scholarly journals Generalist CEOs and Audit Pricing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiming Ma ◽  
Rencheng Wang ◽  
Kaitang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Path Analysis ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Ceo Characteristics ◽  
Shed Light

We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO characteristics, various fixed effects, instrumental variables, and change analyses. We further show that fee differences are larger for firms with weaker monitoring and higher corporate litigation risks. Through path analysis, we find that both client business risk and misreporting risk contribute to the fee difference. Finally, we find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with generalist CEOs. Our study should be of interest to auditing standard setters who link management operating styles to audit risk. We shed light on how management operating styles associated with the CEOs' general or specialized skills affect audit pricing.

The Impact of Conservatism Accounting on Audit Fees

2021 ◽  
pp. 253-280
Author(s):  
Sandra Alves
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
Conservative Accounting ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The Impact

For a sample of listed Portuguese and Spanish firms from 2010 to 2018, this study draws on audit pricing, substitution, signaling, and complementary theories to evaluate the impact of conservatism accounting on audit fees. Using fixed effects technique, the author finds a positive relationship between conservatism accounting and audit fees. The results suggest that firms with more conservative accounting (with strong internal corporate governance) could be more likely to demand high-quality audit to strengthen investor confidence in financial information and, thus pay higher audit fees. Therefore, this study supports signaling and complementary theories. The results also suggest that Big 4, growth, firm size, and leverage are positively related with audit fees. To Spain, audit risk and ROA are also positively related with audit fees.

Politically Connected Boards and Audit Pricing: U.S. Evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keval Amin ◽  
Chansog Francis Kim ◽  
Zhifeng Yang ◽  
FeiTeng Ye
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates the impact of political connections, as measured by having directors that previously held political positions, on the pricing of audits. We document that auditors charge higher fees to politically connected firms than to similar non-connected firms. Our findings are robust to a battery of additional analyses including (1) propensity score matching, (2) entropy balancing, (3) changes analysis, and (4) a fixed effects model with transaction-based measures of political connections (i.e., campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures) in the model. The effect of political connections on audit fees is mitigated by independent monitoring. Moreover, the main effect is stronger in firms with more complicated operational structures and higher litigation risk, but weaker for distressed firms. Although our findings suggest that auditors exert greater effort at politically connected clients, we show that connected clients report significantly higher discretionary accruals, consistent with auditors' incremental effort being insufficient to fully offset the audit risk inherent in these engagements. Collectively, our study sheds light on how auditors perceive political connections and their impact on financial reporting quality.

Product Market Competition and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 139-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuequan Wang ◽  
Andy C. W. Chui
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Competitive Industry ◽  
The One ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Existing theories posit two contradictory predictions on the relation between product market competition and audit fees. On the one hand, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers and increase the accuracy of financial reporting, thus decreasing auditors' assessments of audit risk. Hence, auditors tend to charge lower fees to firms in a more competitive industry. On the other hand, product market competition can increase auditors' assessments of business risk. Therefore, audit fees are expected to increase with industry competitiveness. This study empirically tests the relation between product market competition and audit fees and finds that auditors charge more to firms in a more competitive industry. JEL Classifications: D4, G30, M41, M42.

The Effects of Clients' Controversial Activities on Audit Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Koh ◽  
Yen H. Tong
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Unique Dataset

SUMMARY: We examine the effects of clients' involvement in controversial corporate activities on audit pricing. Clients' involvement in controversial activities raises concerns about management integrity and ethics. Moreover, clients involved in such activities are perceived to have higher risk of adverse financial performance. As a result, there is greater potential for financial misstatement, which increases the auditor's perceived business risk. We hypothesize that, given the higher perceived business risk, auditors charge higher fees to clients engaged in controversial activities. Using a unique dataset from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, we identify clients that engage in controversial activities related to consumers, employees, the community, and the environment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that clients involved in controversial corporate activities pay higher audit fees compared to clients not involved in such activities.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samer Khalil ◽  
Michel L. Magnan ◽  
Jeffrey R. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

SUMMARY: This paper investigates whether audit fees vary with the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights arising from the presence of dual-class share structures. Dual-class shares exist in firms having two or more classes of shares with disproportionate voting rights. They affect audit fees through their effect on the supply for audit services. External auditors conduct wider (narrower) scope audits depending on whether dual-class shares increase (decrease) audit risk and/or auditor business risk. Wider (narrower) scope audits are more (less) costly for the auditors and for their clients. This paper documents a positive association between audit fees and the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights in a sample of Canadian firms during 2004. It extends current research by investigating whether dominant shareholdings affect audit pricing, and by examining audit pricing in Canada over a time period that witnessed significant changes in corporate governance.

Audit Market Structure and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
First Year ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS Extant literature finds mixed evidence on the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. We re-examine this issue using a large sample of U.S. audit clients covering 90 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) spanning 2000–2013. We find that audit market concentration is associated with significantly higher audit fees, consistent with the concerns of regulators and managers. We also find that increases in audit market concentration are associated with fewer initial engagement fee discounts (i.e., reduced lowballing), particularly for non-Big 4 clients. We reconcile our findings with those of prior research and find that our divergent findings are attributable to controls for MSA fixed effects. In supplemental analyses, we find that audit market concentration is associated with higher audit quality. We also find that concentration is associated with higher audit quality for first-year engagements, but only if the auditor does not lowball on the engagement. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the consequences of increased concentration within the U.S. audit market (GAO 2003, 2008). JEL Classifications: M41; M42; L13.

The effect of directors’ and officers’ insurance on audit fees: the case of an emerging economy

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuei-Fu Li ◽  
Yi-Ping Liao
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Market ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Directors And Officers

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of D&O insurance in audit pricing in Taiwan, an emerging market in which auditors face negligible litigation risk and intense competition. Design/methodology/approach It examines the association between audit fees and D&O insurance coverage. Findings Results indicate that audit fees are higher for clients with higher D&O coverage after controlling for other determinants. Further analysis shows that auditors charge additional audit fees for clients whose insurer is foreign owned. Originality/value Overall, the study provides evidence that the induction of financial misstatement risks by D&O insurance is one of the contributing audit risk factors in an emerging economy context.

Are Capitalized Software Development Costs Informative About Audit Risk?

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Changjiang (John) Wang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Intangible Assets ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Intangible Asset ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Software Products ◽  
Development Costs ◽  
Tangible Assets

SYNOPSIS Capitalization of software research and development costs (SDC) under SFAS No. 86 is the only exception to SFAS No. 2 that calls for immediate expensing of R&D costs. Although intangible assets have become increasingly relevant for firm valuation, they remain largely unexplored in audit research. This is an important topic because intangible assets, especially those that are internally developed, pose greater challenges in assessing audit risk relative to tangible assets. Capitalization of SDC offers a unique opportunity to study how auditors assess audit risk associated with the recognition of this intangible asset. While capitalized SDC could shed light on software products' potential commercial success and inform the auditor about the client's business risk, the accounting flexibility allowed by SFAS No. 86 also increases the risk of earnings management, and thus implies higher audit risk. Using audit fees as a proxy for audit risk, our results indicate that capitalized SDC are negatively associated with audit fees for firms where capitalization is inconsequential to beating analysts' forecasts, and also for firms with low analysts' following. These results support the notion that capitalized SDC signal lower business risk, especially for firms with low earnings management risk or high private information.

Audit pricing and product differentiation in small private firms: evidence from Thailand

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahbub Zaman ◽  
Jaravee Chayasombat
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Developed Economies ◽  
Final Sample ◽  
Stratified Sample

Purpose – There is limited evidence on how differences in economic environments affect the demand for and supply of auditing. Research on audit pricing has mainly focused on large client markets in developed economies; in contrast, the purpose of this paper is to focus on the small client segment in the emerging economy of Thailand which offers a choice between auditors of two different qualities. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on a random stratified sample of small clients in Thailand qualifying for audit exemption. The final sample consists of 1,950 firm-year observations for 2002-2006. Findings – The authors find evidence of product differentiation in the small client market, suggesting that small firms view certified public accountants as superior and pay a premium for their services. The authors also find that audit fees have a positive significant association with leverage, metropolitan location and client size. Audit risk and audit opinion are not, however, significantly associated with audit fees. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that clients whose financial year ends in the auditors’ busy period pay significantly higher audit fees, and auditors engage in low-balling on initial engagements to attract audit clients. Research limitations/implications – The research shows the importance of exploring actual decisions regarding audit practice and audit pricing in different institutional and organizational settings. Originality/value – The paper extends the literature from developed economies and large/listed market setting to the emerging economy and small client market setting. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first paper to examine audit pricing in the small client market in an emerging economy.

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