scholarly journals “One Belt, One Road” Project as a new foreign policy strategy of China. Short analysis of the discussion inside China

Author(s):  
M. S. Mikhalev

One of the most significant international infrastructure projects of our time is undoubtedly the foreign policy initiative “One belt, One Road” announced by China ’s leader Xi Jinping in 2013. Despite the fact that the true reasons, scale and long-term goals of this global project of China have not been definitively formulated yet, it is obvious the “One Belt, One Road” Project has surpassed its originally stated infrastructure and economic guidelines and become an ambitious long-term plan to promote the Chinese economic model around the world. From the point the Chinese planners the initiative of Xi Jinping is able in the near future to provide a platform for harmonious coexistence and solidarity between various countries and entire civilizations that while remaining independent from each other politically and culturally, will be economically interdependent and share a common desire for a harmonious co-development. The principles and ideals on which, to the mind of the initiators of the “One Belt, One Road” Project, such a civilizational dialogue of equals should be built, require the most serious attention and careful study. Unfortunately, in most modern publications on this topic, the analysis of the reasons, goals and objectives of the global Chinese initiative is carried out only on the basis of official documents of the Chinese government and the positions of those experts in China, whose opinion rather reflects their own attitude to the “One Belt, One Road” Project than is decisive in the process of internal Chinese discussion on this issue. It seems that this approach does not contribute to the formation of an objective understanding of the conditions under which this new foreign policy of China is born and to what consequences it could lead. In contrast, in this article, an attempt is made to consider the origins and to interpret the goals of “One Belt, One Road” Project through the analysis of the discussion taking place inside China which is not intended for the external audience.

Author(s):  
A. P. Sukhodolov ◽  
I. V. Anokhov

The article aims at evaluating the One Belt One Road project implemented by China that will define long-term trajectories of the world trade and finance development as well as prospects of Russia’s participation in this project. It seems that the project under consideration is not a full alternative to the existing nowadays world system of railroad and sea shipping both from the viewpoint of the shipping cost and the scope of investment required. A possibility of full-scale refocusing of Russia’s transport systems (the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route) on the One Belt One Road project is not currently obvious, thus, one cannot state with certainty Russia’s role in this project. Besides, implementing this project results in building in Eurasia a China-centric economy system that does not coincide with the structures built by Russia, i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union and other ones. At the same time, the One Belt One Road project seems to have no alternatives. None of the other countries has proposed a project that can be compared with the One Belt One Road one in terms of being large-scale, having a global impact as well as long-term effects. It is believed, that after the implementation of the project is complete, the technological and social differences between Europe’s and China’s potentials, which were the reason for shipping goods from Southeast Asia to Europe over the past centuries, will be reduced to a significant extent. In terms of this the China-centric world will have to provide different noneconomic reasons for its existence, i.e. provide the world with new values and meanings of the postindustrial world. In this context Russia’s participating in the One Belt One Road project may appear to be necessary: Russia can act as a project’s security operator, a mediator between China and the countries who are participants of the Silk Road Economic Belt in cases where their interests collide. Russia can also generate values and meanings of economic processes. The safe transportation routes Russia has, i.e. the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route as well as long-term friendly relations with the countries-participants of the Silk Road Economic Belt and Russia’s being experienced in harmonizing different interests can become the key aspects contributing to success of this project.


2021 ◽  
pp. 205789112110388
Author(s):  
Yuan Jiang

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a central policy of the Chinese government. The initiative is directly associated with President Xi Jinping, who first put forward the BRI in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, initially as One Belt One Road. Different from repetitive literature that concludes the BRI as China's global strategy, this article makes a contribution to argue that the BRI is China's domestic and non-strategic policy. To justify this argument, this article analyses how the BRI has been embedded into aspects of Chinese domestic policy by revealing its nexuses with Chinese domestic economy, politics and ideology. To deepen the understanding of the BRI's connection with the Chinese economy, this article explores the link between the BRI and China's supply-side structural reform. Meanwhile, this research demystifies the BRI as a global strategy and the difference between joining and rejecting the BRI to prove the BRI's non-strategic essence. In the end, this article discusses the BRI's far-reaching geopolitical influence.


Author(s):  
Kanat Kakar ◽  

In 2013, China's Silk Road Initiative, the One Belt One Road project, was first mentioned in Kazakhstan and has been widely discussed by major countries and international organizations. Kazakhstan's participation in this project, a resource-rich country in Central Asia, has attracted world attention, and the impact of external forces on Central Asia will have its own impact on the implementation of this project. The interests of countries such as Russia and the United States in Central Asia and the views of international organizations are important factors in the implementation of this project. This article examines the relations between China and Kazakhstan in the framework of the "One Belt - One Road" initiative and the competition of external forces influencing it, their views on the project, their interests, the project and competing projects, and highlights important international organizations and agreements. and the toothed conclusion is pronounced.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suocheng Dong ◽  
Tamir Boldanov ◽  
Arnold Tulokhonov ◽  
Tcogto Bazarzhapov ◽  
Ayana Yangutova ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Ping Zhou ◽  
Dongjuan Lv ◽  
Ying Chen

The “One Belt One Road” strategy is the abbreviation of “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” In September and October of 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to build the cooperation initiative of “New Silk Road Economic Belt” and “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” President Xi Jinping projected to establish the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” during his visit in Indonesia in October 2013. Finally, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce cooperatively issued the “Vision and Action for Promoting the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” on March 28, 2015. The “One Belt One Road” countries were key areas of cooperation in the context of China's policy in communication, road connectivity, smooth trade, currency circulation, people's mutual understanding, strategic coordination to strengthen bilateral and multilateral teamwork, and corresponding development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 146 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-208
Author(s):  
Benoît Lurson

Summary During his reign, King Ay had a speos built in Akhmim, known as the speos of el-Salamuni. Its façade displays a monumental inscription, which contains a long eulogy to the king uttered by the overseer of works, Nakhtmin. For the composition of this inscription, its author had recourse to the Prophecy of Neferti. This paper investigates the ways and means of this recourse. First, el-Salamuni’s inscription is transliterated, deconstructed, and translated. Then, locutions and verb forms belonging to the first part of the inscription and of the Prophecy of Neferti are compared. This comparison shows that whilst conceiving a unique text, the author of the inscription used locutions and verb forms specific to the Prophecy to compose a text structured like it, thereby allowing the reader to readily call the Prophecy to the mind. A lexical comparison of both texts completes this examination. Next, an investigation of Ay’s deeds related in the inscription reveals the importance of the notion of benefactions (ȝḫ.t), with the speos of el-Salamuni being an exemplification of what being ȝḫ means for the king. Furthermore, although Ay’s deeds praised by Nakhtmin in his eulogy look like a collection of random deeds, they do in fact illustrate different facets of the one pivotal and dominant deed that is central to Ay’s actions: the restoration of communication between the gods, the king and the people, for which purpose the speos happens to be a medium. This investigation also shows that by recourse to the Prophecy, Ay is made into a messianic king, likened to Ameny. Then, in order to explore the reason of the recourse to the Prophecy of Neferti, the speeches of Neferti and Nakhtmin are considered in relation to each other. Based on their common witnessing function, it can be deduced that the author of the inscription considered Neferti to be a true prophecy. This leads to the question of the genre of the Prophecy and of el-Salamuni’s inscription. It is proposed that the inscription is an epideictic text. For convincingly classifying el-Salamuni’s inscription as a rhetorical epideictic composition coming under the Aristotelian rhetoric, the essential features of this genre are sought. As a matter of fact, an audience, a kairos, an appropriate ethos for the speaker, an argumentation founded on the logos, but also a strong pathos, can be characterised. As for the thesis of the discourse, it is understood that if the communication with the gods is restored and if the people take advantage of it, it is thanks to Ay’s personal values. The temporality of Nakhtmin’s encomium, who relates events from his present, the focus of the text on virtue, as well as its dispositio, complete the list of the essential features of an epideictic composition. In conclusion, the notion of propaganda is reassessed, and el-Salamuni’s inscription as an epideictic text reinstated as a long-term socio-political discourse, as a composition admittedly aimed at establishing absolute confidence of the audience in Ay, but also at reinforcing social cohesion and cultural identity, a function probably required after the Amarna Period.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Madsen

Both the Chinese state and the Vatican have an interest in maintaining more regular control over local Catholic community life. Their interests partially converge in seeking a regularized process for selecting Catholic bishops in the officially recognized part of the Chinese Church. This overlapping of interests is the basis for the “provisional agreement” between the Vatican and China on the selection of bishops signed on September 22, 2018. The agreement fails to address the area where Sino-Vatican interests diverge, i.e., the status of the thirty-six “underground” bishops, recognized by the Vatican but not by the Chinese government. Meanwhile, grassroots Catholic communities in China are deeply embedded in local social structures and their leaders have long exercised a considerable degree of agency in managing local affairs and adapting Catholic practices to local culture. The interaction between local communities and the long-term development of the Chinese Catholic church will depend, on the one hand, on the complex cooperative and competitive arrangements between the Vatican and the Chinese state and, on the other hand, on the interaction between the agency of local communities and the forces of control from above.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 85-99
Author(s):  
Girdhari Dahal

Nepal and China have a long history of foreign relation since ancient time. As a modern state, Nepal established its diplomatic relations with China in 1955. The main objective of this paper is to explore the foreign relation of Nepal with China. This study uses secondary data for the collection of facts and information. It is descriptive and analytical in nature. This study is based on Constitution of Nepal, bilateral treaties, joint statements of high level official visits and different scholarly articles. Basic principles of the foreign policy of Nepal and China is set by mutual trust and the guidelines of Panchasheel. Nepal has always followed and accepted the One-China policy. Also, Nepal has supported the ambitious Chinese initiatives for one belt one road project. Similarly, China has been Nepal's key development partner. China has helped Nepal in different development projects. Nepal has signed a transit treaty with China. Now, Nepal has an alternative for third country transport transit.


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