The Effects of Clients' Controversial Activities on Audit Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Koh ◽  
Yen H. Tong
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Unique Dataset

SUMMARY: We examine the effects of clients' involvement in controversial corporate activities on audit pricing. Clients' involvement in controversial activities raises concerns about management integrity and ethics. Moreover, clients involved in such activities are perceived to have higher risk of adverse financial performance. As a result, there is greater potential for financial misstatement, which increases the auditor's perceived business risk. We hypothesize that, given the higher perceived business risk, auditors charge higher fees to clients engaged in controversial activities. Using a unique dataset from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, we identify clients that engage in controversial activities related to consumers, employees, the community, and the environment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that clients involved in controversial corporate activities pay higher audit fees compared to clients not involved in such activities.

scholarly journals Generalist CEOs and Audit Pricing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiming Ma ◽  
Rencheng Wang ◽  
Kaitang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Path Analysis ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Ceo Characteristics ◽  
Shed Light

We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO characteristics, various fixed effects, instrumental variables, and change analyses. We further show that fee differences are larger for firms with weaker monitoring and higher corporate litigation risks. Through path analysis, we find that both client business risk and misreporting risk contribute to the fee difference. Finally, we find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with generalist CEOs. Our study should be of interest to auditing standard setters who link management operating styles to audit risk. We shed light on how management operating styles associated with the CEOs' general or specialized skills affect audit pricing.

The effect of directors’ and officers’ insurance on audit fees: the case of an emerging economy

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuei-Fu Li ◽  
Yi-Ping Liao
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Market ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Directors And Officers

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of D&O insurance in audit pricing in Taiwan, an emerging market in which auditors face negligible litigation risk and intense competition. Design/methodology/approach It examines the association between audit fees and D&O insurance coverage. Findings Results indicate that audit fees are higher for clients with higher D&O coverage after controlling for other determinants. Further analysis shows that auditors charge additional audit fees for clients whose insurer is foreign owned. Originality/value Overall, the study provides evidence that the induction of financial misstatement risks by D&O insurance is one of the contributing audit risk factors in an emerging economy context.

CEO Financial Background and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachana Kalelkar ◽  
Sarfraz Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages

SYNOPSIS Accounting scholars theorize that audit price is a function of a client's audit and business risk. Existing research finds that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance improves financial reporting quality (Matsunaga, Wang, and Yeung 2013), increases profitability, and reduces the likelihood of firm failure (Custodio and Metzger 2014). These factors suggest that auditors' engagement risk decreases when incumbent CEOs possess financial expertise, raising the likelihood that auditors will charge these firms lower fees. In this study, we examine whether CEOs' work experience in accounting- and finance-related jobs affects audit fees. Using a panel of U.S. firms between 2004 and 2013, we find that firms that have a financial expert CEO pay lower audit fees. Our results are robust to various specifications, including firm-fixed effect model and specifications that control for other CEO- and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)-specific and audit committee characteristics. Our findings thus add to the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of a functional background of top managers and how this background can create value for a firm through savings in audit fees.

Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories

1999 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen T. Craswell ◽  
Jere R. Francis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Experience Goods ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Time Period

Two competing theories of initial engagement audit pricing are examined empirically. DeAngelo's (1981a) model predicts initial engagement discounts in all settings, while Dye's (1991) model specifically predicts discounting will not occur in settings where audit fees are publicly disclosed. Unlike the United States and most countries, audit fees are publicly disclosed in Australia. Our study examines initial engagement pricing in Australia during a time period when comparable U.S. studies report discounts of 25 percent (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Simon and Francis 1988). The Australian evidence finds initial engagement discounting only for upgrades from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditors. Discounting for upgrades to Big 8 auditors is consistent with economic theories of discount pricing by sellers of higher-priced, higher-quality experience goods as an inducement to purchase when uncertainty about product quality is resolved through buying (experiencing) the goods. The evidence in our study is generally consistent with Dye's (1991) conclusion that public disclosure of audit fees precludes initial engagement discounting and the potential independence problems arising from such discounting.

Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Pricing

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Barry L. Lewis ◽  
Paul L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Sustainable Competitive Advantage ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Absolute Size ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Differentiation Strategy ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
A Company

Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.

scholarly journals The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm’s Financial Performance in Malaysia

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 220
Author(s):  
Dilashenyi Devi Selvarajah ◽  
Uma Murthy ◽  
Mathavi Massilamani
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Employee Engagement ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Company Reputation ◽  
The Impact

The present research aims at investigating the impact of CSR on firm’s financial performance in Malaysia. Based on gaps in extant literature, the current study hypothesizes that four (4) independent variables comprising business risk, company reputation, employee engagement and stakeholder concern will exert statistically significant influences on the dependent variable, firm’s financial performance. The research employs a quantitative research approach whereby a sample 153 respondents were collected using a stratified random sampling technique. Employing SPSS software, multiple linear regression analysis was carried out. The results of multiple regression revealed that out of the four (4) hypotheses of the research, three (3) were supported whilst one (1) was not. In particular, it was shown that business risk, company reputation and stakeholder concern exert statistically significant influences on firm’s financial performance. However, there was no enough evidence to support the claim that employee engage can significantly influence firm’s financial performance. Several implications from the research were further discussed and elaborated.

scholarly journals A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client Segment: A Comment

1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willie E. Gist
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Size Classes ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
The U.S

This study is the second to provide a richer test of the association between auditor size and audit fees by using three audit firm size classes in the small-client segment of the U.S. audit market. The finding of a Big 8 (now Big 6) price premium is consistent with Francis and Simon [1]. However, this price premium exists only with respect to local/regional firms. Francis und Simon showed that the Big 8 price premium exists with respect to both second-tier and local/regional firms. The present study also provides evidence of a second-tier price premium over local/regional firms. The results imply product differentiation to both Big 8 and second-tier firms. Plausible reasons for differences in results between the two studies are given.

Product Market Competition and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 139-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuequan Wang ◽  
Andy C. W. Chui
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Competitive Industry ◽  
The One ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Existing theories posit two contradictory predictions on the relation between product market competition and audit fees. On the one hand, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers and increase the accuracy of financial reporting, thus decreasing auditors' assessments of audit risk. Hence, auditors tend to charge lower fees to firms in a more competitive industry. On the other hand, product market competition can increase auditors' assessments of business risk. Therefore, audit fees are expected to increase with industry competitiveness. This study empirically tests the relation between product market competition and audit fees and finds that auditors charge more to firms in a more competitive industry. JEL Classifications: D4, G30, M41, M42.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

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