Free Market Fairness

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference

This chapter defends a “market democratic” interpretation of justice as fairness that it calls free market fairness, with a particular focus on institutions. The discussion encompasses the difference principle, fair equality of opportunity, fair value of political liberties, and the rest of the first principle guarantee of basic liberties. Market democracy is explored in light of some secondary considerations of justice: the just savings principle, environmental justice, and duties of international aid. The chapter also examines how free market fairness interprets the component of justice as fairness in question and how that interpretation compares to John Rawls' social democratic interpretation. Finally, it asks whether market democratic regimes can satisfy the distributional requirements of free market fairness.

Feasibility, Normativity, and Institutional Guarantees

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
General View ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Economic Liberty ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Market Democracy

This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.

Two Concepts of Fairness

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Economic Freedom ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Social Democracy ◽  
Democratic Citizenship ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Classical Liberal ◽  
The Difference

This chapter considers two concepts of fairness, starting the discussion by focusing on market democracy's thick conception of economic freedom in relation to social justice. Market democracy breaks with traditional classical liberal and libertarian traditions in founding politics on a deliberative ideal of democratic citizenship, even as it makes room for a variety of rival conceptions of the nature of public reason. The chapter offers a market democratic interpretation of John Rawls' notion of justice as fairness. It also examines what free market fairness says about a society in which citizens are experiencing the blessings of liberal justice, along with its alternative perspective to social democracy's emphasis on instilling in the citizenry a sense of democratic solidarity. Finally, it compares the interpretations of social democracy and free market fairness regarding justice as fairness and the difference principle, respectively.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

The Indeterminacy of Rawls’s Principles for Gender Justice

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 237-248
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Costa
Keyword(s):  
Reproductive Rights ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Arbitrary Power ◽  
Women's Lives ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Equal Citizenship ◽  
Sexual And Reproductive Rights

Feminists disagree about whether or not Rawls’s account of free and equal citizenship is an emancipatory ideal for women, and whether or not the application of the two principles of justice would suffice to dismantle relationships of domination that affect women’s lives. This chapter argues that there is no clear and uncontroversial application of Rawls’s principles of justice that supports those feminists who give affirmative answers to these questions. Regarding the first principle, one unsettled question is whether it protects sexual and reproductive rights, including the right to abortion. Regarding the second principle, there is indeterminacy due to the need to balance the requirements of fair equality of opportunity with parental rights. Moreover, the difference principle’s focus on the maximization of income and wealth for the worst off makes room for policies that do this while still leaving some women exposed to the arbitrary power of others.

Freedom, money and justice as fairness

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blain Neufeld
Keyword(s):  
Basic Needs ◽  
Original Position ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
Discretionary Time ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Core Feature ◽  
The Difference

The first principle of Rawls’s conception of justice secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens’ freedom and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen’s argument – if modified to apply to citizens’ ‘moral powers’ rather than ‘negative liberty’ – threatens a core feature of Rawls’s conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens’ freedom. I concede Cohen’s point regarding the relation between freedom and money but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls’s conception of justice if the ‘basic needs principle’ is understood to enjoy lexical priority over the first principle and is modified to include a right to adequate discretionary time. Nonetheless, Cohen’s argument helpfully highlights the infelicitous nature of Rawls’s terminology with respect to liberty: the basic needs principle, the first principle and the difference principle all should be understood as shaping citizens’ freedom to exercise their moral powers.

Free Market Fairness

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Daily Lives ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Economic Liberty ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Liberal Justice

Can libertarians care about social justice? This book argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, the book presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, the book argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, the book offers a “market democratic” conception of social justice: free market fairness. It argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberties and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to this book, free market fairness is social justice, American style. The book offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice—one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.

What Is the Argument for the Fair Value of Political Liberty?

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-514
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Political Liberty ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Conception

The equal political liberties are among the basic first-principle liberties in John Rawls’s theory of Justice as fairness. Rawls insists, further, that the “fair value” of the political liberties must be guaranteed. Disavowing an interest in fair value is what disqualifies welfare-state capitalism as a possible realizer of Justice as fairness. Yet Rawls never gives a perspicuous statement of the reasoning in the original position for the fair-value guarantee. This article gathers up two distinct strands of Rawls’s argument, and presents it in a straightforward sequence. Justice as fairness is contrasted to a competitor political conception of justice that is just like it but without the fair-value guarantee. A schema of the two-strand argument is presented in the Appendix.

scholarly journals RELENDO RAWLS APÓS PIKETTY: justiça, desigualdade e democracia de cidadãos proprietários

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 509
Author(s):  
Leandro Martins Zanitelli
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Recent Analysis ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Wealth Concentration ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Resumo: Ao tratar do tipo de regime institucional mais propenso à realização dos princípios da justiça como equidade, Rawls (2001) apresenta três argumentos sobre a superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários em relação ao capitalismo de bem-estar, um argumento sobre o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, outro sobre a equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e um terceiro acerca do princípio da diferença. Em uma crítica a esses argumentos, O’Neill (2012) conclui que apenas o último deles é convincente. Este trabalho procura demonstrar como a análise recente de Piketty (2014) sobre a tendência ao acirramento da desigualdade em sociedades com baixo crescimento dá fôlego aos argumentos de Rawls quanto à superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários no que se refere ao valor equitativo das liberdades políticas e à igualdade de oportunidades. O trabalho de Piketty também joga luz sobre a importância, no que concerne ao princípio da diferença, da distinção entre um regime que inclui políticas para prevenir a concentração da riqueza (a democracia de cidadãos proprietários) e outro preocupado exclusivamente com a desigualdade de renda (o capitalismo de bem-estar).Palavras-chave: Democracia de cidadãos proprietários, capitalismo de bem-estar, desigualdade, rawls, piketty.READING RAWLS AFTER PIKETTY: justice, inequality and property-owning democracyAbstract: When discussing the type of institutional regime most prone to realizing the principles of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001) presents three arguments about the superiority of a property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism, concerning, respectively, the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. In a critique of those arguments, O’Neill (2012) states that only the last one, the argument of the difference principle, is convincing. This paper, tries to demonstrate how Piketty’s (2014) recent analysis of the tendency of increasing inequality in low-growth societies offers support to Rawls’s arguments favoring property-owning democracy in matters regarding the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Piketty’s work also stresses the importance, in what refers to the difference principle, of distinguishing between a regime encompassing policies to prevent the wealth concentration (property-owning democracy) and another one whose exclusive concern is to reduce income inequality (welfare-state capitalism).Key words: Property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism, inequality, Rawls, Piketty.

A SATISFACTORY MINIMUM CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE: RECONSIDERING RAWLS'S MAXIMIN ARGUMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Minimum Level ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Marginal Value ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Maximin Rule ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is ‘irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’. It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position – employing the maximin rule – seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness.

The State’s Role in Ensuring Fair Income Distribution in Vietnam Today: Some Issues from the Theory of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020

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