scholarly journals COGNITIVE SCIENCE DAN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT DALAM PEMROSESAN INFORMASI (INFORMATION PROCESSING) PADAANAK

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-230
Author(s):  
Ellen Prima

Cognitive science is a science which studies how human mental processes to influence one’s behavior. Principal major issue that needs to be known in the understanding of cognitive science and their development is related to how the initial state of cognitive science itself, the mind is adapted, the development process starting from the concrete to the abstract, the conceptual nature of the change, the difference between learning and development, format representation of the underlying changes in development, the role of implicit and explicit cognitions in the development, the role of the association and the rules in the development, the universal development, cognitive domain and how to influence the development of brain structure. There are three difference in the cognitive domain of the most common sense that domain as a module, as the domain of expertise, and domain as a model of mind. Ilmu kognitif adalah suatu pengetahuan yang mempelajari tentang bagaimana proses mental manusia dalam mempengaruhi perilaku seseorang. Pokok pembahasan utama yang perlu diketahui dalam memahami ilmu kognitif dan perkembangannya yaitu terkait dengan bagaimana keadaan awal dari ilmu kognitif itu sendiri, pikiran yang teradaptasi, proses perkembangan mulai dari hal yang kongkrit sampai dengan abstrak, sifat konseptual dalam perubahan, perbedaan antara belajar dan pengembangan, format representasi yang mendasari perubahan dalam perkembangan, peran kognisi implisit dan eksplisit dalam perkembangan, peran asosiasi dan aturan dalam perkembangan, perkembangan secara universal, domain kognitif dan bagaimana struktur otak mempengaruhi perkembangan. Ada tiga perbedaan domain kognitif dari indera yang paling umum yaitu domain sebagai modul, domain sebagai bidang keahlian, dan domain sebagai model pikiran.

Communicology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-52
Author(s):  
E. V. Koydan

The paper examines the historical connection of phonetics with general linguistics, and reveals why this area of linguistics did not develop neither consistently, nor simultaneously in the structure of philological sciences. Attention is paid to the modern media-text approach to such an area of phonetics as intonation; the latter, in turn, is viewed as part of communication theory. It is hypothesized that such an attitude to sound, to the phoneme, has already been considered among the Futurists, Dadaists, Lettrists, Budelyans and Oberiuts, who interpreted sounds as an unknowable phenomenon that is beyond the cognition of the mind. Here the place and the pragmatic role of modern science on current approaches to phonetics in communicology is determined, where intonation does not refer to either cognitive science or paralinguistics, but, at the same time, unites these two areas of practical speech production. It is hypothetically assumed that such approaches were realized by some representatives of trends and schools of the direction of modernism of the early twentieth century.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tony James Scott

<p>Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our lineage's history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes and culture.</p>


Author(s):  
Iris Berent

Do newborns think? Do they know that 3 is greater than 2? Do they prefer right to wrong? What about emotions? Do newborns recognize happiness or anger? If they do, then how are our inborn thoughts and feelings encoded in our bodies? Could they persist after we die? Going all the way back to ancient Greece, human nature and the mind–body link are the topics of age-old scholarly debates. But laypeople also have strong opinions about such matters. Most people believe, for example, that newborn babies don’t know the difference between right and wrong—such knowledge, they insist, can only be learned. For emotions, they presume the opposite—that our capacity to feel fear, for example, is both inborn and embodied. These beliefs are stories we tell ourselves about what we know and who we are. They reflect and influence our understanding of ourselves and others, and they guide every aspect of our lives. In a twist that could have come out of a Greek tragedy, Berent proposes that our errors are our fate. These mistakes emanate from the very principles that make our minds tick: Our blindness to human nature is rooted in human nature itself. An intellectual journey that draws on philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, and Berent’s own cutting-edge research, The Blind Storyteller grapples with a host of provocative questions, from why we are so infatuated with our brains to what happens when we die. The end result is a startling new perspective on our humanity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-28
Author(s):  
Peter Bertram

A problem is typically defined prior to an architectural process and the result is seen as a solution. The process as a whole is conceived as problem solving. However, the artistic element of the process is inseparable from constructing the problem. From the artistic point of view the solution is merely a derivative. Conventional understanding of artistic creation is sometimes coloured by the misconception that invention first and foremost takes place in the mind of the artist parallel or prior to the actual process. However, as far as the artistic element in an architectural process is concerned the problem cannot be abstracted from the specificity of the material, the drawings, models etc., which constitutes the project under development. The problem is an immanent relational field and invention is triggered by the difference between maker and architectural media. The aim of the paper is to portray the artistic practice as a learning process different from communication of knowledge. It proposes a kind of leaning not about improvement of skills and competences but rather concerned with the dynamics of a material field. It emphasises the role of technique and presents architectural media as the prime material field investigated by the process. The discussion uses examples of assignments and student projects developed under my supervision to demonstrate how a problem field is framed by the ordering of techniques.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tony James Scott

<p>Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our lineage's history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes and culture.</p>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Christian Trettenbrein

AbstractSynaptic plasticity is widely considered to be the neurobiological basis of learning and memory by neuroscientists and researchers in adjacent fields, though diverging opinions are increasingly being recognised. From the perspective of what we might call “classical cognitive science” it has always been understood that the mind/brain is to be considered a computational-representational system. Proponents of the information-processing approach to cognitive science have long been critical of connectionist or network approaches to (neuro-)cognitive architecture, pointing to the shortcomings of the associative psychology that underlies Hebbian learning as well as to the fact that synapses are practically unfit to implement symbols. Recent work on memory has been adding fuel to the fire and current findings in neuroscience now provide first tentative neurobiological evidence for the cognitive scientists’ doubts about the synapse as the (sole) locus of memory in the brain. This paper briefly considers the history and appeal of synaptic plasticity as a memory mechanism, followed by a summary of the cognitive scientists’ objections regarding these assertions. Next, a variety of tentative neuroscientific evidence that appears to substantiate questioning the idea of the synapse as the locus of memory is presented. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the role of synaptic plasticity in learning and memory is proposed.


Author(s):  
Bahare Ghasemi ◽  
Aligholi Rowshan

Given the growth and role of entrepreneurship today, it is becoming increasinglyimportant to understand how new entrepreneurial opportunities get developed. Discussions of the emergence of new entrepreneurial opportunities often include “eureka” moments, but our understanding of how new opportunities get brought forward is limited. We attribute the difference to a loosely defined quality that Kirzner called “entrepreneurial alertness”. Other market actors do not have the responsibility to create innovative market opportunities although they do have an obligation to consider such opportunities once they are available in the marketplace. Consequently, understanding the opportunity identification processrepresents one of the core intellectual questions for the domain of entrepreneurship. So the question of this paper is how are market environments represented and interpreted in the mind of the entrepreneur such that opportunity identification occurs? and what factors impress on it? To achieve this goal we distribute questionnaires between 115 M.A. students from Economics and Management college of University of Sistan & Baluchestan for the years2012 and 2013. Analysis was done by correlation test. Results showed that there is a significant relationship between market disequilibrium, accuracy vs. timeliness, schema complexity, counterfactual thinking, frame-breaking and sensitivity to profit potential and student’s entrepreneurial alertness; but the relationship between ignorance of new resource and excessive optimism or pessimism about resource and student’s entrepreneurial alertness was not significant.


Author(s):  
Rao Mikkilineni

Making computing machines mimic living organisms has captured the imagination of many since the dawn of digital computers. However, today’s artificial intelligence technologies fall short in replicating even the basic autopoietic and cognitive behaviors found in primitive biological systems. According Charles Darwin, the difference in mind between humans and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind. Autopoiesis refers to the behavior of a system that replicates itself and maintains its own identity and stability while facing fluctuations caused by external influences. Cognitive behaviors model the system’s state, sense internal and external changes, analyze, predict and take action to mitigate any risk to its functional fulfilment. How did intelligence evolve? what is the relationship between the mind and body? Answers to these questions should guide us to infuse autopoietic and cognitive behaviors into digital machines. In this paper we use recent advances in our understanding of general theory of information, and the role of structures in managing the transformations between information and knowledge to pave the path to infuse autopoietic and cognitive functions into digital computing and build a new class of intelligent machines going beyond the current state of the art.


Author(s):  
E.M. Waddell ◽  
J.N. Chapman ◽  
R.P. Ferrier

Dekkers and de Lang (1977) have discussed a practical method of realising differential phase contrast in a STEM. The method involves taking the difference signal from two semi-circular detectors placed symmetrically about the optic axis and subtending the same angle (2α) at the specimen as that of the cone of illumination. Such a system, or an obvious generalisation of it, namely a quadrant detector, has the characteristic of responding to the gradient of the phase of the specimen transmittance. In this paper we shall compare the performance of this type of system with that of a first moment detector (Waddell et al.1977).For a first moment detector the response function R(k) is of the form R(k) = ck where c is a constant, k is a position vector in the detector plane and the vector nature of R(k)indicates that two signals are produced. This type of system would produce an image signal given bywhere the specimen transmittance is given by a (r) exp (iϕ (r), r is a position vector in object space, ro the position of the probe, ⊛ represents a convolution integral and it has been assumed that we have a coherent probe, with a complex disturbance of the form b(r-ro) exp (iζ (r-ro)). Thus the image signal for a pure phase object imaged in a STEM using a first moment detector is b2 ⊛ ▽ø. Note that this puts no restrictions on the magnitude of the variation of the phase function, but does assume an infinite detector.


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