to (1) controlling for various incentives for CSR and earnings management, (2) considering various CSR dimensions and components, and (3) using alternative proxies for CSR and accruals quality. To the extent that we control for the potential effects of reputation and financial performance, our findings suggest that ethical concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

Irregularities in Accounting Numbers and Earnings Management—A Novel Approach Based on SEC XBRL Filings

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Henselmann ◽  
Dominik Ditter ◽  
Elisabeth Scherr
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Analysis ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analysis Approach ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Fully Automatic ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The SEC XBRL mandate enables the gathering of accounting numbers to be fully automatic in a database-like manner that provides vast opportunities for financial analysis. Using this functionality, this study proposes a simple analytical prescreening measure that uses abnormal digit distributions at the firm-year level to identify firms suspected of having managed earnings. On average, we find that the constructed measure indicates a greater amount of irregularities in the reported accounting numbers of firms with higher incentives to engage in earnings management. The suggested XBRL-enhanced digit analysis approach may provide the SEC and investors a simple measure to flag financial reports carrying a higher probability of human interaction. JEL Classifications: C10; M41; M43. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are publicly available. The analytical prescreening VBA-Tool is available upon request. A description of the tool is available; see Appendix B.

The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 33-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Ernstberger ◽  
Benedikt Link ◽  
Michael Stich ◽  
Oliver Vogler
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Business Decisions ◽  
Real Effects ◽  
Interim Management ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Short Termism

ABSTRACT This paper examines how mandatory quarterly reporting affects managers' business decisions in terms of real activities manipulations. For our analyses, we use the setting of the European Union, where the reporting frequency was increased with the introduction of a mandate to issue Interim Management Statements (IMSs) on a quarterly basis. Controlling for accrual-based earnings management, we find an increase in real activities manipulations for firms mandated to switch from semiannual to quarterly IMS reporting, relative to matched control firms. This finding is in line with the notion of higher managerial short-termism resulting from increased reporting frequency requirements. Further, we provide evidence that reporting frequency-induced real activities manipulations are more pronounced if the price pressure from investors is high and if the informativeness of IMS disclosure is low. We also document that reporting frequency-induced real activities manipulations are followed by a short-term increase and then a decrease in firms' operating performance. Data Availability: Data are available from the commercial databases and public sources identified in the paper.

Overvaluation and the Choice of Alternative Earnings Management Mechanisms

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (5) ◽  
pp. 1491-1518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad A. Badertscher
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Early Stages ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this study I examine how the degree and duration of overvaluation affect management's use of alternative within-GAAP earnings management, restrictions on further exploitation of within-GAAP accruals management, and subsequent non-GAAP earnings management. Further, I examine how one type of earnings management segues into another type as overvaluation persists. I present evidence that the longer the firm is overvalued, the greater is the amount of total earnings management. I also find that managers engage in accruals management in the early stages of overvaluation before moving to real transactions management, in order to sustain their overvalued equity. Finally, I find that the longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely it is to engage in one of the most egregious forms of earnings management, non-GAAP earnings management. Collectively, the results suggest that the duration of firm overvaluation is an important determinant of managements' choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms. JEL Classifications: M41, M43, M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 915-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng-Chia Chiu ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh ◽  
Feng Tian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Contagion Effect ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
Endogenous Matching ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of M&A, industry, and contagion via a common auditor or geographical proximity. These findings support the view that board monitoring plays a key role in the contagion and quality of firms' financial reports. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

An Analysis of Managerial Use and Market Consequences of Earnings Management and Expectation Management

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 1935-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somnath Das ◽  
Kyonghee Kim ◽  
Sukesh Patro
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Structural Models ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Expectation Management ◽  
Earnings Targets ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study examines how managers coordinate the joint use of earnings management and expectation management by estimating the relationship between these instruments and how this relationship changes as their respective constraints change. We do this by estimating structural models of the two instruments that account for the constraints on their use as well as their effects on each other. Our results suggest that managers use earnings management and expectation management complementarily when managers' ability to use earnings management is less restricted. However, as the constraints on earnings management increase, managers substitute earnings management with expectation management. Moreover, we find that the extent of expectation management influences the extent of earnings management, but not vice versa. Examining the market consequences of the use of these instruments, we find that, while there are penalties for using both earnings management and expectation management, either as complements or as substitutes, the net stock price benefit from meeting or beating earnings targets exceeds these penalties. JEL Classifications: G14; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.

The Search for Order in Municipal Administration: Herman A. Metz and the New York City Experience, 1898–1909

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
Ryan P. McDonough ◽  
Paul J. Miranti ◽  
Michael P. Schoderbek
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
York City ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
The City

ABSTRACT This paper examines the administrative and accounting reforms coordinated by Herman A. Metz around the turn of the 20th century in New York City. Reform efforts were motivated by deficiencies in administering New York City's finances, including a lack of internal control over monetary resources and operational activities, and opaque financial reports. The activities of Comptroller Metz, who collaborated with institutions such as the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, were paramount in initiating and implementing the administrative and accounting reforms in the city, which contributed to reform efforts across the country. Metz promoted the adoption of functional cost classifications for city departments, developed flowcharts for improved transaction processing, strengthened internal controls, and published the 1909 Manual of Accounting and Business Procedure of the City of New York, which laid the groundwork for transparent financial reports capable of providing vital information about the city's activities and subsidiary units. JEL Classifications: H72, M41, N91. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Earnings Management, Litigation Risk, and Asymmetric Audit Fee Responses

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Price Earnings Ratio ◽  
Year 2000 ◽  
Conservative Bias

This study examines the association between audit fees and earnings management, using publicly available fee data. We hypothesize that, due to asymmetric litigation effects, audit fees decrease (increase) with a client's risk of income-decreasing (increasing) earnings management risk. We also hypothesize that the positive relation between income-increasing earnings management risk and audit fees is heightened for clients that are high-growth firms. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 429 public, non-regulated, Big 5 audited companies, using fee data for the year 2000. We find that downward earnings management risk, as estimated by negative (i.e., income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, is associated with lower audit fees. We also document that upward earnings management risk, as estimated by positive discretionary accruals, is associated with higher audit fees and that the interaction of this risk with an industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio has an incrementally significant, positive effect on fees. We interpret our findings as consistent with a conservative bias on the part of auditors. The conservative bias arises from asymmetric litigation risk in which income-increasing discretionary accruals exhibit greater expected litigation costs than income-decreasing discretionary accruals (Simunic and Stein 1996; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2002; Heninger 2001).

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