Taken for Suckers: Causal Attributions of the Consequences of Overcharging Sales Tax in Daily Deal Transactions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Foy ◽  
Vijay Sampath ◽  
Rachel Raskin ◽  
Frimette Kass-Shraibman ◽  
Pradeep Gopalakrishna
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Intentions ◽  
Sales Tax ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Ethical Norm ◽  
Repurchase Intentions ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Lower Status ◽  
Attribution Theories

In an experimental setting, we examine consumer reactions in daily deal transactions when they are overcharged sales tax. The overcharges arise when the daily deal operators subsequently provide additional discounts to consumers unbeknownst to the merchants. Drawing on social status and attribution theories, we posit that consumers will ascribe causes for the overcharges to the merchants because of their lower status when compared to the higher status of the daily deal operators. We then examine the main and moderating effects of the overcharges on the behavioral intentions of consumers to repurchase from merchants. Merchants’ ability to verify correct sales prices, descriptive social norms, and the trust placed in tax accountants explain variations in repurchase intentions.  Overall, the results suggest that ethical norm violations by higher-status entities results in the transfer of negative consequences to lower-status entities.  Forensic accountants can be instrumental in helping businesses to understand these effects.

scholarly journals Fear vs humor appeals: a comparative study of children's responses to anti-smoking advertisements

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Nicolini ◽  
Fabio Cassia
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Intentions ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
Healthy Lifestyle ◽  
Fear Appeal ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Youth Smoking ◽  
Lifestyle Habits ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study aims to examine the different effects that the fear and humor appeals in anti-smoking advertisements for children have on their affective reactions to the advertisements, on their beliefs about smoking and on their behavioral intentions to smoke.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents the findings of a qualitative research study conducted in Italy with children aged from 8 to 11 years.FindingsThe results indicated that the humor appeal is a useful method for conveying a social theme in a pleasant way and creating a likable character that becomes an example for children to imitate; however, it is necessary to employ the fear appeal to make children reflect carefully about the negative consequences of smoking.Research limitations/implicationsThis study examined only children's behavioral intentions derived from anti-smoking advertisements, but future research should also examine their real behaviors after a period following repeated viewing of public service announcements about smoking prevention or other social issues.Practical implicationsUnderstanding how different types of appeals can influence children represents an important result for the prevention of youth smoking and the promotion of healthy lifestyle habits during childhood.Social implicationsUnderstanding how different types of appeals can influence children represents an important result for the prevention of youth smoking and the promotion of healthy lifestyle habits during childhood.Originality/valueFew studies have examined the impact of social advertisements on children, and particularly little is known about the effectiveness of fear appeals on this group.

Who Takes the Floor and Why

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 622-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria L. Brescoll
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Mediation Analyses ◽  
Strong Positive Relationship ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect

Although past research has noted the importance of both power and gender for understanding volubility—the total amount of time spent talking—in organizations, to date, identifying the unique contributions of power and gender to volubility has been somewhat elusive. Using both naturalistic data sets and experiments, the present studies indicate that while power has a strong, positive effect on volubility for men, no such effect exists for women. Study 1 uses archival data to examine the relationship between the relative power of United States senators and their talking behavior on the Senate floor. Results indicate a strong positive relationship between power and volubility for male senators, but a non-significant relationship for female senators. Study 2 replicates this effect in an experimental setting by priming the concept of power and shows that though men primed with power talk more, women show no effect of power on volubility. Mediation analyses indicate that this difference is explained by women’s concern that being highly voluble will result in negative consequences (i.e., backlash). Study 3 shows that powerful women are in fact correct in assuming that they will incur backlash as a result of talking more than others—an effect that is observed among both male and female perceivers. Implications for the literatures on volubility, power, and previous studies of backlash are discussed.

The Social Influence of Brand Community: Evidence from European Car Clubs

2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Algesheimer ◽  
Utpal M. Dholakia ◽  
Andreas Herrmann
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation Model ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Brand Community ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Community Influence ◽  
Brand Knowledge ◽  
The Social ◽  
Community Pressure

The authors develop and estimate a conceptual model of how different aspects of customers’ relationships with the brand community influence their intentions and behaviors. The authors describe how identification with the brand community leads to positive consequences, such as greater community engagement, and negative consequences, such as normative community pressure and (ultimately) reactance. They examine the moderating effects of customers’ brand knowledge and the brand community's size and test their hypotheses by estimating a structural equation model with survey data from a sample of European car club members.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee de-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
The Individual

It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Participants made lower offers when making a collective vs individual decisions. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

Japan shies away from fiscal growth strategy

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Growth Strategy ◽  
Sales Tax ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Fiscal Stimulus ◽  
Secular Stagnation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Deficits ◽  
Rich Countries

Subject Secular stagnation in Japan. Significance Economists argue that Japan has reached the stage of secular stagnation ahead of other rich countries. However, Japan differs from its contemporaries in important ways. Impacts Interest on government debt is below nominal GDP growth, which favours fiscal stimulus and government deficits. Monetary policy that continues to keep interest rates close to zero would support a more aggressive fiscal stance. On balance, a planned sales tax increase in October is likely to proceed, with negative consequences for economic growth.

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