The Moral Nexus

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Special Significance ◽  
Relational Approach ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Prior Relationship ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Moral Demands

This book develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. It argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

scholarly journals Trusting the Corona-Warn-App? Contemplations on trust and trustworthiness at the intersection of technology, politics and public debate

2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312110283
Author(s):  
Judith Simon ◽  
Gernot Rieder
Keyword(s):  
Technology Development ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Initial Development ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Debates ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Demands

Ever since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, questions of whom or what to trust have become paramount. This article examines the public debates surrounding the initial development of the German Corona-Warn-App in 2020 as a case study to analyse such questions at the intersection of trust and trustworthiness in technology development, design and oversight. Providing some insights into the nature and dynamics of trust and trustworthiness, we argue that (a) trust is only desirable and justified if placed well, that is, if directed at those being trustworthy; that (b) trust and trustworthiness come in degrees and have both epistemic and moral components; and that (c) such a normatively demanding understanding of trust excludes technologies as proper objects of trust and requires that trust is directed at socio-technical assemblages consisting of both humans and artefacts. We conclude with some lessons learned from our case study, highlighting the epistemic and moral demands for trustworthy technology development as well as for public debates about such technologies, which ultimately requires attributing epistemic and moral duties to all actors involved.

Discretionary Moral Duties

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties

The topic of Chapter 3 is the idea that there are discretionary moral duties, i.e., duties that cede to the agent who stands under them wide latitude in determining the actions that count as satisfying them. The chapter offers a general framework for thinking about moral obligations, which construes such obligations in essentially relational terms. It then draws on this conception of moral obligation to understand two classes of obligations that are intuitively understood to exhibit wide agential discretion: duties of gratitude and of mutual aid. It argues that the wide agential discretion apparent in these cases makes sense against the background of an understanding of morality as a set of directed obligations that we owe to each other, as individuals. A further important theme is the standing of morality as a source of requirements that make it possible for agents to relate to each other on a basis of autonomy and equality.

scholarly journals Guilt, Practical Identity, and Moral Staining

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-645
Author(s):  
Andrew Ingram
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
Moral Duties

AbstractThe guilt left by immoral actions is why moral duties are more pressing and serious than other reasons like prudential considerations. Religions talk of sin and karma; the secular still speak of spots or stains. I argue that a moral staining view of guilt is in fact the best model. It accounts for guilt's reflexive character and for anxious, scrupulous worries about whether one has transgressed. To understand moral staining, I borrow Christine Korsgaard's view that we construct our identities as agents through our actions. The contribution of immoral actions to self-constitution explains why moral obligations have priority and importance.

scholarly journals The Duty of the Patient to Cooperate

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Löschke
Keyword(s):  
Medical Ethics ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Patient Relationship ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Doctor Patient Relationship ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Normative Implications

AbstractIn discussing the normative implications of the doctor-patient relationship, medical ethics has mostly focused on the duties of doctors to their patients. This focus neglects an important normative dimension of the doctorpatient- relationship, namely the duties of patients to doctors. Only few authors have discussed the content and ground of the moral duties of patients, and each of these accounts are wanting in some way. This paper discusses patients’ duties and argues that patients have a relationship-dependent obligation to cooperate with the doctor, because doctors have a morally justified interest in fulfilling their moral role obligations as doctors, and by not cooperating, patients make it more difficult for doctors to fulfill their moral obligations. In some cases, failing to cooperate might even create an avoidable moral dilemma for the doctor.

scholarly journals Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léo Fitouchi ◽  
Jean-Baptiste André ◽  
Nicolas Baumard
Keyword(s):  
Large Body ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Emotional Processes ◽  
Moral Anger ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Adaptive Challenges ◽  
Psychological Evidence ◽  
Pathogen Avoidance

In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology. However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social and properly moral emotions. Here, we build on (i) evolutionary theories of morality as an adaptation for attracting others’ cooperative investments, and on (ii) specifications of the distinctive form and content of moral cognitive representations. On this basis, we argue that only indignation (“moral anger”) and guilt can be rigorously characterized as moral emotions, operating on distinctively moral representations. Indignation functions to reclaim benefits to which one is morally entitled, without exceeding the limits of justice. Guilt functions to motivate individuals to compensate their violations of moral contracts. By contrast, other proposed moral emotions (e.g. empathy, shame, disgust) appear only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges. Shame doesn’t track, by design, the respect of moral obligations, but rather social valuation, the two being not necessarily aligned. Empathy functions to motivate prosocial behavior between interdependent individuals, independently of, and sometimes even in contradiction with the prescriptions of moral intuitions. While disgust is often hypothesized to have acquired a moral role beyond its pathogen-avoidance function, we argue that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for this claim remain inconclusive for now.

Imperatives of Right

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-329
Author(s):  
Andrew Israelsen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Tension ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” and his broader moral philosophy is a fraught one, with some readers insisting that the two domains are mutually supporting parts of a cohesive practical philosophy and others arguing for their conceptual and legislative independence. In this paper I investigate the reasons for this disparity and argue that both main interpretive camps are mistaken, for Kant’s Rechtslehre can neither be reconciled to his moral philosophy nor stand on its own. I argue that this failure results from Kant’s confused attempt to define the sphere of right as one that functions independently of (yet analogously to) the moral domain through the construction of non-moral yet categorical imperatives. The result is a fundamental tension in Kant’s text that can only be solved through either collapsing juridical duties into broad moral duties or denying any categorical status to duties of right.

Self-efficacy and self-awareness: moral insights to increased leader effectiveness

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (9) ◽  
pp. 1163-1173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cam Caldwell ◽  
Linda A. Hayes
Keyword(s):  
Self Efficacy ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Leader Effectiveness ◽  
Individual Growth ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Ethical Leaders

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the relationships between self-efficacy and self-awareness and the moral obligations of leaders in understanding and developing these personal qualities. As leaders strive for excellence, self-efficacy and self-awareness can empower them to unlock their own potential and the potential of their organizations and those with whom they work. Design/methodology/approach The paper integrates research of self-efficacy and self-awareness as they pertain to ethical leadership and presents six propositions that increase leadership effectiveness, create value for the organization, and develop leaders considered my trusted by others. Findings The authors argue that greater understanding of self-efficacy and self-awareness is important for individual growth and can enable ethical leaders to empower themselves, their colleagues, and the organization in which they work. Research limitations/implications This research presents six propositions concerning self-efficacy and self-awareness and their influence on effective leadership that can be tested in future research. The ethically based nature of self-efficacy and self-awareness merits additional academic research and practitioner application. Practical implications This paper provides valuable insights to scholars and practitioners by proposing six propositions that will allow leaders to increase their effectiveness and add value to the organization. Social implications Ethical leaders add value by continuously improving themselves. Ethical leaders owe it to others and themselves to be more effective through a greater understanding of self-efficacy and self-awareness. Originality/value Self-efficacy and self-awareness are moral duties associated with the identities of leaders and important for leaders in understanding their own capabilities and identities. Greater knowledge of self-efficacy and self-awareness can enable ethical leaders to be more effective and create value.

Self-Love and Altruism

1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Conduct ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Moral Requirements

Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard moral obligations as authoritative practical considerations. But heeding these obligations appears sometimes to constrain the agent's pursuit of his own interests or aims. If we think of rationality in prudential terms–as what would promote the agent's own interests–we may wonder whether moral conduct is always rationally justifiable. Indeed, we do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons–that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others.

Moral Problems of Employing Foreign Workers

1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviva Geva
Keyword(s):  
Migrant Workers ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Foreign Workers ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Work Relations ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
The Government

Abstract:The employment of foreign workers is one of the most crucial problems today in the domain of work relations. Absorbing workers from abroad poses serious questions concerning the moral obligations of the employers as well as the government authorities in the migrant-receiving country. Unfortunately, the moral dilemmas of foreign labor have been largely neglected by business ethics researchers. This paper develops a conceptual framework based on the multinational corporation (MNC) ethical research to help examine the moral obligations of employers and states toward foreign workers, as opposed to citizens. The main argument is that domestic employers, who have the power to affect crucial aspects in the lives of migrant workers, incur obligations to these people and bear moral responsibility for their subsistence. As regards the host country in a universal social order based on the existence of nation-states, the employment of foreign workers poses a genuine ethical dilemma between two valid moral duties: the duty to improve the welfare of nationals and the duty to promote the interests of everyone, regardless of their nationality.

The Moral Theme in Political Division

Philosophy ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 35 (134) ◽  
pp. 234-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurel Kolnai
Keyword(s):  
Moral Relativism ◽  
Human Practice ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Moral Attitudes ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Moral Demands ◽  
Moral Convictions

In this paper, I am trying to show that antithetic political positions appear to imply different moral attitudes not only accidentally but essentially, yet in a peculiar, limited and ambiguous fashion; and that political relativism or pluralism is far from implying moral relativism or pluralism in a corresponding and co-extensive sense. In other words, the gist of my contention is that men may be agreed about the basic universal laws of morality and none the less (or, indeed, all the more significantly) differ in their response to various moral requirements and points of view as emerging in specified contexts of human practice. Political positions are not as such derived from moral demands, nor consequent upon moral errors; nor do they, as such, determine the moral convictions of those who hold them; but they tend to be associated with distinct kinds of dominant moral emphases rather than simply to respect or to disregard morality.

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